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Bureaucratic ambition : careers, motives, and the innovative administrator / Manuel P. Teodoro.

Van Pelt Library JS331 .T46 2011
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Teodoro, Manuel P., 1972-
Series:
Johns Hopkins studies in governance and public management
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Bureaucracy--United States.
Bureaucracy.
Ambition.
United States.
Public administration--United States.
Public administration.
Local government--United States.
Local government.
Ambition--Political aspects--United States.
Administrative agencies--United States--Management.
Administrative agencies.
Management.
Physical Description:
xv, 222 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
Place of Publication:
Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011.
Summary:
Political Scientists and public administration scholars have long recognized that innovation, in public agencies is contingent on entrepreneurial bureaucratic executives. But unlike their commercial counterparts, public administration "entrepreneurs" do not profit from their innovations. What motivates enterprising public executives? How are they created? Manuel P. Teodoro's theory of bureaucratic executive ambition explains why pioneering leaders are not the result of serendipity, but rather arise out of predictable institutional design.
Teodoro explains the systems that foster or frustrate entrepreneurship among public executives. Through case studies and quantitative analysis of original data, he shows how psychological motives and career opportunities shape administrators' decisions, and he reveals the consequences these choices have for innovation and democratic governance. Tracing the career paths and political behavior of agency executives, Teodoro finds that, when advancement involves moving across agencies, ambitious bureaucrats, have strong incentives for entrepreneurship. Where career advancement occurs vertically within a single organization, ambitious bureaucrats have less incentive for innovation, but perhaps greater accountability. This research introduces valuable empirical methods and has already generated additional studies.
A powerful argument for the art of the possible, Bureaucratic Ambition advances a flexible theory of politics and public administration. Its lessons will enrich debate among scholars and inform policymakers and career, administrators. Book jacket.
Contents:
Principles, principals, and ambition
Glorious heroes, tragic heroes, antiheroes
Bureaucratic ambition
Career path and professional innovation
Motivation and political advocacy
Ramps and ladders
Bureaucratic ambition and democratic governance.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:
9781421402451
1421402459
OCLC:
706965834

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