The possibility of Inquiry : Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus / Gail Fine.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Fine, Gail.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Plato. Meno.

Plato.

Inquiry (Theory of knowledge).

Philosophy, Ancient.

Physical Description:

xiv, 399 pages ; 24 cm

Edition:

First edition.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2014.

Summary:

Gail Fine examines a compelling puzzle in ancient philosophy, one that not only attracted the attention of many of the major philosophers of antiquity but is also of contemporary concern. We tend to take the possibility of inquiry for granted, though we less often try to say what inquiry is and what makes it possible. But Meno's Paradox, which is first formulated in Plato's Meno, challenges the very possibility of inquiry. Hence, contrary to Meno's Paradox, inquiry is possible after all. To explain how it is possible, Plato, among other things, introduces the theory of recollection, according to which we all had prenatal knowledge, and what we call inquiry involves recollecting what we previously knew. Plato is not the only philosopher to grapple with Meno's Paradox: so too do Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, and Sextus Empiricus. Fine compares and evaluates all these replies to the Paradox, placing them within the broader context of the epistemologies of these various philosophers. In doing so, she draws on a fascinating fragment by Plutarch (preserved in Damascius' Commentary on the Phaedo). She also considers such fundamental questions in ancient epistemology as the nature of knowledge and justification; the difference between knowledge and true belief; varienties of innatism; concepts and meaning; and the scope and limits of experience. Fine's book is the first full-length systematic discussion of Meno's Paradox and replies to it. The Possibility of Inquiry will be of interest to anyone interested in ancient philosophy or epistemology. Book jacket.

Contents:

1 Introduction 1

1 Overview 1

2 What is inquiry? 4

3 Meno's Paradox and the possible of inquiry 7

4 Plutarch's account 9

5 Plato's reply to Meno's Paradox 10

6 Foreknowledge: stepping-stone and matching versions 12

7 Propositional and objectual inquiry 14

8 Foreknowledge: cognitive level 16

9 Foreknowlege: content 19

10 When must one know or cognize? 20

11 Skeptical inquiry 23

12 Conclusion 24

Appendix: Meno's Paradox: what's in a name? 25

Part 1 Plato's Meno

2 The Origins of Problem 31

1 The priority of knowledge what 31

2 Knowing what x is and knowing what x is like 35

3 The scope of the priority and knowledge what 38

4 The oneness assumption 42

5 The first definition of shape and the first statement of the Dialectical Requirement 45

6 The Dialectical Requirement and knowledge 50

7 The Dialectical Requirement and further definitions 53

8 Definitions and circularity 57

9 The second statement of the Dialectical Requirement 61

10 The problem of discovery 64

11 Conclusion 67

3 Meno's Questions and Socrates' Dilemma 69

1 The torpedo fish 69

2 Meno's first two question 74

3 Meno's argument 78

4 Meno's argument 81

5 Meno's mistake 82

6 Socrates' dilemma 83

7 The structure of Socrates' dilemma 87

8 Three clues 91

9 Socrates' support for S2 and S3 93

10 Ryle on the ambiguity of 'know what one is inquirity into' 94

11 Charles on signification and Meno's Paradox 99

12 Conclusion 103

4 Socrates' Three-State Reply: The First and Second State 105

1 Socrates' three-stage reply 105

2 The first stage: the initial statement of the theory of recollection 106

3 Teaching, learning, and recollection 114

4 The second stage the geometrical discussion 119

5 How has Socrates replied? 124

6 How has Socrates replied? 128

7 Conclusion 134

5 The Third Stage: The Second Statement of the Theory of Recollection 137

1 Preliminaries 137

2 Varieties of innatism 140

3 Plato's argument for the immortality of the soul, and steps 1-2 147

4 Steps 3-6 152

5 Steps 7-10 155

6 Innate true belief? 160

7 Step 11 162

8 Summary of the argument 164

9 Why posit prenatal but not innate knowledge 165

10 The problem of discovery and the theory of recollection 168

11 Evidence of outside the Meno: two passages 171

12 Conclusion 175

Part II Aristotle and After

6 Aristotelian Inquirty 179

1 Introduction 179

2 The implicit and explicit replies 179

3 Teaching, intellectual learning, and inquiry 182

4 APo. 71a2-11 and Plato's conditions on inquiry 183

5 What is intellectual learning? 185

6 Prior gnosis 187

7 Prior cognition 190

8 Two types of prior cognition 191

9 Plato and Aristotle on prior cognition 195

10 A particular case 197

11 Analysis of the case 200

12 The aporema of the Memo 203

13 Aristotle's reply 206

14 Must one know that which one is learning? 208

15 A rival solution 211

16 Prior Analytics 2.21 212

17 Posterior Analytics 2.19 215

18 Sleeping geometers and writing tables 221

7 Epicurean Inqruty 226

1 Introduction 226

2 Prolepses: introduction 228

3 Prolepses and belief 231

4 Prolepses and apprehension 233

5 The range of prolepses 235

6 The contents of prolepses 235

7 Prolepses and meaning 237

8 Prolepses and innatism 241

9 Three types of inquiry 245

10 Prolepses and inquiry 250

11 conclusion 255

8 Stoic Inquiry 257

1 Introduction 257

2 Aetius' accouin 257

3 Prolepses 258

4 The range of prolepses 260

5 Prolepses, outline accounts, and definition 267

6 Prolepses and meaning 272

7 Innatism 275

8 Innatism and the early Stoics 277

9 Epictetus and innatism 283

10 Prolepses and inquiry 286

11 Possible criticisms 291

12 Conclusion 296

9 Plutarch's Accouint 299

1 Introduction 299

2 Plutarch's account of Aristotle 301

3 Plutarch's account of Aristole 308

4 Plutarch's account of the Stoics 312

5 Plutarch's account of Epicurus 315

6 Conclusion 318

10 Skeptical Inquiry 1: Sextus and the Stoics 320

1 Introduction 320

2 Skeptics and Dogmatists 320

3 The Stoics' challenge to the possibility of Skeptical inquiry 322

4 Evaluation of the Stoics' argument 326

5 The some Belief View and the No Belief View 329

6 Sextus' reply: two types of apprehension 331

7 Sextus' reply: a third type of apprehension 333

8 Thinking, concepts, and nondoxastic appearances 336

9 Thinking, understanding, and inquiry 339

10 Sextus' challenge to Dogmatic inquiry 343

11 Skeptical Inquiry 2: Sextus and the Epicurens 345

1 Proof 345

2 A challenge to the possibility of inquiry about proof 345

3 An Epicurean challenge to Skeptical inquiry 350

4 Concepts and prolepses 353

5 Concepts as apprehension 356

6 An Epicuren reply 357

7 Concepts as bare motions of thought 358

8 Skepticism and concepts 360

9 Is Sextus inconsistent? 364

10 Skeptical and Dogmatic inquiry: a compromise 367.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9780199577392

0199577390

OCLC:

861675326