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A new reading of Kant's theory of punishment / Robert R. Hoffman.

LIBRA B001 2015 .H7112
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Format:
Book
Manuscript
Thesis/Dissertation
Author/Creator:
Hoffman, Robert R., author.
Contributor:
Guyer, J. Paul, degree supervisor.
Freeman, Samuel, degree committee member.
Martin, Adrienne, degree committee member.
Larmore, Charles E., degree committee member.
Detlefsen, Karen, degree committee member.
University of Pennsylvania. Department of Philosophy, degree granting institution.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Penn dissertations--Philosophy.
Philosophy--Penn dissertations.
Local Subjects:
Penn dissertations--Philosophy.
Philosophy--Penn dissertations.
Physical Description:
vi, 284 leaves ; 29 cm
Production:
[Philadelphia, Pennsylvania] : University of Pennsylvania, 2015.
Summary:
There are deep, insurmountable difficulties with the traditional interpretation of Immanuel Kant's writings on the subject of punishment. Although it is undeniable that throughout his published writings on practical philosophy--and in particular in his Metaphysics of Morals--he consistently advocates for the view that punishment can only be justified as a direct response to an individual's act of wrongdoing, his status as one of the foremost theorists in the retributivist pantheon is philosophically untenable. In this dissertation, I articulate the ways in which Kant's explicit support for retributivism directly contradicts more foundational elements of his practical philosophy and argue instead that he has the resources to consistently construct a deterrent theory of punishment. In particular, I highlight Kant's division of duties and his conception of the state to demonstrate that the idea of a political community retributively responding to moral desert is wholly incompatible with Kantian principles. In order to overcome these obstacles, I develop a new approach to Kantian deterrence--which I call Kantian Protective Deterrence--that grounds the state's right to exercise coercive force against its citizens in what Kant understood to be its fundamental role of protecting each individual citizen from violations of her or his right to exercise external freedoms.
Notes:
Ph. D. University of Pennsylvania 2015.
Department: Philosophy.
Supervisor: Paul Guyer.
Includes bibliographical references.
OCLC:
951160721

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