A metaphysics for scientific realism : knowing the unobservable / Anjan Chakravartty.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Chakravartty, Anjan

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Metaphysics.

Science.

Realism.

Physical Description:

xvii, 251 pages ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Summary:

Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Debates between realist and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science. Anjan Chakravartty traces the contemporary evolution of realism by examining the most promising recent strategies adopted by its proponents in responds to the forceful challenges of antirealist sceptics, resulting in a positive proposal for scientific realism today. He examines the core principles of the realist position, ans sheds light on topics including the varieties of metaphysical commitment required, and the nature of the conflict between realism and its empiricist rivals. By illuminating the connections between realist interpretations of scientific knowledge and the metaphysical foundations supporting them, his book offers a compelling vision of how realism can provide an internally consistent and coherent account of scientific knowledge.

Contents:

Part I Scientific realism today

1 Realism and antirealism; metaphysics and empiricism 3

1.1 The trouble with common sense 3

1.2 A conceptual taxonomy 8

1.3 Metaphysics, empiricism, and scientific knowledge 13

1.4 The rise of stance empiricism 17

1.5 The fall of the critique of metaphysics 20

2 Selective scepticism: entity realism, structural realism, semirealism 27

2.1 The entities are not alone 27

2.2 Lessons from epistemic structuralism 33

2.3 Semirealism (or: how to be a sophisticated realist) 39

2.4 Optimistic and pessimistic inductions on past science 45

2.5 The minimal interpretation of structure 52

3 Properties, particulars, and concrete structures 58

3.1 Inventory: what realists know 58

3.2 Mutually entailed particulars and structures 61

3.3 Ontic structuralism: farewell to objects? 70

3.4 Ontological theory change 76

3.5 Return of the motley particulars 80

Part II Metaphysical foundations

4 Causal realism and causal processes 89

4.1 Causal connections and de re necessity 89

4.2 Is causal realism incoherent? 96

4.3 A first answer: relations between events 102

4.4 A better answer: causal processes 107

4.5 Processes for empiricists 114

5 Dispositions, property identity, and laws of nature 119

5.1 The causal property identity thesis 119

5.2 Property naming and necessity 126

5.3 Objections: epistemic and metaphysical 134

5.4 Vacuous laws and the ontology of causal properties 141

5.5 Causal laws, ceteris paribus 147

6 Sociability: natural and scientific kinds 151

6.1 Law statements and the role of kinds 151

6.2 Essences and clusters: two kinds of kinds 156

6.3 Clusters and biological species concepts 162

6.4 Sociability (or: how to make kinds with properties) 168

6.5 Beyond objectivity, subjectivity, and promiscuity 174

Part III Theory meets world

7 Representing and describing: theories and models 183

7.1 Descriptions and non-linguistic representations 183

7.2 Representing via abstraction and idealization 187

7.3 Extracting information from models 192

7.4 The inescapability of correspondence 199

7.5 Approximation and geometrical structures 205

8 Approximate truths about approximate truth 212

8.1 Knowledge in the absence of truth simpliciter 212

8.2 Measuring "truth-likeness" 214

8.3 Truth as a comparator for art and science 218

8.4 Depiction versus denotation; description versus reference 224

8.5 Products versus production; theories and models versus practice 230.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

9780521876490

0521876494

OCLC:

149011911