Structure and being : a theoretical framework for a systematic philosophy / Lorenz B. Puntel ; translated by and in collaboration with Alan White.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Puntel, Lorenz B. (Lorenz Bruno)

Contributor:

White, Alan, 1951-

Standardized Title:

Struktur und Sein. English

Language:

English

German

Subjects (All):

Philosophy.

Physical Description:

xxvi, 518 pages ; 25 cm

Place of Publication:

University Park, Pa. : Pennsylvania State University Press, [2008]

Summary:

"Presents, and in part develops, a systematic philosophy as the universal science, or the theorization of the unrestricted universe of discourse, explicitly including being as such and as a whole. Argues that complete exploration of the theoretical domain requires such a science"--Provided by publisher.

Contents:

1 Global Systematics: Determination of the Standpoint of the Structural-Systematic Philosophy 22

1.1 A Theoretical Framework for a Systematic Philosophy: The Complexity of the Concept and of Its Presentation 22

1.2 A First Determination of Systematic Philosophy 26

1.2.1 A Quasi-Definition of the Structural-Systematic Philosophy 26

1.2.2 "Theory" 27

1.2.3 "Structure" 27

1.2.4 "Unrestricted Universe of Discourse" 30

1.2.5 "Most General or Universal Structures" 33

1.2.6 "Systematic Philosophy" and "Philosophical System" 35

1.3 Structure and Being: A First Characterization of the Basic Idea Behind the Structural-Systematic Philosophy 36

1.4 The Idealized Four-Stage Philosophical Method 41

1.4.1 The Problem of Method 41

1.4.2 First Methodic Stage: Identification of Structures and Construction of Minimal and Informal Formulations of Theories 42

1.4.3 Second Methodic Stage: Constitution of Theories 44

1.4.4 Third Methodic Stage: Systematization of Theories 50

1.4.5 Fourth Methodic Stage: Evaluation of the Comprehensive System or Network with Respect to Theoretical Adequacy and Truth Status 51

1.5 (Self-)Grounding of Systematic Philosophy? 52

1.5.1 On the Concept of Grounding in General 52

1.5.2 The Problem of Grounding in Philosophy 54

1.5.2.1 On the Nonsystematic Concept of Grounding 55

1.5.2.2 The Systematic Process of Grounding and Its Forms, Stages, or Levels 64

1.5.2.3 The Process of Systematic Grounding as an Idealized Form of the Practice of Systematic Grounding 71

2 Systematics of Theoreticity: The Dimension of Philosophical Presentation 74

2.1 Theoreticity as a Dimension of Presentation 74

2.2 Language as the Medium of Presentation for Theoreticity 76

2.2.1 Language, Communication, and Dimension of Presentation 77

2.2.2 Normal or Ordinary Language and Philosophical Language 78

2.2.3 Philosophical Language as Theoretical Language 89

2.2.3.1 The Linguistic Criterion for Theoreticity 89

2.2.3.2 Basic Features of a Program for the Development of a Systematic Philosophical Language 94

2.2.4 The Centrality of Language to Philosophy 96

2.2.5 From the Dimension of Language to the Dimension of Knowledge: The Roles of Speaker and Subject 97

2.3 The Epistemic Dimension as the Domain of the Accomplishment of Theoreticity 99

2.3.1 On the Problem of the Epistemic Subject (or of Epistemic Subjectivity) 99

2.3.2 On the Systematic Status of the Epistemic Dimension-The Dimension of Knowledge 101

2.3.2.1 The Ambiguity of "Knowledge" 101

2.3.2.2 Knowledge as a Philosophical Problem 102

2.3.2.3 Knowledge and Cognition in Kant 108

2.3.2.4 Subjectivity and Knowledge with Respect to Systematicity 110

2.3.2.5 A Reversal of Perspective: The Indispensable but Secondary Theoretical Status of the Epistemic Dimension 117

2.4 The Dimension of Theory in the Narrower Sense 121

2.4.1 On the Proper Concept of Theory in General 121

2.4.2 The Theory-Concept in Metalogic/Metamathematics and in Philosophy of Science 121

2.4.2.1 The "Logical" Theory-Concept 121

2.4.2.2 The "Scientific" Theory-Concept I: The "Received View" 122

2.4.2.3 The "Scientific" Theory-Concept II: "Semantic Approaches" 124

2.4.2.3.1 Bas van Fraassen's Constructive-Empiricist Position 124

2.4.2.3.2 The Structuralistic Conception of Theory 127

2.4.3 A Structural Theory-Concept for (Systematic) Philosophy 130

2.4.3.1 The Problematic 130

2.4.3.2 The Essential Components of a Structural Theory-Concept for Systematic Philosophy 136

2.4.3.3 The Structural Theory-Concept as Regulative, and Its Approximative-Partial Realization 138

2.5 Fully Determined Theoreticity: First Approach to a Theory of Truth 141

2.5.1 Preliminary Questions 141

2.5.1.1 The Word "Truth" and the Problem of the Concept of Truth 141

2.5.1.2 Substantialism and Deflationism 144

2.5.1.3 "Truth" as Predicate and as Operator 145

2.5.1.4 Comprehensive Theory of Truth and Subtheories of Truth 147

2.5.2 The Basic Idea of Truth 148

2.5.2.1 The Fundamental Fact About Language: Linguistic Items Require Determination 148

2.5.2.2 The Three Levels of Semantic Determination 149

2.5.2.3 The Interconnection of the Three Levels: The Explicitly Semantic Dimension as Fundamental 152

2.5.2.4 Informal-Intuitive Formulation of the Fundamental Idea of Truth 153

3 Systematics of Structure: The Fundamental Structures 155

3.1 What Is the Systematics of Structure? 155

3.1.1 The Basic Idea 155

3.1.2 Preliminary Clarifications of Terms and Concepts 158

3.1.2.1 "Concept," "Meaning," "Sense," "Bedeutung," "Semantic Value," "Thought," "Proposition," "State of Affairs" 158

3.1.2.2 "Object," "Property," "Relation," "Fact," and Other Entities 163

3.1.2.3 "Category" 164

3.1.3 The Systematic-Architectural Status in Philosophy of the Expanded Concept of Structure 167

3.1.4 The Program of a Philosophical Systematics of Structure 168

3.1.5 The Status of Language and Semantics Within the Systematics of Structure 170

3.2 The Three Levels of Fundamental Structures 172

3.2.1 Formal Structures 172

3.2.1.1 Logic, Mathematics, and Philosophy 172

3.2.1.2 Mathematical Structures 175

3.2.1.3 Logical Structures 178

3.2.2 Semantic Primary Structures 183

3.2.2.1 General Characterization 183

3.2.2.2 The Decisive Option: Ontologically Oriented Semantics for Philosophical Language 185

3.2.2.3 Critique of the Semantics and Ontology That Are Based on the Principle of Compositionality 186

3.2.2.3.1 Basic Features of Compositional Semantics: Compositional Semantic Structures 186

3.2.2.3.2 Critique of Compositional Semantics and Ontology: The Unacceptability of Substance as Fundamental Ontological Category 190

3.2.2.3.2.1 Substance Ontology and Its Alternatives in Contemporary Philosophy 190

3.2.2.3.2.2 The Root Problem with All Conceptions of Substance 193

3.2.2.3.2.3 Quine's Procedure for the Elimination of Singular Terms: An Insufficient Means for Accomplishing a Philosophical Revolution 195

3.2.2.4 Basic Features of a Semantics Based on a Strong Version of the Context Principle 199

3.2.2.4.1 A Strong Version of the Semantic Context Principle 199

3.2.2.4.1.1 Incompatibility of the Context Principle and the Principle of Compositionality 200

3.2.2.4.1.2 Basic Features of and Requirements for a Strong Version of the Context Principle 201

3.2.2.4.1.3 The Problem of Identity Conditions for Primary Propositions (and Primary Facts) 203

3.2.2.4.2 The Concept of Contextual Semantic Structure: Primary Propositions as Semantic Primary Structures 207

3.2.3 Ontological Structures 208

3.2.3.1 Definition of Ontological Primary Structures (Primary Facts) 208

3.2.3.2 Simple Primary Facts as Simple Ontological Primary Structures 209

3.2.3.3 Forms of Configuration as Ontological Structures 214

3.2.3.3.1 On the Relation Between Logical/Mathematical Structures and Ontological Structures 215

3.2.3.3.2 Configurations and Propositional Logic 216

3.2.3.3.3 Configurations and First-Order Predicate Logic 218

3.2.3.3.4 Forms of Configurations: Expansions of Classical Logic and the Multiplicity of Mathematical Structures 222

3.3 Theory of Truth as Explication (Articulation) of the Fully Determinate Connections Among Fundamental Structures 222

3.3.1 A More Precise Characterization of the Basic Idea of Truth 223

3.3.2 The So-Called "Truth-Bearers" and the Fundamental Structures 226

3.3.3 Truth as Composition of Three Functions: The Tristructural Syntactic-Semantic-Ontological Connection 227

3.3.3.1 The Syntactic-Semantic Dimension: A "Cataphoric" Theory 227

3.3.3.2 The Semantic-Ontological Dimension: The Identity Thesis 231

3.3.3.2.1 The Fully Determined Semantic Status of Language and the Ontological Dimension 231

3.3.3.2.2 The Ontological Import of Truth as Identity of Proposition and Fact (the Identity Thesis) 232

3.3.3.2.3 The Ontology of Primary Facts as the Ontology Appropriate to the Structural Truth-Theory 235

3.3.4 Three Concluding Questions 236

3.3.4.1 Starting Points for a Theory of Falsity 237

3.3.4.2 On the Ontological Import of the Truth of Formal (Logical and Mathematical) Propositions or Structures 239

3.3.4.3 A Moderate Relativism with Respect to Truth 241

4 World-Systematics: Theory of the Dimensions of the World 246

4.1 The Concept of World 247

4.1.1 World, Universe of Discourse, and Being as a Whole 247

4.1.2 The Most Important Domains or Subdimensions of the Actual World 249

4.2 The "Natural World" 250

4.2.1 Is a Philosophy of the Natural World at all Possible? 251

4.2.1.1 An Instructive Example: The Philosophical Incoherence of Quine's Attempted Reconciliation of "Naturalism" and "Global Ontological Structuralism" 251

4.2.1.2 The Interdependence of Philosophy and the Natural Sciences 257

4.2.2 Major Tasks and Global Theses of a Philosophy of the Natural World Connected to the Natural Sciences 260

4.2.2.1 The Categorial-Structural Constitution of the Natural World 261

4.2.2.2 The Natural World and the Plurality of Domains of Being(s): The "Ontological Difference" 262

4.3 The Human World 263

4.3.1 Philosophical Anthropology, or Philosophy of Mind 263

4.3.1.1 What is an Individual, Categorially/Structurally Considered? 263

4.3.1.2 The Individual Human Being as Person 264

4.3.1.2.1 On the Problematic of the Adequate Formal Articulation of the Concept of Configuration 265

4.3.1.2.2 Is "Configuration" the Adequate Ontological Structure of the Individual Human Being as Person? 269

4.3.1.2.2.1 A Fundamental Systematic-Methodological Consideration 270

4.3.1.2.2.2 The Elements of the Configuration Constituting the Human Individual 273

4.3.1.2.2.3 The Unifying Point as the Factor Configuring the Configuration 275

4.3.1.2.2.4 Intentionality and Self-Consciousness 278

4.3.1.2.3 Is the Human Individual or Person Explicable Materialistically/Physicalistically? 282

4.3.1.2.3.1 On the Current Discussion 282

4.3.1.2.3.2 An Argument Against Physicalism 287

4.3.2 Moral Action and Moral Values (Ethics) 290

4.3.2.1 On the Theoretical Character of Ethical Sentences 291

4.3.2.1.1 The Ambiguity of "Practical Philosophy" and of "Normative Ethics" 291

4.3.2.1.2 Primarily Practical, Theoretical-Deontic, and Theoretical-Valuative Sentences 293

4.3.2.2 The Ontological Dimension of Ethical Truth: Ontological Values 296

4.3.2.3 The Distinction Between Basal-Ontological Values and Moral-Ontological Values 298

4.3.2.4 The Ontological Status of Basal-Ontological Values 300

4.3.2.4.1 The General-Metaphysical Perspective 300

4.3.2.4.2 The Metaphysical-Anthropological Perspective 301

4.3.2.5 The Ontological Status of Moral-Ontological Values 303

4.4 The Aesthetic World 305

4.4.1 The Three Central Logical-Semantic Forms of Aesthetic Sentences 306

4.4.2 The Universal Aesthetic Dimension: Beauty as Fundamental Concept 314

4.4.3 The Specific Dimension of Art 318

4.4.4 Two Objections 322

4.5 The World as a Whole 324

4.5.1 Natural-Scientific Cosmology 324

4.5.2 The Phenomenon of the Religious and the Plurality of Religions: The Necessity of a Philosophical Interpretation 329

4.5.3 World History 332

4.5.3.1 Philosophy of World History and the Science of History 333

4.5.3.2 The Ontology of World History 334

4.5.3.3 Does World History Have an Inner Structure? 340

4.5.3.4 Does World History Have a Meaning? 342

4.5.3.4.1 Preliminary Clarifications 342

4.5.3.4.2 Reasons for the Necessity of a Comprehensively Systematic Theory of World History 345

4.5.3.4.3 Presuppositions for a Comprehensively Systematic Theory That Clarifies the Meaning of World History 350

5 Comprehensive Systematics: The Theory of the Interconnection of All Structures and Dimensions of Being as Theory of Being as Such and as a Whole 357

5.1 The Philosophical Status of Comprehensive Systematics 357

5.1.1 Comprehensive Systematics as Structural Metaphysics 357

5.1.2 The Primary Obstacle to the Development of a Comprehensive Systematics as Structural Metaphysics 359

5.1.2.1 The Problem of the Gap Putatively Separating the Theorist from Reality as It Is "In Itself" 360

5.1.2.2 Examples of Failed Attempts to Solve the Problem of the Putative Gap 361

5.1.3 Comprehensive Clarification of the Problem of the Putative Gap as Starting Point for a Theory of Comprehensive Systematics: Four Fundamental Theses 369

5.1.3.1 Thesis One: The Appropriate Form of Presentation for the Structural-Systematic Philosophy Requires Sentences in the Purely Theoretical Form 369

5.1.3.2 Thesis Two: Semantics and Theories of Beings and of Being are Fundamentally Interrelated 370

5.1.3.3 Thesis Three: Expressibility Is a Factor Fundamental to the Structurality of Beings and of Being 371

5.1.3.4 Thesis Four: Philosophical Languages Are Languages of Presentation 371

5.1.4 The Adequate Concept of Theoretical-Philosophical Language 371

5.1.4.1 Language, Communication, and Presentation 372

5.1.4.2 The Fundamental Criterion for the Determination of the Basic Structures of an Adequately Clarified Philosophical Language 373

5.1.4.3 Philosophical Language as Semiotic System with Uncountably Many Expressions 374

5.1.4.3.1 The Realism/Anti-Realism Debate as a Dead End: Reasons and Consequences 374

5.1.4.3.2 An Essential Presupposition for the Universal Expressibility of the World (of Being): Theoretical Languages with Uncountably Many Expressions 378

5.1.4.3.2.1 The Possibility in Principle of Semiotic Systems with Uncountably Many Signs/Expressions 378

5.1.4.3.2.2 A Fundamental Problem: Language and "Tokening System" (the Position of Hugly and Sayward) 380

5.1.4.3.2.3 The Status of Tokening Systems for Theoretical Languages 384

5.1.4.3.3 The Segmental Character of Effective Theoretical Languages 387

5.1.4.4 Are There Uncountably Many Entities? 392

5.1.4.5 Is Philosophical or Scientific Language a Purely Human Production? Or What, Ultimately, Is (a) Language? 394

5.1.5 The Plurality of Languages: Its Ontological Interpretation, and Several Consequences 397

5.1.5.1 In What Sense and on What Basis Is There a Plurality of (Theoretical) Languages? 397

5.1.5.2 The Ontological Ramifications of the Plurality of Theoretical Languages 398

5.1.5.2.1 On Various Approaches to the Problem 398

5.1.5.2.2 A Suggested Three-Step Solution to the Problem 401

5.1.5.2.2.1 First Step: The Ontologization of the Theoretical Sphere 402

5.1.5.2.2.2 Second Step: Changing the Focus of the (Philosophical/Scientific) Perspective from Subjectivity to Being (Nature, the World) 402

5.1.5.2.2.3 Third Step: Three Pairs of Concepts as Criteria for Judging the Strength or Weakness of the Ontological Adequacy of Theoretical Frameworks 405

5.1.6 Summary: Comprehensive Systematics as Universal Theory 411

5.2 Basic Features of a Theory of Being as Such and as a Whole 413

5.2.1 What is Being as Such and as a Whole? 413

5.2.2 Talk of "the Whole (the Totality)": Semantics, Logic/Mathematics, and Philosophy 421

5.2.3 The Primordial Dimension of Being, the Actual World, and the Plurality of Possible Worlds 431

5.2.4 The Inner Structurality of the Primordial Dimension of Being: The Most Universal Immanent Characteristics 436

5.3 Starting Points for a Theory of Absolute Being 441

5.3.1 Preliminary Clarifications 441

5.3.2 The Decisive Step: The Primordial Difference with Respect to Being as the Difference Between the Absolutely Necessary and the Contingent Dimensions of Being 443

5.3.3 Additional Remarks and Clarifications 446

5.3.4 Additional Steps in the Explication of the Absolutely Necessary Dimension of Being 451

6 Metasystematics: Theory of the Relatively Maximal Self-Determination of Systematic Philosophy 461

6.1 The Status of Metasystematics 461

6.1.1 Metasystematics and Metaphilosophy 461

6.1.2 The Metasystematic Self-Determination of the Structural-Systematic Philosophy and the Criterion of Relatively Maximal Intelligibility and Coherence 463

6.2 Immanent Metasystematics 467

6.2.1 What is Immanent Metasystematics? 467

6.2.2 Three Aspects of Immanent Metasystematics 467

6.3 External Metasystematics 469

6.3.1 What Is External Metasystematics? 469

6.3.2 External Intratheoretical Metasystematics 470

6.3.2.1 External Intratheoretical Interphilosophical Metasystematics 470

6.3.2.2 External Intratheoretical Philosophical-Nonphilosophical Metasystematics 477

6.3.3 Extratheoretical Metasystematics 480

6.4 Self-Determination, Metasystematics, and the Self-Grounding of the

Structural-Systematic Philosophy 481.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages [485]-498) and index.

ISBN:

9780271033730

0271033738

OCLC:

212410046