A primer on auction design, management, and strategy / David J. Salant.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Salant, David J., author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Auctions.

Game theory.

Physical Description:

xiv, 184 pages ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England : The MIT Press, [2014]

Contents:

1 Introduction 1

1.1 Goals of This Primer 1

1.2 What Are Auctions? 4

1.2.1 Why Auctions? 5

1.2.2 Types of Auctions 6

1.3 A New Age of Auctions 8

1.3.1 New Types of Auctions 9

1.3.2 Auctions Replacing Regulation 10

1.3.3 Auctions in the Private Sector 12

1.4 Why Auction Design (and Management) Matters 13

1.5 Outline of This Primer 15

2 Game Theory, Auction Design, and Strategy 17

2.1 Game Theory and Auctions 17

2.2 Noncooperative Games 18

2.2.1 One-Shot Auctions 18

2.2.2 Normal Form Games 18

2.2.3 Equilibrium in Normal Form Games 20

2.2.4 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in Spectrum Auctions: Some Examples 21

2.2.5 Equilibrium in Multi-Attribute Auctions 22

2.3 Multi-Stage and Sequential Auctions 23

2.3.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium 23

2.3.2 Signaling Games 24

2.4 Repeated Games 25

2.4.1 Finitely Repeated Games 26

2.4.2 Infinitely Repeated Games 27

2.4.3 Overlapping Generations of Flayers 27

2.5 Summary 28

3 Revenue Equivalence 29

3.1 Four Basic Auction Types for Single-Object Auctions 29

3.2 Auction Strategy in the Four Basic Auction Types 31

3.3 Strategic Equivalence 32

3.4 Revenue Equivalence of English and Dutch Auctions 34

3.5 Summary 37

4 Optimal and VCG Auctions 41

4.1 Optimal Auctions 41

4.2 Calculating Optimal Bid Functions 42

4.3 Optimal Auctions 43

4.3.1 The Revelation Principle 43

4.3.2 The Revelation Principle and Optimal Auctions 44

4.4 Incentive-Compatible Auctions 47

4.4.1 The Vickrey-Clark-Groves Mechanism 47

4.4.2 Properties of VCG Auctions 48

4.4.3 Multi-Object VCG Auctions 50

4.4.4 VCG-like Mechanisms for Advertising Auctions 52

4.5 Summary 53

5 Imperfect Information and the Winner's Curse 55

5.1 Common Values and Order Statistics 55

5.2 Bidding Strategy in Common-Value Auctions 57

5.2.1 Bid Strategy in Dutch and First-Price Auctions 57

5.2.2 Bid Strategy in a Second-Price Auction 58

5.2.3 Bid Strategy in English Auctions 58

5.2.4 Comparisons of English, Second-Price, and Dutch Common-Value Auction Outcomes 60

5.3 Almost Common-Value Auctions and Informational Asymmetries 61

5.3.1 Auctions with One Informed Bidder 62

5.3.2 Auctions with Both Informed and Uninformed Bidders 63

5.3.3 Other Asymmetries 63

5.4 Summary 64

6 Sequential Auctions of Substitutes 67

6.1 Multi-Lot Auctions 67

6.2 The Declining-Price Anomaly 68

6.3 Weber's Martingale Theorem 70

6.4 Strategic Allocation Decisions 72

6.4.1 A Simple Two-Auction Example 73

6.4.2 Optimizing the Distribution of Auction Target Volume across Auctions 77

6.4.3 Sequential Auctions and Risk 80

6.4.4 Auction Timing 81

6.5 A Summary of Auction Timing Considerations 82

7 Sequential Auctions of Complements 85

7.1 Examples of Complementarities 85

7.2 Renewal Auctions 87

7.3 Sequential Auctions of Complements 90

7.4 Sequential Intellectual Property Rights Auctions 92

7.5 Auctions for Complementary Inputs with Imperfect Competition in Downstream Markets 95

7.6 Summary 96

8 Single-Product Auctions 99

8.1 Introduction 99

8.2 Simultaneous versus Sequential Auctions 101

8.3 Clock Auctions 102

8.3.1 Clock Auctions and Sealed-Bid Auctions 103

8.3.2 Clock Auctions, Sealed-Bid Auctions, and Market Power 104

8.4 Supply-Function Auctions 105

8.5 Conclusions and Applications 108

9 Simultaneuous Auctions 111

9.1 The SMR Auction 111

9.2 Introduction to the SMR Auction 112

9.2.1 A Brief History of the SMR and Clock Auctions 112

9.2.2 SMR Auction and Its Variants 113

9.3 SMR Auction Properties 115

9.3.1 Straightforward Bidding in SMR Auctions 115

9.3.2 Strategic Withholding in SMR Auctions 117

9.4 SMR Auction Experience 119

9.5 SMR Auction Configuration 124

9.5.1 The Texas Capacity Auctions 124

9.5.2 The Spanish 4G Auction (2011) 125

9.5.3 The Mexican PCS Auction 127

9.5.4 US FCC Auction 66-Advanced Wireless Services 127

9.5.5 Arbitrage in SMR Auctions 130

9.6 Conclusion 133

11.4 Single-Object versus Multi-Object Auctions 159

11.5 Sequential Auctions 159

11.6 Bidding Behavior 160

11.7 Optimal Auctions 161

11.8 Auction Design, Management, and Strategy 161

11.9 Participation 161

11.10 Auctions and Markets 162

Notes 163

References 173

Index 179

10 Combinational Actions 135

10.1 Introduction 135

10.2 Hierarchical Package Bidding 138

10.3 VCG Auction Properties 139

10.3.1 Revenues in VCG Auctions 140

10.3.2 Fairness in VCG Auctions 141

10.3.3 Budgets in VCG Auctions 142

10.4 Core-Selecting Auctions 143

10.5 Ascending Package Auctions and the Combinatorial Clock Auction 145

10.5.1 Complexity 147

10.5.2 Bidder incentives 148

10.6 Comparing the Performance of the CCA and Other Auctions 150

10.7 The Austrian CCA 151

10.8 Conclusion 154

11 Final Remarks 157

11.1 Introduction 157

11.2 Game Theory and Bidder Incentives 157

11.3 Bidder Incentives and Revenue Equivalence 158

References 173.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9780262028264

0262028263

OCLC:

878501844