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Markets for Clean Air : The U.S. Acid Rain Program / A. Denny Ellerman, Paul L. Joskow, Richard Schmalensee, Juan-Pablo Montero, Elizabeth M. Bailey.
Connect to full text Available online
View online- Format:
- Book
- Series:
- Cambridge books online.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Emissions trading--United States.
- Emissions trading.
- Acid rain--Environmental aspects--Government policy.
- Acid rain--Environmental aspects.
- United States.
- Air quality management--Government policy--United States.
- Air quality management.
- Air quality management--Government policy.
- Acid rain--Environmental aspects--Government policy--United States.
- Acid rain.
- Physical Description:
- 1 online resource (388 pages) : digital, PDF file(s)
- Place of Publication:
- Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- System Details:
- Mode of access: World Wide Web.
- text file
- Summary:
- Markets for Clean Air provides a comprehensive, in-depth description and evaluation of the first three years' experience with the U.S. Acid Rain Program. This environmental control program is the world's first large-scale use of a tradable emission permit system for achieving environmental goals. The book analyzes the behavior and performance of the market for emissions permits, called allowances in the Acid Rain Program, and quantifies emission reductions, compliance costs, and cost savings associated with the trading program. The book also includes chapters on the historical context in which this pioneering program developed and the political economy, of allowance allocations.
- Contents:
- 1 A Market-Based Experiment 3
- A Star Is Born (?) 3
- The U.S. Acid Rain Program 5
- 2 A Political History of Federal Acid Rain Legislation 13
- Early History of Federal Regulation of SO[subscript 2] Emissions 13
- Legislative History of the 1990 Acid Rain Program 21
- 3 The Political Economy of Allowance Allocations 31
- Competing Theories of Distributive Politics 31
- The Allowance "Pie" 36
- Phase I Allowance Allocations 39
- Phase II Allowances 43
- Alternative Phase II Allocation Rules 48
- Gainers and Losers from Alternative Phase II Allocation Rules 53
- Hypothetical Votes on Phase II Allocations 61
- Estimating Political Determinants of Allowance Allocations 64
- A Majoritarian Equilibrium 75
- 4 The Pre-1995 Trend in SO[subscript 2] Emissions 77
- Expected versus Actual SO[subscript 2] Emissions 77
- The Economics of Coal Choice 80
- Historical Patterns in Rail and Coal Prices 82
- Econometric Analysis 89
- Rail-rate Deregulation Reduces SO[subscript 2] Emissions 104
- Part II. Compliance and Trading 107
- 5 Title IV Compliance and Emission Reductions, 1995-97 109
- Perfect Compliance and Significant Emission Reductions 109
- Counterfactual Emissions 110
- Emissions Reductions Resulting from Title IV 118
- 6 Emissions Trading: The Effect on Abatement Behavior 141
- Unit-level Emissions Trading 141
- Some Classifications and Definitions 143
- Overcompliance 149
- Excess Allowances 151
- Current Demand for Allowances 154
- Banking of Allowances 161
- From Internal to External Trading 165
- 7 Emissions Trading: Development of the Allowance Market 167
- Annual EPA Auctions 169
- Emergence of the Private Allowance Market 172
- Influence of State Electric Utility Regulation on Allowance Trading 190
- The Allowance Market Works 195
- 8 Title IV's Voluntary Compliance Program 197
- Patterns of Voluntary Compliance 198
- The Decision to Volunteer 203
- Effects on the SO[subscript 2] Market 213
- Implications for Program Design 215
- Adverse Selection Is a Problem 219
- 9 Cost of Compliance with Title IV in Phase I 221
- Confusion about Control Costs 221
- Assumptions and Data Sources 223
- Estimates of Phase I Costs of Compliance 228
- The Cost of Abatement by Scrubbing 235
- The Cost of Abatement by Switching to Lower-Sulfur Coal 242
- Monitoring Costs 248
- Part III. Questions and Implications 251
- 10 Cost Savings from Emissions Trading 253
- Cost Savings Is the Goal 253
- Evidence of Cost Savings 254
- Basic Analytic Framework 260
- Positioning the Title IV Cost Curves 270
- Cost-Saving Estimates 280
- Substantial and Real Cost Savings 294
- 11 Errors, Imperfections, and Allowance Prices 297
- Unexpected Behavior at Allowance Prices 297
- Some Unconvincing Hypotheses 299
- Expectation Errors and Overinvestment 302
- Puzzles and Future Price Trends 309
- A Better Alternative Policy? 312
- 12 Concluding Observations 314
- Trading Can Work 315
- Politics Don't Matter 316
- Markets Can Develop 317
- Trading Handles Surprises 319
- Opt-in Provisions Are Tricky 320
- Extrapolate with Care 321
- Appendix Effect of Title IV on SO[subscript 2] Emissions and Heat Input by Susanne M. Schennach 323
- Data 324
- Specification of the Model 324
- Results 329
- Effect of Title IV on Utilization 334.
- Notes:
- Title from publishers bibliographic system (viewed on 02 Mar 2012).
- Other Format:
- Print version:
- ISBN:
- 9780511528576
- 9780521660839
- Access Restriction:
- Restricted for use by site license.
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