Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) / Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O'Connell.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Pirnie, Bruce, 1940-

Contributor:

O'Connell, Edward.

Series:

Rand counterinsurgency study ; paper 2.

Rand counterinsurgency study ; v. 2

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Postwar reconstruction--Iraq.

Postwar reconstruction.

Counterinsurgency.

Iraq.

Counterinsurgency--Iraq.

Physical Description:

xxvii, 106 pages : color illustrations ; 23 cm.

Place of Publication:

Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 2008.

Summary:

This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on COIN; analyzes COIN operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about COIN, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future COIN operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct COIN in the future. For example, U.S. COIN experience in Iraq has revealed the need to achieve synergy and balance among several simultaneous civilian and military efforts and the need to continually address and reassess the right indicators to determine whether current strategies are adequate. The need to continually reassess COIN strategy and tactics implies that military and civilian leaders must have not only the will, but also a formal mechanism, to fearlessly and thoroughly call to the attention of senior decisionmakers any shortfalls in policies and practices, e.g., in Iraq, failure to protect the civilian population, as well as overreliance on technological approaches to COIN. The Iraq experience is particularly germane to drawing lessons about COIN. In essence, the conflict there is a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by fanatical foreign jihadists and criminal opportunists-a combination of factors likely to be replicated in insurgencies elsewhere.

Contents:

Summary

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

Overview of the conflict in Iraq

Ba'athist regime

Invasion of Iraq

Occupation of Iraq

First priority : setting up a constitutional government

Spring

The spiral downward begins (Spring 2004)

Benchmark one : holding Iraqi elections

Islamic extremists and sectarian violence

A U.S. approach hesitantly unfold

Armed groups in Iraq

Overview

Kurdish separatists

Sunni Arab insurgents

Violent extremists

Shi'ite Arab militias

Criminal gangs

Insurgent use of terrorism

Counterinsurgency in Iraq

Organization and recognition of the U.S. COIN effort is slow to unfold

Traditional U.S. military forces may need to be adjusted

Fallujah

Tal Afar

Baghdad

Air support

Combatting improvised explosive devices

Detainee operations

U.S. development and support of Iraqi forces

Iraqi police

Iraqi armed forces

Assessing progress in counterinsurgency

Iraqi casualties and displacement

Iraqi economy

Iraqi opinion

Accounting for success and failure

Understanding Iraqi society

Little planning for the occupation of Iraq

The impact of a lack od international support for the war

The disastrous effects of prematurely dismantling the Ba'athist regime

The challenge of building a new Iraqi state from scratch

Instituting a new system of justice

Undertaking the reconstruction of Iraq

The consequences of failing to maintain security early on military missions

Lck of infiltration and tips hinder intelligence on the insurgency

Building effective capabilities for counterinsurgency

Use of force

Public safety and security

Partnering with and enabling indigenous forces

Reporting on the enemy and infiltration

Provision of essential services

Informing and influencing operations

Rigorous and coordinated detainee operations

Recommendations

Development of strategy

Coalition-building

Planning process

Unity of effort

Interagency process

Host-nation governance

Funding mechanisms

Counterinsurgency as a mission

Protection of the indigenous population

Personnel policy

U.S. Army special forces

Partnership with indigenous forces

Policing functions

Brigade organization

Gunship-like capability

Intelligence collection and sharing.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 99-106).

ISBN:

9780833042972

0833042971

OCLC:

190843537