Democratic institutions and the governance of foreign security policy: Peacemaking after two world wars.

Format:

Book

Thesis/Dissertation

Author/Creator:

Ripsman, Norrin M.

Contributor:

University of Pennsylvania.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

International law.

United States--History.

United States.

History.

Europe--History.

Europe.

0335.

0337.

0616.

Local Subjects:

0335.

0337.

0616.

Physical Description:

435 pages

Contained In:

Dissertation Abstracts International 58-11A.

System Details:

Mode of access: World Wide Web.

text file

Summary:

This dissertation argues that the impact of domestic opinion on a democratic state's foreign security policy choices depends on its domestic decision making environment, composed of political institutions, decision making procedures and legislative procedural norms. Therefore, contrary to the expectations of traditional realists and neoliberals alike, democratic foreign policy executives vary considerably in the degree of autonomy from domestic opinion they command. Consequently, it determines which institutional, procedural, and normative factors determine the autonomy of a democratic state's foreign policy apparatus and model their operation. Finally, it argues that weak democratic states can escape some of their structural constraints by engaging in independence-enhancing strategies that mislead domestic groups about the policies they pursue.

To test these theoretical hypotheses, this dissertation examines the policy making processes of Great Britain, France, and the United States in the construction of settlement policies toward Germany after both World Wars. In particular, it investigates each executive's capacity to pursue a conciliatory peace when domestic opinion favoured sternness and its ability to use its domestic opposition to its advantage in international negotiations. This research confirms that the democracies with the more restrictive domestic decision making environments (the Third and Fourth French Republics and the United States and Great Britain in 1919) were highly constrained by domestic pressure for a punitive settlement. Their leaders could escape their domestic constraints to some extent, though, if they were willing to deceive domestic opposition forces about the policies they pursued. They were also somewhat successful when they attempted to exploit domestic opposition at the bargaining table. Democracies which were insulated from public pressures by institutional and procedural means (the United States and Great Britain after the World War II), however, were able to pursue policies which were quite consistent with decisionmaker preferences, although they were expected to be more flexible in international negotiations.

Notes:

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-11, Section: A, page: 4436.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 1997.

Local Notes:

School code: 0175.

ISBN:

9780591659375

Access Restriction:

Restricted for use by site license.