Rigid designation and theoretical identities / by Joseph LaPorte.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

LaPorte, Joseph.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Reference (Philosophy).

Identity (Philosophical concept).

Physical Description:

xiii, 245 pages ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013.

Summary:

Joseph LaPorte offers a new account of the connections between the reference of words for properties and kinds, and theoretical identity statements. Some terms for concrete objects, such as 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', are rigid, and the rigidity of these terms is important because it helps to determine whether certain statements containing them, including identity statements like 'Hesperus = Phosphorus', are necessary or contingent. These observations command broad agreement. But there has been much less agreement about whether and how designators for properties are rigid: terms like 'white', 'brontosaur', 'beautiful', 'heat', 'H

Contents:

1 Rigid Designators for Concrete Objects and for Properties 1

1 A Basic Characterization of Rigid Designators and Their Interest 2

1.1 Names, Ordinary Descriptions, and Identity Statements 2

1.2 Standard Clarifications from Kripke 3

1.3 Clarifications on Rigidity's Relationship to the Necessary A Posteriori 4

2 On the Significance of Rigidity for Identity Statements about Properties 7

2.1 Identity Statements with Just Names for Properties 8

2.2 Theoretical Identity Statements About Properties 9

3 Complications and Elaboration 11

3.1 What Stays the Same in the Rigid Designation of Properties? 11

3.2 The Agenda of Chapters to Come 13

2 On the Coherence of the Distinction 22

1 The Problem of Artificial-Property Designators 22

2 The Problem of Shadowing 25

2.1 A Parallel for Concrete-Object Designators 27

2.2 Responses to the Problem 28

2.2.1 Without Shadowing Candidates 29

2.2.2 The Irrelevance of Shadowing Candidates 32

2.2.2.1 Beyond Shadowing: a General Problem with a General Remedy 32

2.2.2.2 Context at Work to Relieve the Shadowing Problem 34

2.2.2.2.1 Context at Work for Shadow-Attended Property Designators 34

2.2.2.2.2 Context at Work for Shadow-Attended Concrete-Object Designators 35

3 A Confusion Between Rigidity and Meaning Constancy? 36

4 Conclusion 37

3 On Whether the Distinction Assigns to Rigidity the Right Role 42

1 Rigidity's Duty of Securing the Necessity that Characterizes Identity Statements Featuring Rigid Designators 42

2 Other Duties Attributed to Rigidity 46

2.1 Work Securing Essential-Property Attributions 46

2.2 Work Securing Externalism 49

2.3 Work Securing Aposteriority 51

2.4 Work Refuting Descriptivism 51

2.4.1 Are 'Bachelor' and 'Soda' Descriptive? 53

2.4.2 Why Refuting Descriptivism is Not What is Most Important About Rigidity 55

2.5 Work Securing Linguistic Stability 57

3 Conclusion 57

4 A Uniform Treatment of Property Designators as Singular Terms 64

1 Descriptions as Singular Terms 65

2 Avoiding Millian Dualism 68

2.1 Accommodating English Grammar: Uniform vs. Nonuniform Accounts 69

2.2 Patterns of Reasoning Formalized: Uniform vs. Nonuniform Accounts 71

2.2.1 A Millian Treatment of the Rigid - Nonrigid Distinction for Singular Property Designators 72

2.2.2 Uniformly Singular Treatments of the Rigid - Nonrigid Distinction for Property Designators 74

2.2.2.1 A Basic Second-Order Treatment 74

2.2.2.2 A Basic First-Order Treatment 75

2.2.2.3 Beyond Adjectives 76

2.2.2.4 Comparing the Treatments 77

2.2.2.4.1 Faithfully Representing the Copula 78

2.2.2.4.2 Theoretical Issues in the Background 79

3 Conclusion 81

5 Rigid Appliers 89

1 Rigidity for Mere Appliers 90

1.1 A Basic Account: Rigid and Nonrigid Designators for Predicables 91

1.1.1 The Account 91

1.1.2 The Lessons of Rigidity 92

1.1.2.1 How Necessity Follows from Rigidity with Designation Multiplied 92

1.1.2.2 Predicative Arguments Concerning A Posteriori Necessity, Essence, and Mind 95

1.1.2.3 Generalizing: How to Reformulate with Predicates Arguments with Singular Terms for Properties 97

1.1.2.4 Predicative Versions of the Familiar Arguments Appealing to the Rigidity of Concrete-Object Designators 98

1.1.3 Objections 100

1.1.3.1 Rigidity Performs the Modal Duties to Which I have Assigned it 100

1.1.3.2 News of the Rigidity of Nonsingular Property Designators is Appropriately Surprising and Important 103

1.2 Nominalist-Friendly Variations of the Basic Account 106

1.2.1 "Properties" in Semantic Work 107

1.2.2 Rigidity for Radical Nominalism 108

2 A Rival Account 110

2.1 Essential Application as Rigidity 111

2.2 Essential Application as a Component of Rigidity 112

2.3 Essential Application and Anti-Descriptivism 114

3 Conclusion 116

6 Rigidity-Associated Arguments in Support of Theoretical Identity Statements: on their Significance and the Cost of their Philosophical Resources 124

1 Significance 125

1.1 Are Theoretical Identity Statements Uninformative? 126

1.2 Is What is Designated What Matters, Not Designation? 127

1.3 Do Mechanisms that Secure Rigidity Draw from Rigidity's Significance? 128

2 Costs 131

2.1 Rigidity Without Cost and Controversy 131

2.1.1 On the Rigidity of Name-Like Subject Terms 131

2.1.2 On the Rigidity of Theoretical Expressions 132

2.1.2.1 Doubts 132

2.1.2.2 Facile Defenses of Rigidity to be Avoided 134

2.1.2.2.1 Support from Essentialism 134

2.1.2.2.2 Support from Stipulations that Come Too Easily 134

2.1.2.3 A Defense of De Facto Rigidity 137

2.1.2.4 A Defense of De Jure Rigidity 139

2.2 Theoretical Identity Statements Without Hidden Essentialist Costs 141

3 Conclusion 143

7 The Skeptical Argument Impugning Psychophysical Identity Statements: on its Significance and the Cost of its Philosophical Resources 148

1 Significance 148

1.1 Against Specific Psychophysical Identities, Not Materialism 148

1.1.1 Why Not Conclude that No Psychophysical Identity Statement is True? 149

1.1.2 Psychophysical Identities: Is What Eludes us Just Conceptual or Explanatory? 152

1.2 Is Type Identity Irrelevant? 154

1.2.1 Type Identity Obtains if Multiple Realizability Does 155

1.2.2 Why Type Identity Matters and Why Supervenience or Token Identity is No Substitute 157

1.2.3 How to Redirect the Skeptical Argument to Address Supervenience and Token Identity Instead of Type Identity 161

2 Costs 163

2.1 The Privilege of an Insider's Perspective: a Cost Too High for Eliminative Materialists 164

2.2 Two-Dimensionalism: No Commitment, No Cost 170

2.3 Modal Rationalism and Apriority: No Commitment, No Cost 171

3 Conclusion 173

8 The Skeptical Argument Further Examined: on Resources, Allegedly Overlooked, for Conferring Psychophysical Identities 176

1 Psychophysical Identity Statements' Support is Undermined by Missing De Jure Connections to Physically Described Matter 177

2 Why Not Dispense with De Jure Connections in Favor of Correlation and Scientific Induction? 179

2.1 Why De Jure Connections Must Attend Correlation and Scientific Induction 180

2.1.1 Problematic Theoretical Identity Statements and Correlation 181

2.1.2 Problematic Theoretical Identity Statements and Broad Inductive Principles Testifying to Identity 186

2.2 Are De Jure Connections Controversial? 190

2.2.1 The Recognitional Theory of Reference 190

2.2.2 The Theory of Direct Reference 192

3 De Jure Connections Supplied by way of Scientific Necessitarianism? 193

3.1 From Subject Terms to Properties to Law-Governed Behavior: the Missing De Jure Link? 196

3.2 From Subject Terms to Constitution to Law-Governed Behavior: the Missing De Jure Link? 198

3.3 From Subject Terms to Constitution to Fundamental-Law Governed Behavior 200

3.4 From Fundamental Laws to Fatalism to Identity 204

3.5 Dissolving the Problem with Scientific Development 207

3.5.1 A New Sort of Theory 207

3.5.2 Familiar Work on Familiar Sorts of Theories 208

3.6 Where We Are Left: Scientific Empiricism 211

4 Concluding Remarks 213.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages [219]-235) and index.

ISBN:

9780199609208

0199609209

OCLC:

809082993