What makes the EU viable? : European integration in the light of the antebellum US experience / Andrew Glencross.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Glencross, Andrew.

Contributor:

Anne and Joseph Trachtman Memorial Book Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

European Union.

European federation.

Europe--Economic integration--Political aspects.

Europe.

United States--Politics and government--1783-1865.

United States.

Politics and government.

Political culture--United States--History--19th century.

Political culture.

History.

Physical Description:

xii, 232 pages ; 23 cm

Place of Publication:

Basingstoke [England] ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Summary:

This book is distinguished by its use of the antebellum US experience as a foil to address the under-explored question of what makes the EU viable. The nature of political conflict in both cases is defined in terms of four contested rules of the game: state sovereignty, federal competences, political representation and decision-making procedures. Hence, viability is conceptualized as the ability to find an agreement over these four elements.

The analysis shows that, to remain viable, the antebellum USA resorted to an ultimately untenable voluntary centralization of these rules of the game. Conversely, the EU has maintained a dynamic equilibrium, although this is not a self-reinforcing process. The transatlantic contrast is then used to examine proposals for reforming the EU, especially its system of political representation. The comparison reveals that, despite high expectations, changing the system of representation is no shortcut solution for the EU's constitutional woes.

Contents:

1 The Problem of Viability in a Compound Polity 7

1.1 Introduction 7

1.2 Viability as defined in relation to the 'Rules of the Game' of politics 8

1.3 Scenarios of viability in a compound polity 15

1.4 The Theory of the compound polity and the issue of the units' sovereign status 20

1.5 Comparing the EU with other political systems 24

1.6 Conclusion 31

2 Developing an Analogical Comparison between the EU and the Antebellum US Republic 32

2.1 Introduction 32

2.2 The attraction of transatlantic comparison 33

2.3 The caesura of the Civil War: The overlooked significance of antebellum political conflict 37

2.4 Comparing viability in the EU and antebellum US: A question of praxis not preconditions 43

2.5 Conclusion: Learning through analogy 51

3 Comparing How the Rules of the Game are Contested 53

3.1 Introduction 53

3.2 Viability and the conflict over the rules of the game of politics in the antebellum US 54

3.3 Contesting the rules of the game in the EU 63

3.3.1 Dual federalism v. joint federalism 66

3.3.2 A constitution for popular government v. a treaty system 67

3.3.3 A project for freedom v. a project for undefined ever close union 69

3.3.4 A single fault line v. multiple fault lines 70

3.3.5 A party system and Supreme Court arbitrator v. politics of treaty reform and council arbitration 71

3.4 Conclusion 73

4 The Struggle to Maintain a Compound System: Creating and Contesting the Rules of the Game in European Integration 74

4.1 Introduction 74

4.2 The construction of the rules of the game of European politics, from the ECSC to the EEC 75

4.2.1 The Coal and Steel Community 76

4.2.2 The European Economic Community 79

4.3 After the EEC: Unexpected constitutionalization (ECJ), the first enlargement (UK) and democratic consolidation (Mediterranean enlargement) 81

4.3.1 The impact of the court on the rules of the game 82

4.3.2 British accession: Opening up the Pandora's box of domestic politics 86

4.3.3 The Mediterranean enlargement round: Defining the Community's democratic values 93

4.4 Maastricht and after: Questioning the purpose and nature of integration 97

4.5 Two steps forward but how many back? European integration's dynamic equilibrium 107

4.6 Conclusion 112

5 Contrasting and Explaining the Viability of Two Compound Systems 113

5.1 Introduction 113

5.2 American dual federalism (with the highest functions of government) v. European joint federalism (with the most numerous) 115

5.3 A constitution for popular government v. a treaty system 118

5.4 A project for freedom (the union as a means to an end) v. a project for undefined ever closer union (integration as an end in itself) 125

5.5 A single fault line v. multiple fault lines 131

5.6 A party system and Supreme Court arbitrator v. politics of treaty reform and Council arbitration 138

5.7 Conclusion: Recognizing what makes the EU viable 150

6 The Future Evolution of the EU Compound Polity: The Obstacles to Voluntary Centralization 152

6.1 Introduction 152

6.2 Dynamic equilibrium: A self-reinforcing process? 154

6.3 Compound polities and the problem of representing both states and individuals 161

6.4 How to manage the voluntary centralization of representation 169

6.5 The political process needed for justifying voluntary centralization 173

6.6 Conclusion 180.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Anne and Joseph Trachtman Memorial Book Fund.

ISBN:

9780230224506

0230224504

OCLC:

317926821

Publisher Number:

99935365735

Online:

Contributor biographical information

Publisher description