Voting and collective decision-making : bargaining and power / Annick Laruelle and Federico Valenciano.

Format:

• Book

Author/Creator:

• Laruelle, Annick.

Contributor:

• Valenciano, Federico.
• Anne and Joseph Trachtman Memorial Book Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

• Decision making--European Union countries.
• Voting--European Union countries.
• Game theory.
• Voting.
• Decision making.
• European Union countries.

Physical Description:

xvii, 184 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Contents:

• 1.1 Basic set-theoretic notation 1
• 1.2 Some combinatorics 2
• 1.2.1 Permutations and combinations 2
• 1.2.2 Some useful approximations 3
• 1.3 Voting rules 4
• 1.3.1 Dichotomous voting rules 5
• 1.3.2 Some particular voting rules 7
• 1.4 Expected utility theory 10
• 1.4.1 Players, games and game theory 10
• 1.4.2 Preferences and utility 10
• 1.4.3 Lotteries and expected utility 11
• 1.4.4 Expected utility preferences 13
• 1.5 Some basic game theory notions 18
• 1.5.1 Equilibrium 19
• 1.5.2 Cooperative and non-cooperative game theory 20
• 1.5.3 Subgame perfect equilibrium 21
• 1.5.4 Basic cooperative models 24
• 2 Seminal papers, seminal ambiguities 30
• 2.1 Seminal papers and seminal ambiguities 30
• 2.1.1 Nash (1950): The bargaining problem 30
• 2.1.2 Shapley (1953): The value of a TU game 34
• 2.1.3 Shapley-Shubik (1954): A power inde 37
• 2.1.4 Banzhaf (1965): Power as decisiveness 39
• 2.1.5 Penrose (1946), Rae (1969) and Coleman (1971) 41
• 2.1.6 Through the axiomatic glasses: Dubey (1975), Dubey-Shapley (1979) 41
• 2.2 Clear-cut models to dissipate ambiguity 44
• 2.3.1 Axiomatic approach 47
• 2.3.2 Probabilistic approach 48
• 3 'Take-it-or-leave-it' committees 52
• 3.1 The take-it-or-leave-it scenario 52
• 3.2 Success and decisiveness in a vote 54
• 3.3 Preferences, behaviour and probabilities 55
• 3.4 Success and decisiveness ex ante 57
• 3.5 A priori assessments based on the voting rule 60
• 3.5.1 Rae index 62
• 3.5.2 Banzhaf(-Penrose) index 62
• 3.5.3 Coleman indices 63
• 3.5.4 Konig and Brauninger's inclusiveness index 65
• 3.5.5 Summary and remarks 65
• 3.6 Success versus decisiveness 67
• 3.6.1 Success is the issue in a take-it-or-leave-it scenario 67
• 3.6.2 Conditional success 69
• 3.7 The choice of voting rule: egalitarianism and utilitarianism 71
• 3.7.1 Egalitarianism 74
• 3.7.2 Utilitarianism 74
• 3.8 The choice of voting rule in a committee of representatives 77
• 3.8.1 An ideal two-stage decision procedure 78
• 3.8.2 Egalitarianism in a committee of representatives 81
• 3.8.3 Utilitarianism in a committee of representatives 87
• 4 Bargaining committees 105
• 4.1 The bargaining scenario 106
• 4.2 A model of a bargaining committee: voting rule and voters' preferences 107
• 4.3 Cooperative game-theoretic approach 109
• 4.3.1 Rationality conditions 110
• 4.3.2 Axiomatic characterizations 112
• 4.4 A non-cooperative model of a bargaining committee 117
• 4.4.1 Probabilistic protocols 119
• 4.4.2 Bargaining protocols under a voting rule 123
• 4.5 Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in a bargaining committee 128
• 4.6 The neutral voting rule in a committee of representatives 130
• 5 Application to the European Union 136
• 5.1 Voting rules in the European Council 136
• 5.2 The Council as a take-it-or-leave-it committee 142
• 5.2.1 Criteria based on probabilities 143
• 5.2.2 Criteria based on utilities 156
• 5.3 The Council as a bargaining committee 163.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 176-181) and index.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Anne and Joseph Trachtman Memorial Book Fund.

ISBN:

• 9780521873871
• 0521873878

OCLC:

213400630

Online:

The Anne and Joseph Trachtman Memorial Book Fund Home Page