Scepticism and reliable belief / José L. Zalabardo.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Zalabardo, José L.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Knowledge, Theory of.

Skepticism.

Physical Description:

xi, 215 pages ; 24 cm

Edition:

First edition.

Other Title:

Scepticism & reliable belief

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2012.

Summary:

Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are rendered illegitimate by reliabilist accounts. In Scepticism and Reliable Belief José L. Zalabardo assesses the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and challenges this consensus. He articulates and defends a reliabilist theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition. Zalabardo's main analytic tool in the account of knowledge he provides is the theory of probability: he analyses both truth tracking and evidence in these terms, and argues that this account of knowledge has the resources for blocking the standard lines of sceptical reasoning- including the regress argument, arguments based on sceptical hypotheses, and the problem of the criterion. But although Zalabardo's theory can be used to refute the standard lines of sceptical reasoning, there is a sceptical argument against which his account offers no defence, as it does not rely on any assumptions that he renders illegitimate. According to this argument, we might have considerable success in the enterprise of forming true beliefs: if this is so, we have knowledge of the world. However, we cannot know that we are successful, even if we are. Beliefs to this effect cannot be knowledge on Zalabardo's reliabilist account, since these beliefs do not track the truth and we cannot obtain adequate evidence in their support. Zalabardo ends with the suggestion that the problem might have a metaphysical solution: although the sceptical argument may make no illegitimate epistemological assumptions, it does rest on a questionable account of the nature of cognition. Book jacket.

Contents:

1 The Problem of Scepticism 1

1.1 Sceptical arguments 1

1.2 The epistemic regress argument 5

1.3 Sceptical possibilities 8

1.4 The criterion 14

2 Reliabilism and the Evidential Constraint 18

2.1 Intuitions 19

2.2 Perfect pitch 23

2.3 Bonjour and the intuitive approach 24

2.4 Epistemic rationality and responsibility 26

2.5 Premise 1 27

2.6 Premise 2 34

2.7 Two further arguments 37

3 Knowledge and Truth Tracking 41

3.1 Nozick's analysis of knowledge 42

3.2 Adherence 45

3.3 Nozick's defence of adherence 49

3.4 Methods 56

3.5 Evidence 63

3.6 Conclusion 66

4 Evidence 68

4.1 Probability 68

4.2 Conditional probability 71

4.3 Evidence and probability 74

4.4 Incremental confirmation 77

4.5 What adequate evidence is 84

5 Inferential Knowledge 87

5.1 Foundationalism 88

5.2 Gettier 89

5.3 Moorean inferences 94

5.4 Transmission principles 95

5.5 An idea from Nozick 98

5.6 Closure and transmission 99

5.7 Reflective knowledge 100

5.8 Not falsely believing 103

5.9 Bootstrapping 104

5.10 Roush on inferential knowledge 107

6 Knowledge without Evidence 111

6.1 Tracking and probability 111

6.2 Probabilistic tracking 113

6.3 Safety 115

6.4 Inferential and non-inferential knowledge 118

6.5 Problem cases I: positive misclassifications? 119

6.6 Problem cases II: negative misclassifications? 126

6.7 Adherence 133

6.8 Knowledge by default 136

6.9 Closure 139

7 Sceptical Arguments 144

7.1 The regress argument 144

7.2 Sceptical hypotheses 146

7.3 The criterion 150

7.4 Reflective knowledge 153

7.5 Evidence for cognitive self-assessments 155

7.6 Using S's evidence in support of assessments of her beliefs 157

7.7 Evidence for CSAs 160

7.8 The sceptical argument 162

8 Scepticism and Realism 166

8.1 The anti-realist conception 166

8.2 Realism and cognition 167

8.3 Anti-realism 171

8.4 Anti-reductionism 172

8.5 Stability 177

8.6 Anti-realist reductions and the sceptical problem 180

8.7 The middle position 181

8.8 Two conceptions of cognitive assessment 182

8.9 The middle position and the sceptical problem 185.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9780199656073

019965607X

OCLC:

781497185