My Account Log in

1 option

How Hume and Kant reconstruct natural law : justifying strict objectivity without debating moral realism / Kenneth R. Westphal.

LIBRA B809.13 .W47 2016
Loading location information...

Available from offsite location This item is stored in our repository but can be checked out.

Log in to request item
Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Westphal, Kenneth R., author.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Hume, David, 1711-1776.
Hume, David.
Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804.
Kant, Immanuel.
Constructivism (Philosophy).
Physical Description:
xvi, 252 pages ; 23 cm
Edition:
First edition.
Place of Publication:
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.
Summary:
Kenneth R. Westphal presents an original interpretation of Hume's and Kant's moral philosophies, the differences between which are prominent in current philosophical accounts. Westphal argues that focussing on these differences, however, occludes a decisive, shared achievement: a distinctive constructivist method to identify basic moral principles and to justify their strict objectivity, without invoking moral realism nor moral anti-realism or irrealism. Their constructivism is based on Hume's key insight that 'though the laws of justice are artificial, they are not arbitrary'. Arbitrariness in basic moral principles is avoided by starting with fundamental problems of social coördination which concern outward behaviour and physiological needs; basic principles of justice are artificial because solving those problems does not require appeal to moral realism (nor to moral anti-realism). Instead, moral cognitivism is preserved by identifying sufficient justifying reasons, which can be addressed to all parties, for the minimum sufficient legitimate principles and institutions required to provide and protect basic forms of social coordination (including verbal behaviour). Hume first develops this kind of constructivism for basic property rights and for government. Kant greatly refines Hume's construction of justice within his 'metaphysical principles of justice', whilst preserving the core model of Hume's innovative constructivism. Hume's and Kant's constructivism avoids the conventionalist and relativist tendencies latent if not explicit in contemporary forms of moral constructivism. Book jacket.
Contents:
1 Reconstructing Moral Constructivism 1
2 Objectivity, the Euthyphro Question, and Reconstructing Natural Law 15
3 Hume's Construction of Justice 27
4 Hume's Proof of the Insufficiency of Moral Sentiments 39
5 Kant's Principles of Moral Constructivism 69
6 Natural Law Constructivism and Rational Justification 91
7 Constructivism, Contractarianism, and Basic Obligations 113
8 Kant's Justification of Rights to Usufruct 145
9 Conclusion: Reintegrating Justice into Morals 175.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references (pages 221-246) and indexes.
ISBN:
0198747055
9780198747055
OCLC:
951557657

The Penn Libraries is committed to describing library materials using current, accurate, and responsible language. If you discover outdated or inaccurate language, please fill out this feedback form to report it and suggest alternative language.

My Account

Shelf Request an item Bookmarks Fines and fees Settings

Guides

Using the Library Catalog Using Articles+ Library Account