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Strategy : an introduction to game theory / Joel Watson.

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Lippincott Library HB144 .W37 2008
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LIBRA HB144 .W37 2008
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Watson, Joel.
Contributor:
Alumni and Friends Memorial Book Fund.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Game theory.
Economics--Psychological aspects.
Economics.
Strategic planning.
Physical Description:
xvii, 404 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
Edition:
Second edition.
Place of Publication:
New York : W.W. Norton, [2008]
Summary:
In this innovative textbook, Joel Watson adopts a refreshing new format for teaching game theory to advanced undergraduates. The book is rigorous and mathematically precise but also extremely careful in its focus on using the simplest possible models and least complicated mathematics necessary. Another innovation of the book is the way in incorporates elements of contemporary contract theory into the exposition, in a format that is highly engaging for students and easily adapted to the standard coverage familiar to teachers.
Contents:
The extensive form
Strategies and the normal form
Beliefs, mixed strategies, and expected payoffs
General assumptions and methodology
Dominance and best response
Rationalizability and iterated dominance
Location and partnership
Nash equilibrium
Oligopoly, tariffs, crime, and voting
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
Strictly competitive games and security strategies
Contract, law, and enforcement in static settings
Details of the extensive form
Backward induction and subgame perfection
Topics in industrial organization
Parlor games
Bargaining problems
Analysis of simple bargaining games
Games with joint decisions; negotiation equilibrium
Unverifiable investment, hold up, options, and ownership
Repeated games and reputation
Collusion, trade agreements, and goodwill
Random events and incomplete information
Risk and incentives in contracting
Bayesian nash equilibrium and rationalizability
Lemons, auctions, and information aggregation
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Job-market signaling and reputation.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Local Notes:
Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the Alumni and Friends Memorial Book Fund.
ISBN:
9780393929348
0393929345
OCLC:
144330953

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