Mathematics and democracy : designing better voting and fair-division procedures / Steven J. Brams.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Brams, Steven J.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Voting--Mathematical models.

Voting.

Elections--Mathematical models.

Elections.

Finance, Public--Mathematical models.

Finance, Public.

Physical Description:

xvi, 373 pages ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, [2008]

Summary:

Voters today often desert a preferred candidate for a more viable second choice to avoid wasting their vote. Likewise, parties to a dispute often find themselves unable to agree on a fair division of contested goods. In Mathematics and Democracy, Steven Brams, a leading authority in the use of mathematics to design decision-making processes, shows how social choice and game theory could make political and social institutions more democratic. Using mathematical analysis, he develops rigorous new procedures that enable voters to better express themselves and that allow disputants to divide goods more fairly.

One of the procedures that Brams proposes is "approval voting," which allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable. There is no ranking, and the candidate with the most votes wins. The voter no longer has to consider whether a vote for a preferred but less popular candidate might be wasted. In the same vein, Brams puts forward new, more equitable procedures for resolving disputes over divisible and indivisible goods.

Contents:

Electing a single winner : approval voting in practice

Electing a single winner : approval voting in theory

Electing a single winner : combining approval and preference

Electing multiple winners : constrained approval voting

Electing multiple winners : the minimax procedure

Electing multiple winners : minimizing misrepresentation

Selecting winners in multiple elections

Selecting a governing coalition in a parliament

Allocating cabinet ministries in a parliament

Allocating indivisible goods : help the worst-off or avoid envy?

Allocating a single homogeneous divisible good : divide-the-dollar

Allocating multiple homogeneous divisible goods : adjusted winner

Allocating a single heterogeneous good : cutting a cake

Allocating divisible and indivisible goods

Summary and conclusions.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages [343]-362) and index.

ISBN:

9780691133201

0691133204

9780691133218

0691133212

OCLC:

144547881