Truth in virtue of meaning / Gillian Russell.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Russell, Gillian Kay, 1976-

Contributor:

Class of 1953 Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Truth.

Meaning (Philosophy).

Grammar, Comparative and general--Sentences.

Grammar, Comparative and general.

Knowledge, Theory of.

Physical Description:

xv, 232 pages ; 23 cm

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2008.

Summary:

The analytic/synthetic distinction looks simple. It is a distinction between two different kinds of sentence. Synthetic sentences are true in part because of the way the world is, and in part because of what they mean. Analytic sentences-like all bachelors are unmarried and triangles have three sides-are different. They are true in virtue of meaning, so no matter what the world is like, as long as the sentence means what it does, it will be true.

This distinction seems powerful because analytic sentences seem to be knowable in a special way. One can know that all bachelors are unmarried, for example, just by thinking about what it means. But many twentieth-century philosophers, with Quine in the lead, argued that there were no analytic sentences, that the idea of analyticity didn't even make sense, and that the analytic/synthetic distinction was therefore an illusion. Others couldn't see how there could fail to be a distinction, however ingenious the arguments of Quine and his supporters.

But since the heyday of the debate, things have changed in the philosophy of language. Tools have been refined, confusions cleared up, and most significantly, many philosophers now accept a view of language-semantic externalism-on which it is possible to see how the distinction could fail. One might be tempted to think that ultimately the distinction has fallen for reasons other than those proposed in the original debate.

In Truth in Virtue of Meaning, Gillian Russell argues that it hasn't. Using the tools of contemporary philosophy of language, she outlines a view of analytic sentences which is compatible with semantic externalism and defends that view against the old Quinean arguments. She then goes on to draw out the surprising epistemological consequences of her approach.

Contents:

I The Positive View

1 The 'in virtue of' Relation 29

1.1 The Two-Factor Argument 29

1.2 Disambiguating 'in virtue of' 32

1.3 Collapse into Necessity? 37

2 Meaning 43

2.1 The Language Myth 43

2.2 Kripke and Kaplan 47

2.3 Truth in Virtue of Reference Determiner 52

2.4 Examples of Analytic Truths 57

2.5 Two Objections and a Serious Problem 66

3 Beyond Modality 71

3.1 The Problem 71

3.2 Semantics and Modality 72

3.3 Strict Truth in Virtue of Meaning 82

3.4 The Definition of Analyticity 99

Appendix A The Formal System 109

A.2 The Language 117

A.3 Semantics 119

A.4 Content, Validity and Reference Determiners 121

A.5 Some Theorems 122

II A Defense

4 The Spectre of "Two Dogmas" 129

4.1 The Circularity Objection 129

4.2 The Argument from Confirmation Holism 135

5.1 The Transience of Definition 144

5.2 Rethinking Definitions 146

5.3 Definitions as Postulates 157

5.4 Conventions of Notational Abbreviation 159

6 More arguments against analyticity 163

6.1 The Regress Argument 163

6.2 The Indeterminacy of Translation 170

6.3 Two Arguments from Externalism 175

6.4 An Argument from Vagueness 177

6.5 Blue Gold, Robot Cats 180

III Work for Epistemologists

7 Analytic Justification 195

7.1 A Priori Justification 196

7.2 Analytic Justification 198

7.3 Theory 1: Naive Analytic Justification 199

7.4 Theory 2: Nihilism about Analytic Justification 202

7.5 The Problem of Semantic Competence 203

7.6 An Alternative Basis for Analytic Justification 207

7.7 Theory 3: Analytic Justification 209

7.8 Some Consequences 215.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages [223]-228) and index.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Class of 1953 Fund.

ISBN:

9780199232192

0199232199

OCLC:

181068376