The natural resources trap : private investment without public commitment / edited by William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger.

Format:

Book

Contributor:

Hogan, William W.

Sturzenegger, Federico

Charles H. Maxson Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Natural resources--Government policy.

Natural resources.

Natural resources--Law and legislation.

Investments, Foreign.

Public-private sector cooperation.

Physical Description:

xiv, 519 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, [2010]

Summary:

"Volatility in commodity prices has been accompanied by perpetual renegotiation of contracts between private investors in natural resource production and the governments of states with mineral and energy wealth. When prices skyrocket, governments want a larger share of revenues, sometimes to the point of nationalization or expropriation; when prices fall, larger state participation becomes a burden and the private sector is called back in. Recent and newsworthy changes in the price of oil (which fell from an all-time high of $147 in mid-2008 to $40 by year's end) are notable for their speed and the steepness of their rise and fall, but the up-and-down pattern itself is not unusual. If the unpredictability of commodity prices is so predictable, why do contracts not allow for this with mechanisms that would provide a more stable commercial framework?

In The Natural Resources Trap, top scholars address this question in terms of both theory and practice. Theoretical contributions range across a number of fields, from contract theory to public finance, and treat topics that include taxation, royalties, and expropriation cycles. Case studies examine experiences in the U.K., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela, and other parts of the world."--pub. desc.

Contents:

1 Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources

2 Petroleum Contracts: What Does Contract Theory Tell Us?

3 Sovereign Theft: Theory and Evidence about Sovereign Default and Expropriation

4 A Resource Belief Curse? Oil and Individualism

5 Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation

6 Denying the Temptation to GRAB

7 Dealing with Expropriations: General Guidelines for Oil Production Contracts

8 Pricing Expropriation Risk in Natural Resource Contracts: A Real Options Approach

9 Credibility, Commitment, and Regulation: Ex Ante Price Caps and Ex Post Interventions

10 Hydrocarbon Policy, Shocks, and the Collective Imagination: What Went Wrong in Bolivia?

11 Urgency and Betrayal: Three Attempts to Foster Private Investment in Argentina's Oil Industry

12 The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Charles H. Maxson Fund.

ISBN:

0262013797

9780262013796

OCLC:

426391153

Publisher Number:

99944094295