Hidden ownership, monitoring, and the value of the firm.

Format:

Book

Thesis/Dissertation

Author/Creator:

Shashua, Roy.

Contributor:

Edmans, Alex, committee member.

Yilmaz, Bilge, 1968- committee member.

Goldstein, Itay, committee member.

Yilmaz, Bilge, 1968- advisor.

Goldstein, Itay, advisor.

University of Pennsylvania. Finance.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Finance.

0508.

Penn dissertations--Finance.

Finance--Penn dissertations.

Local Subjects:

Penn dissertations--Finance.

Finance--Penn dissertations.

0508.

Physical Description:

55 pages

Contained In:

Dissertation Abstracts International 74-12A(E).

System Details:

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

text file

Summary:

This paper analyzes the effect of market transparency on firm value and social surplus.

I investigate the incentives of large investors to publicly disclose their economic interests, as well as to monitor management. I find that when markets are sufficiently liquid, large investors will tend to forgo share ownership in favor of "hidden ownership"---alternative forms of economic exposure not subject to disclosure regulations. The resulting uncertainty regarding the extent of investor exposure to firm performance can better align management's incentives with shareholder interests, thereby increasing firm value and social surplus, even when management displays risk neutral preferences. A transparent market may therefore become a liability from both the shareholder and social planner perspectives.

Notes:

Thesis (Ph.D. in Finance) -- University of Pennsylvania, 2013.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-12(E), Section: A.

Advisers: Itay Goldstein; Bilge Yilmaz.

Local Notes:

School code: 0175.

ISBN:

9781303348563

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.