Structure and the metaphysics of mind : how hylomorphism solves the mind-body problem / William Jaworski.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Jaworski, William, author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Hylomorphism.

Form (Philosophy).

Mind and body.

Philosophy of mind.

Physical Description:

ix, 361 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Summary:

Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind is the first book to show how hylomorphism can be used to solve mind-body problems-persistent problems understanding how thought, feeling, perception, and other mental phenomena lit into the physical world described by our best science. Hylomorphism claims that structure is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. Some individuals, paradigmatically living things, consist OF materials that are structured or organized in various ways. Those structures are responsible for individuals being the kinds of things they are, and having the kinds of powers or capacities they have. From a hylomorphic perspective, mind-body problems are byproducts of a world view that rejects structure. Hylomorphic structure carves out distinctive individuals from the otherwise undifferentiated sea of matter and energy described by our best physics, and it confers ON those individuals distinctive powers, including the powers to think, feel, and perceive. A worldview that rejects hylomorphic structure lacks a basic principle which distinguishes the parts of the physical universe that can think, feel, and perceive from those that can't, and without such a principle, the existence OF those powers in the physical world can start to look inexplicable and mysterious. But IF mental phenomena are structural phenomena, as hylomorphism claims, then they are uncontroversially part of the physical world, for on the hylomorphic view, structure is uncontroversially part OF the physical world. Hylomorphism thus provides an elegant way of solving mind-body problems. Book jacket.

Contents:

1 Structure in the World 8

1.1 The Hylomorphic Notion of Structure 8

1.2 Four Approaches to Structure 18

1.3 Structure Realism and Hylomorphism 23

2 Individuals, Properties, and Events 27

2.1 A Basic Substance-Attribute Ontology 27

2.2 The Eleatic Principle 29

2.3 An Argument against Abundant Properties 32

2.4 Arguments in Favor of Sparse Properties 35

2.5 Conclusion 37

3 Tropes 38

3.1 Tropes versus Universals 38

3.2 Arguments for Trope Theory 40

3.3 Objections to Trope Theory 45

3.4 Conclusion 52

4 The Identity Theory of Powers 53

4.1 One Property, Many Roles 53

4.2 Directedness and Mutual Manifestation 57

4.3 Identity Conditions for Powers 59

4.4 Nomological and Metaphysical Necessity 63

4.5 The Identification of Powers with Their Causal Bases 65

4.6 Identity Theoretic Solutions to Dispositionalist Problems 70

4.7 Objections to the Identity Theory of Powers 78

4.8 Conclusion 80

5 Competing Theories of Powers 81

5.1 Conditional Analyses 81

5.2 Categoricalist Theories: Quidditism plus Laws of Nature 82

5.3 Higher-Order Properties 87

5.4 Dualistic Theories 92

5.5 Conclusion 92

6 Structured Individuals and Their Parts 93

6.1 What Are Structures? 93

6.2 Van Inwagen on Composition and Lives 98

6.3 Hylomorphic Composition 104

6.4 Biofunctional Parts 114

6.5 Ackrill's Puzzle and the Thomistic Theory of Parts 117

6.6 Levels in the Natural World 123

6.7 Conclusion 128

7 The Problems of Composition 129

7.1 The Body-Minus Problem 129

7.2 The Problem of Too Many Thinkers 136

7.3 Atomless Gunk 141

7.4 The Denial 147

7.5 The Vagueness Argument 150

7.6 Conclusion 154

8 Structured Activities and Embodiment 155

8.1 Activity-Making Structures 155

8.2 Activity Composition 160

8.3 The Embodiment Thesis 162

8.4 Psychological Activities 170

8.5 The Mental-Physical Distinction 173

8.6 Conclusion 177

9 Hylomorphic Necessitation and Supervenience 178

9.1 Activity and Power Necessitation 178

9.2 Activity and Power Supervenience 183

9.3 Structo-Physical Necessitation and Supervenience 186

9.4 Conclusion 194

10 Explanation and Lower-Level Determination 196

10.1 Necessitation, Supervenience, and Explanation 196

10.2 Lower-Level Determination 199

10.3 Causal-Explanatory Pluralism 201

10.4 Lower-Level Explanations 205

10.5 Objections 208

10.6 Williams' Worry 213

10.7 Conclusion 216

11 Physicalism and Other Mind-Body Theories 218

11.1 General Definitions of Mind-Body Theories 218

11.2 The Definition of Physicalism 221

11.3 Reduction 227

11.4 Nonreductive Physicalism 231

11.5 Physicalism and Supervenience 237

11.6 Necessitation Physicalism and Abundant Properties 240

11.7 Conclusion 249

12 Williams' Worry: Is Hylomorphism Just a Form of Physicalism? 250

12.1 Why Hylomorphism Is Incompatible with Physicalism 250

12.2 Worry 1: Biological and Physical Structure 251

12.3 Worry 2: Exhaustive Physical Decomposition 251

12.4 Worries 3 and 4: Necessitation, Physicalism, and Reduction 253

12.5 Worry 5: Phenomenal Consciousness 254

12.6 Chalmers' Argument against Materialism 257

12.7 Strong Necessities 261

12.8 Conclusion 270

13 Hylomorphism and Mind-Body Problems 272

13.1 Problems with Emergentism: Emergence and Downward Causation 272

13.2 Hylomorphism and the Problem of Emergence 276

13.3 Hylomorphism and the Problem of Downward Causation 280

13.4 Objections to the Hylomorphic Solution 285

13.5 Worries 6 and 7: Epiphenomenalism 292

13.6 Hylomorphism and the Problem of Other Minds 294

13.7 Worry 8: Behaviorism, Dennett, and the Psychophysical Identity Theory 301

13.8 Worry 9; Multiple Realizability 307

13.9 Conclusion 311

14 Why Hylomorphism? 314

14.1 The Intuitive Appeal of Hylomorphism 314

14.2 Structure Realism versus the Alternatives 317

14.3 Hylomorphism versus Other Mind-Body Theories 322

14.4 Which Hylomorphism? 327

14.5 Conclusion 336.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 339-352) and index.

ISBN:

9780198749561

0198749562

OCLC:

947087465