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Strategy : an introduction to game theory / Joel Watson.
Table of contents only Available online
View onlineLIBRA HB144 .W37 2008
Available from offsite location
- Format:
- Book
- Author/Creator:
- Watson, Joel.
- Language:
- English
- Subjects (All):
- Game theory.
- Economics--Psychological aspects.
- Economics.
- Strategic planning.
- Physical Description:
- xvii, 404 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
- Edition:
- Second edition.
- Place of Publication:
- New York : W.W. Norton, [2008]
- Summary:
- In this innovative textbook, Joel Watson adopts a refreshing new format for teaching game theory to advanced undergraduates. The book is rigorous and mathematically precise but also extremely careful in its focus on using the simplest possible models and least complicated mathematics necessary. Another innovation of the book is the way in incorporates elements of contemporary contract theory into the exposition, in a format that is highly engaging for students and easily adapted to the standard coverage familiar to teachers.
- Contents:
- The extensive form
- Strategies and the normal form
- Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs
- General assumptions and methodology
- Dominance and best response
- Rationalizability and iterated dominance
- Location and partnership
- Nash equilibrium
- Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting
- Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
- Strictly competitive games and security strategies
- Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings
- Details of the extensive form
- Backward induction and subgame perfection
- Topics in industrial organization
- Parlor games
- Bargaining problems
- Analysis of simple bargaining games
- Games with joint decisions; negotiation equilibrium
- Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership
- Repeated games and reputation
- Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill
- Random events and incomplete information
- Risk and incentives in contracting
- Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability
- Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
- Job-market signaling and reputation.
- Notes:
- Includes bibliographical references and index.
- Local Notes:
- Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Alumni and Friends Memorial Book Fund.
- ISBN:
- 9780393929348
- 0393929345
- OCLC:
- 144330953
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