Modality and explanatory reasoning / Boris Kment.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Kment, Boris Christian, 1975- author.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Modality (Theory of knowledge).

Reasoning.

Physical Description:

xii, 362 pages ; 25 cm

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2014.

Summary:

Since the ground-breaking work of Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and others in the 1960s and 70s, one dominant interest of analytic philosophers has been in modal truths, which concern the question of what is possible and what is necessary. However, there is considerable controversy over the source and nature of necessity. In Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Boris Kment takes a novel approach to the study of modality that places special emphasis on understanding the origin of modal notions in everyday thought. Kment argues that the concepts of necessity and possibility originate in a common type of thought experiment-counterfactual reasoning-that allows us to investigate explanatory connections. This procedure is closely related to the controlled experiments of empirical science. Necessity, is defined in terms of causation and other forms of explanation such as grounding, a relation that connects metaphysically fundamental facts to non-fundamental ones. Therefore, contrary to a widespread view, explanation is more fundamental than modality. The study of modal facts is important for philosophy, not because these facts are of much metaphysical interest in their own right, but because they provide evidence about explanatory relationships. In the course of developing this position, the book offers new accounts of possible and impossible worlds, counterfactual conditionals, essential truths and their role in grounding, and a novel theory of how counterfactuals relate to causation and explanation. Book jacket.

Contents:

1 Synopsis 1

1.1 The Nature of Modality 2

1.2 Modality and Explanation 5

1.2.1 Explanation 5

1.2.2 The Direction of Analysis 6

3.2.3 Closeness to Actuality 8

1.3 The Function of Modal Thought 10

1.4 Modality in Metaphysics 14

1.5 The Question of Reduction 15

1.6 A Guide for Selective Readers 18

2 The Nature of Modality 20

2.1 Necessity as Invariability 21

2.1.1 The Problem of the Narrow Circle 21

2.1.2 Truth in a Situation 22

2.1.3 Ramseyfying out of the Circle 26

2.2 Necessity as Unconditional Truth 27

2.3 Necessity as Secure Truth 28

2.4 The Necessity Scale 30

2.5 Modal Holism 34

2.6 Comparisons 37

2.6.1 Modality and the Space of Worlds 37

2.6.2 Modal Monism and Modal Dualism 38

2.7 An Agenda for the Analysis of Modality 43

Appendix A 46

Appendix B 51

3 Absolute Necessity and Iterated Modality 54

3.1 Context Dependence and the Absolute Nature of Necessity 54

3.1.1 Absolute Terms 54

3.1.2 Context Invariance and the Quest for Precision 59

3.1.3 Other Domain Restrictions 60

3.2 Worlds and Possibility 61

3.3 Modal Operators and Iterated Modality 63

3.3.1 Modal Operators 63

3.3.2 The Tetradic Relation of Comparative Closeness 65

3.3.3 The Modal Status of Modal Truths 67

4 On the Contingency of Worlds 71

4.1 Worlds as Stories 72

4.2 Propositions 74

4.3 Logic 77

4.4 Three Principles about Worlds 83

4.5 The Individuation of Worlds 85

4.5.1 Actualization Conditions and Existential Dependence 85

4.5.2 The Identity of Worlds across Possible Worlds 88

4.5.3 The Existence Conditions of Worlds 93

4.6 An Account of Worlds 99

4.6.1 Defining Worlds and Truth at a World 99

4.6.2 Truth in a World and Truth at a World 102

4.7 On the Fragility of All Worldly Matters 104

4.8 Contingently Existing Worlds and Iterated Modality 108

Appendix 110

5 A Theory of Worlds 113

5.1 Extensions of the Lagadonian Language 114

5.1.1 Introduction: Sets and Proper Classes 114

5.1.2 Compounds of Proper-Class-Many Propositions 115

5.1.3 Singular Propositions about Proper Classes 119

5.2 Redefining Worlds and Truth at a World 121

5.2.1 The Maximality of Worlds 121

5.2.2 The Plenitude of the Space of Worlds 126

5.2.3 The Identity and Existence Conditions of Worlds 128

5.2.4 A New Definition of Worlds and of Truth at a World 131

5.3 Implications for the Theory of Modality 133

Appendix A 134

Appendix B 137

Appendix C 140

6 Essence, Laws, and Explanation 146

6.1 Essential Truths 147

6.1.1 Identity Conditions and Instantiation Conditions 147

6.1.2 A Selective Survey of Essentialist Idioms 152

6.1.3 Definition, Reduction, and Fundamentality 158

6.2 Essence and Explanation 159

6.2.1 Data 159

6.2.2 Essence, Laws, and Metaphysical Explanation 161

6.2.3 The Covering-Law Conception of Grounding 167

6.3 Essence and Fundamentality 173

6.3.1 Essentiality is Indefinable 173

6.3.2 Fundamental Essence Facts 175

6.4 Explanatory Asymmetries 180

7 Metaphysical and Nomic Necessity 183

7.1 Defining Metaphysical and Nomic Necessity 183

7.2 Explaining the Modal Facts 189

7.3 An Alleged Example of Contingent Essence 192

7.4 A Simpler Account? 197

8 The Standards of Closeness 199

8.1 Preliminary Survey of Data 199

8.2 David Lewis's Account 202

8.3 The Causal Criterion of Relevance 205

8.4 The Explanatory Criterion of Relevance 209

8.5 The Laws of Nature and Pre-antecedent Match 213

8.6 Facts about the Natural Laws 217

8.7 The Standards of Similarity 218

8.8 The Account in Action 221

9 Clarifications, Additions, and Objections 224

9.1 Spelling Out the Explanatory Criterion of Relevance 224

9.1.1 Fact Talk 224

9.1.2 Producers, Omissions, and Preventers 225

9.1.3 Omissions 227

9.1.4 Explanation and Context Dependence 228

9.1.5 Relevant Similarities and Holding Fixed 229

9.2 Closeness-Relevant Dissimilarities 231

9.2.1 Completing the Account of Closeness 231

9.2.2 Defining Departures 236

9.3 Objections 239

9.3.1 Counterfactual Chance Raising 239

9.3.2 Antecedents that Contradict my Account 241

9.3.3 A Problem Case 241

10 Causation, Nomic Determination, and the Counterfactual Test 243

10.1 Causal and Counterfactual Thought 244

10.2 Causal Discourse without Causal Relata 245

10.3 Causation and Counterfactual Dependence 247

10.3.1 The Deterministic Problem Cases 247

10.3.2 Additional Problems under Indeterminism 249

10.4 The Determination Idea 250

10.4.1 The Determination Idea Spelled Out 251

10.4.2 An Objection to the Determination Idea 256

10.5 The Method of Difference 258

10.6 The Counterfactual Test 262

10.6.1 The Workings of the Counterfactual Test 262

10.6.2 The Epistemic Requirements of the Counterfactual Test 264

10.6.3 The Function of Counterfactual Reasoning 266

10.7 The Utility of the Method of Difference and the Counterfactual Test 270

11 On the Genealogy of Modality 272

11.1 The Closeness Ordering 273

11.1.1 Reducing the Epistemic Preconditions of the Counterfactual Test 273

11.1.2 Preliminaries 275

11.1.3 Comparative Closeness to Actuality 276

11.1.4 Generalizing the Counterfactual Test 283

11.2 The Explanatory Criterion of Relevance 288

11.2.1 An Informal Exposition 288

11.2.2 A Formal Treatment 291

11.3 Weighing Relevant Similarities 294

11.3.1 Counterfactual Reasoning about Matters of Particular Fact 295

11.3.2 Counterfactual Reasoning about the Natural Laws 300

11.3.3 A System of Spheres 302

11.3.4 Metaphysical Laws Revisited 304

11.3.5 How to Weight Similarities 306

11.4 The Notion of Counterfactual Dependence 307

11.5 The Epistemic Preconditions of the Counterfactual Test (Revisited) 309

11.6 The Notions of Possibility and Necessity 312

Appendix: The Rationale for the Explanatory Criterion of Relevance 314

12 Extensions and Limitations of the Counterfactual Test 318

12.1 The Limits of the Counterfactual Test 318

12.2 The Versatility of the Counterfactual Test 322

12.3 The Counterfactual Test under Indeterminism 326

12.3.1 Testing Claims about the Causes of Chances 326

12.3.2 Avoiding Departures 329

12.4 The Counterfactual Test without the Transitivity Assumption 334.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9780199604685

0199604681

OCLC:

893914216