Free will and modern science / edited by Richard Swinburne.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Swinburne, Richard.

British Academy.

Oxford University Press.

Series:

British Academy original paperbacks

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Free will and determinism.

Human behavior.

Neurosciences.

Quantum theory.

Mathematics.

Genre:

Aufsatzsammlung.

Physical Description:

xviii, 206 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2011.

Summary:

New investigative tools in neuroscience now enable us to study the processes in our brains that take place when we decide to perform some intentional action. Drawn from backgrounds in philosophy, neuroscience, physics, and mathematics, the contributors to this volume examine the relevance of these and other recent scientific developments to the issue of whether humans have free will of the kind which makes us morally responsible for our actions.

Neuroscience may tell us that some brain event of a particular kind is a necessary condition for the occurrence of the bodily movements involved in our intentional actions, but could it show that this is sufficient to cause them independently of our intentions? Quantum theory opens up the possibility that not all our brain events are fully determined by their causes, and so maybe - if neuroscience does not rule this out - there is a role for intentions after all. Perhaps Gödel's theorem in mathematics implies that the initial brain state and laws of development of a mathematician's brain could not fully determine which mathematical conjectures he or she sees to be true. And how these scientific achievements are to be understood may depend on the philosophical issue of whether conscious events, such as intentions, are themselves merely brain events, or whether they are separate events which interact with brain events. Finally, the book considers whether even if our actions are not fully caused by brain events, it follows that we have the kind of free will we need in order to be morally responsible for our actions or to be held guilty in a court of law; and if not, what else we would need. Book jacket.

Contents:

1 Does brain science change our view of free will? / Patrick Haggard Haggard, Patrick 7

2 Libet and the case for free will scepticism / Tim Bayne Bayne, Tim 25

3 Physicalism and the determination of action / Frank Jackson Jackson, Frank 47

4 Dualism and the determination of action / Richard Swinburne Swinburne, Richard 63

5 On determinacy or its absence in the brain / Harald Atmanspacher Atmanspacher, Harald, Stefan Rotter Rotter, Stefan 84

6 Gödel's incompleteness theorems, free will and mathematical thought / Solomon Feferman Feferman, Solomon 102

7 Feferman on Gödel and free will: a response to Chapter 6 / J.R. Lucas Lucas, J.R. 123

8 The impossibility of ultimate responsibility? / Galen Strawson Strawson, Galen 126

9 Moral responsibility and the concept of agency / Helen Steward Steward, Helen 141

10 Substance dualism and its rationale / Howard Robinson Robinson, Howard 158

11 What kind of responsibility must criminal law presuppose? / R.A. Duff Duff, R.A. 178.

Notes:

"Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press."

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9780197264898

0197264891

OCLC:

751794764