The self in question : memory, the body and self-consciousness / Andy Hamilton, University of Durham, UK.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hamilton, Andy, 1957-

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Self (Philosophy).

Self-consciousness (Awareness).

Identity (Psychology).

Identity (Philosophical concept).

Memory.

Proprioception.

Physical Description:

xii, 249 pages ; 23 cm

Place of Publication:

Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Summary:

The Self in Question offers a humanistic account of self-consciousness and personal identity, providing a much-needed rapprochement between Analytic and Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. In Analytic philosophy, a resurgence of interest in the topic of self-consciousness has been inspired by the work of Gareth Evans. Both Evans and his successors make the plausible assumption that self-consciousness is a capacity manifested in the use of "I", or through behaviour which must be described in terms of "I". The Self in Question develops this assumption through an analysis of Wittgenstein's insights into 'I'-as-subject and self-identification, relating them - as their author did not - to the epistemology of memory and bodily awareness. As a result, it is able to discern the truth in the apparently discredited memory criterion of personal identity. It also draws on Husserl's and Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the body's significance for self-consciousness, to offer a critique of materialism about the body. Book jacket.

Contents:

1 Self-Consciousness and Its Linguistic Expression 10

1.1 A two-part elucidation of self-consciousness: self-reference and the grounds of self-knowledge 12

1.2 Self-consciousness and conceptual holisms 14

1.3 Ability holism and the circularity of the self-reference rule 22

1.4 Self-conscious self-reference and indexicality: the name-user scenario 25

1.5 Implications of the name-user scenario 30

2 Memory and Self-Consciousness (1): Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Critique of Quasi-Memory 36

2.1 The epistemology of self-consciousness: "I"-as-subject and autobiographical memory 37

2.2 Memory-based immunity to error and the nature of personal memory 42

2.3 Justification of the immunity and its significance for self-consciousness 51

2.4 Objections to the immunity: from misremembering 54

2.5 Objections to the immunity: from q-memory 60

2.6 Rejecting q-memory: concepts of information 64

2.7 Rejecting a more conservative presentation of q-memory 71

3 Memory and Self-Consciousness (2): The Conceptual Holism of Memory and Personal Identity, and the Unity of Consciousness 75

3.1 The objection that the immunity to error is artefactual 76

3.2 Future-tense immunity to error 79

3.3 The objection that the error is artefactual - continued 81

3.4 IEM, personal identity, and conceptual holisms 83

3.5 The circularity objection, no-priority explanation, and the holism of memory and personal identity 85

3.6 The unity of consciousness versus the unitary self: Kantian origins of the dialectic 92

Appendix: De Gaynesford's critique of IEM as a merely pragmatic phenomenon 101

4 Proprioception and Self-Consciousness (1): Proprioception as Direct, Immediate Knowledge of the Body 105

4.1 The Phenomenological challenge to materialism about the body 108

4.2 Proprioception as direct, non-inferential knowledge: rejecting the image theory 112

4.3 Proprioception as direct, immediate knowledge: rejecting the perceptual model 115

4.4 Gibsonian and other considerations against the perceptual model 121

4.5 Proprioception and agency 127

4.6 IEM and q-proprioception 129

5 Proprioception and Self-Consciousness (2): Self-Conscious Knowledge and the Rejection of Self-Presentation 136

5.1 Self-conscious knowledge versus materialism concerning bodily identity 137

5.2 Rejecting materialism concerning bodily identity and limb-ownership 142

5.3 Self-presentation versus elusiveness 147

5.4 Descartes is not committed to self-presentation 149

5.5 The contrast argument against self-presentation 152

5.6 "I know that I have a body" and Anscombian doubt 160

5.7 The Body-body problem 164

5.8 The unity of consciousness versus the unitary self 167

6 Self-Identification and Self-Reference 172

6.1 Guaranteed reference and IEM 173

6.2 Limited defence of indirect reference as not associated with observational model 174

6.3 A deflationary account replaces direct and indirect reference 177

6.4 Deflationary account developed: discrimination and non-discrimination requirements 185

6.5 Deflationary account concluded: self-location 188

6.6 Two senses of "identification" and the no-reference view of "I" 194

7 Humanism and Animal Self-Consciousness 199

7.1 Philosophical humanism in the philosophy of mind 200

7.2 Philosophical humanism and the humanities 207

7.3 The mirror test as illustration of proto-self-consciousness in non-language-users 214

7.4 Deflationary objection to the mirror test as illustrating primitive self-consciousness 218

7.5 Inflationary objection to the mirror test as illustrating primitive self-consciousness 224.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9781137290403

1137290404

OCLC:

855858186