Fixing reference / Imogen Dickie.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Dickie, Imogen, 1972- author.

Series:

Context and content

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Reference (Philosophy).

Philosophy of mind.

Language and languages--Philosophy.

Language and languages.

Physical Description:

x, 333 pages ; 24 cm.

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford, United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2015.

Summary:

Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles. The first connects aboutness and truth: a belief is about the object upon whose properties its truth or falsify depends. The second connects truth and justification: justification is truth conducive; in general and allowing exceptions, a subject whose beliefs are justified will be unlucky if they are not true, and not merely lucky if they arc. These principles-one connecting aboutness and truth; the other truth and justification-combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification: a body of beliefs is about the object upon which its associated means of justification converges; the object whose properties a subject justifying beliefs in this way will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely lucky to get right. The first part of the book proves a precise version of this principle. Its remaining chapters use the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them-perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions-do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness. The Context and Content series is a forum for outstanding original research at the intersection of philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science. The general editor is François Recanati (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris). Book jacket.

Contents:

1 Introduction 1

1.1 The Question and Basic Components of the Answer 1

1.2 Preliminaries 8

1.2.1 Language and thought 8

1.2.2 Naturalism vs non-naturalism 12

1.2.3 Justification 14

1.2.4 The status of examples 19

1.2.5 Explanatory ambitions 22

1.2.6 The notion of an ordinary object and the 'problem of the many' 27

2 In Which a Precise Version of the Connection Between Aboutness and Justification Is Derived From More Basic Principles 37

Introduction 37

2.1 Truth and Justification 38

2.2 From truth and Justification to Reference and Justification 47

2.3 The Objection from Potential Counterexamples 60

Appendix A Proof of the Uniqueness Lemma 65

Appendix B Not About Nothing 73

3 The Mind Has a Basic Need to Represent Things Outside Itself 79

Introduction 79

3.1 Anscombe's Distinction Between Practical and Speculative Knowledge 86

3.2 From Anscombian Practical Knowledge to Justification by Intention 91

3.3 The Need to Represent 99

3.4 The Need to Represent and the Normative Status of Direct Coordination 102

3.5 Reference, Justification, and Orders of Explanation 108

4 Perceptual Demonstratives 114

Introduction 114

4.1 An Empirical Component 115

4.2 Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing (I)-Structure 122

4.3 Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing (II)-Normativity 125

Interim Conclusion 130

4.4 Three Puzzles about Perceptual Demonstrative Aboutness-Fixing 131

4.4.1 First puzzle: Classification 131

4.4.2 Second puzzle: Comprehension 136

4.4.3 Third puzzle: Directness 138

4.5 The Problem of Empty Perceptual Demonstrative Thought 141

4.6 Perceptual Demonstrative Thought and the Nature of Perception 148

5 Proper Names 151

Introduction 151

5.1 Descriptivisms vs Causalisms: The Traditional Debate 152

5.2 Evans on Proper Names 160 Interim Conclusion 170

5.3 Proper Names in the Reference and Justification Framework 171

5.4 Varieties of Deference 185 Appendix A: Additional Intricacies 194 Appendix B: The Context-Dependence of Proper-Name-Based Aboutness 199

6 The Delicate Question of Reference by Description 212

Introduction 212

6.1 Russell 216

6.2 (Mere) Descriptive Thought vs Description-Based Thought (I)-Truth Conditions 219

6.3 (Mere) Descriptive Thought vs Description-Based Thought (II) -Justification 231

Conclusion 245

7 Descriptions and Singular Thought 247

Introduction 247

7.1 The Boundaries of Description-Based Singular Thought 248

7.2 Object Dependence 254

7.3 Comparison with Extant Proposals: Extended Acquaintance and Modified Semantic Instrumentalism 264

7.3.1 Extended acquaintance 265

7.3.2 Modified semantic instrumentalism 269

8 Thought and Consciousness 273

Introduction 273

8.1 Naturalism in the Reference and Justification Framework 279

8.2 Putting Consciousness Back In 284

8.3 What Is Missing If Consciousness Is Missing (I)-The Role of Motivational Phenomenology 293

Interim Conclusion 302

8.4 What Is Missing If Consciousness Is Missing (II)-Thought Without Perceptual Awareness? 303

8.4.1 The question of role 306

8.4.2 The question of essence 311.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9780198755616

0198755619

OCLC:

920844352