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Metaethics / Simon Kirchin.

Van Pelt Library BJ1012 .K48 2012
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Kirchin, Simon.
Series:
Palgrave philosophy today
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Ethics.
Physical Description:
x, 195 pages ; 23 cm.
Place of Publication:
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Summary:
When we say that sharing is morally good and that murdering is wicked, what are we doing? Are we picking out existing moral values? Can our judgements be correct and incorrect? How do moral values fit into the natural world? Do moral values even exist? How do our moral judgements relate to how we are motivated to act?
Metaethics is an argumentative textbook that considers these and other metaethical questions in a lively and clear manner. As well as discussing all of the main metaethical positions, a new idea-metaethical pluralism-is introduced.
Chapters cover central topics in the subject, including:
Moral realism: initial thoughts
Moral realism: naturalism and reductionism
Moral error theory
Noncognitivism
Sensibility theory
Moral motivation
Metaethics is aimed at upper-level undergraduates and postgraduates, but should appeal to anyone with an interest in the area. Book jacket.
Contents:
1 What Is Metaethics? 1
1.1 Starting thoughts 1
1.2 The main questions and some standard positions 5
1.3 Moral psychology 12
1.4 Moral relativism again 14
1.5 Concluding remarks and a plan 16
2 Moral Realism: Mind-Independence 19
2.1 Introduction 19
2.2 Why realism? 19
2.3 Moral properties and humans 22
2.4 Objectivity and subjectivity 25
2.5 Why be an IM Realist? 30
2.6 Concluding remarks 35
3 Moral Realism: Naturalism and Reductionism 37
3.1 Introduction 37
3.2 A naive naturalism and the motivation for adopting it 37
3.3 The open question argument 41
3.4 Two problems with the argument 43
3.5 A third problem with the argument 46
3.6 A summary and two definitions 48
3.7 Nonreductive naturalism explained 50
3.8 Three problems for nonreductive naturalism 57
3.9 Reductionist realism 68
3.10 One last point 75
3.11 Concluding remarks 76
4 Moral Error Theory 78
4.1 Introduction 78
4.2 What is error theory? 78
4.3 Arguments for error theory 85
4.4 What if we accept error theory? 93
4.5 Concluding remarks 97
5 Noncognitivism 99
5.1 Introduction 99
5.2 What is noncognitivism? 100
5.3 Why be a noncognitivist? 107
5.4 The Frege-Geach problem 111
5.5 The moral attitude problem 119
5.6 Concluding remarks 123
6 Sensibility Theory 125
6.1 Introduction 125
6.2 Colours and ethics 126
6.3 Shapelessness and patterns 133
6.4 Those two distinctions 138
6.5 Problems and some responses 142
6.6 Concluding remarks 147
7 Moral Motivation 149
7.1 Introduction 149
7.2 Internalism and externalism about moral motivation 150
7.3 Beliefs, desires, and besires 160
7.4 Concluding remarks 173
8 Further Thoughts 175
8.1 Introduction 175
8.2 Metaethics and the generalizing tendency 177
8.3 Concluding remarks 186.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
9780230219465
0230219462
9780230219472
0230219470
OCLC:
785873558

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