Kant's problem regarding others: Knowing, seeing, and treating others as free.

Format:

Book

Thesis/Dissertation

Author/Creator:

Latta, Marcy.

Contributor:

Guyer, J. Paul, advisor.

University of Pennsylvania.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Philosophy.

Ethics.

0394.

0422.

Penn dissertations--Philosophy.

Philosophy--Penn dissertations.

Local Subjects:

Penn dissertations--Philosophy.

Philosophy--Penn dissertations.

0394.

0422.

Physical Description:

203 pages

Contained In:

Dissertation Abstracts International 72-12A.

System Details:

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

text file

Summary:

Kant's transcendental framework appears to generate an intractable problem about the possibility of cognizing other beings as free. While I can apprehend that I am free on the basis of my consciousness of being obligated under the moral law, Kant's epistemology seems to preclude, in principle, the possibility of cognizing that another being is free. Because it is by virtue of freedom that a being deserves moral consideration, this epistemological problem has significant implications for morality.

After canvassing the, by my lights, unsuccessful attempts of Fichte, Christine Korsgaard, and Allen Wood to resolve this epistemological problem of how we might rationally determine which among the various beings we encounter fall under the category of humanity, I instead seek to undercut the problem rather than to solve it directly on its own terms. I show that Kant's assumption that there are other free beings to be recognized is in conflict with a core insight of his doctrine of transcendental idealism. I then draw from Schopenhauer to propose an alternative, although nevertheless Kantian, metaphysical view of the relationship between freedom and appearance, according to which freedom might uniformly underly and unite all of nature. While this view allows for a rich plurality within nature, as to the underlying essence of nature, all is folded into a single, vastly enlarged, free self.

This metaphysical view paves the way for an alternative epistemology by which we can perceive how we should see and treat apparent others. First, I appeal to an argument by Paul Guyer that shows that, whereas Kant's transcendental idealism appears to have generated the original epistemological problem, it is by virtue of this doctrine that Kant can countenance a role for feeling in moral recognition and motivation. I then look to Nomy Arpaly, Elisabeth Camp, John McDowell, and Martha Nussbaum, among others, to develop an account of an affect-laden, normatively-constrained mode of moral perception by which we can see apparent others as ourselves and thus as free, in accordance with what may be the underlying metaphysical reality, and, in turn, be disposed to treat them as we would ourselves.

Notes:

Thesis (Ph.D. in Philosophy) -- University of Pennsylvania, 2011.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 72-12, Section: A, page: 4590.

Adviser: Paul Guyer.

Local Notes:

School code: 0175.

ISBN:

9781124899817

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.