A unified theory of collective action and social change / Luis Fernando Medina.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Medina Sierra, Luis Fernando, 1968-

Series:

Analytical perspectives on politics

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Patronage, Political.

Patron and client.

Social action.

Social change.

Physical Description:

xxiv, 278 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.

Place of Publication:

Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, [2007]

Contents:

I Theory 1

1 Why Another Book on Collective Action? 3

1.1 The Book's Basic Claims 3

1.2 A Plea for Comparative Statics 9

1.3 LPT's Privileged Status 14

1.4 A Short Methodological Note 17

2 Rational-choice Models of Collective Action: A Generalization and Critical Assessment 21

2.2 A General Model of the Collective Action Problem 23

2.3 A Formalization of Model 0 26

2.4 Single-equilibrium Models of Collective Action 29

2.4.1 The Olsonian Model of Collective Action 29

2.4.2 Selective Incentives 30

2.4.3 Implications of the Model 31

2.4.4 Outcome-independent Preferences in the Public Goods Model 33

2.5 Strategic Dominance and Equilibrium Uniqueness 35

2.6 Multiple-equilibria Models 37

2.6.1 Threshold Games 37

2.6.2 An Olsonian Model with Differential Costs 39

2.6.3 The "Stock-option" Model 40

2.6.4 Focal Points 44

2.6.5 Tipping Games 51

2.7 Which Is It, Then? 66

2.8 Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemmas 70

2.9 Bayesian Games 79

2.A Proof of Theorem 1 82

3 The Method of Stability Sets 87

3.2 The Method of Stability Sets in a 2 x 2 Coordination Game 88

3.2.1 Stability Sets of the Prisoners' Dilemma 99

3.3 Stability Sets and Other Related Concepts 101

3.3.1 The Problem of Infinite Regress 102

3.3.2 Equilibrium Selection and Probabilistic Predictions 105

3.3.3 Stability Sets and Evolutionary Games 107

3.4 The Tracing Procedure 108

3.4.1 A Numerical Example 111

3.4.2 An Illustrative Diagram 113

3.5 Nash Play in Collective Action Problems with Large Numbers of Players 115

3.6 An Example of Correlated Equilibria 120

3.7 Correlated Equilibrium: A Formal Definition 122

3.8 Tracing Correlated Equilibria 124

3.9 Tracing Equilibria in Large Games 127

3.10 In Lieu of a Conclusion 128

4 The Comparative Statics of Collective Action Problems 131

4.1 Single-equilibrium Models 131

4.1.1 The Public Goods Model 132

4.2 A Basic Model with Multiple Equilibria 134

4.2.1 The Main Result 136

4.2.2 Computing Stability Sets in a Generalized Collective Action Game 143

4.2.3 A Diagrammatic Presentation 144

4.2.4 A "Simple" Tipping Game 145

4.3 Toward an Analysis of Stability Sets in Repeated Games 152

II Applications 167

5 Clientelism as Political Monopoly 177

5.2 Clientelism in Society and in Politics 179

5.3 Contestability and Entry Deterrence in Political and Economic Monopolies 183

5.4 Clientelism and Collective Action 188

5.5 A Politico-economic Model of Clientelism 190

6 Wage Bargaining and Redistribution 201

6.2 A Limitation of Electoral Models 202

6.3 Distributive Coalitions in an Economy with Factors' Markets 204

6.4 The Political Economy of Labor-market Regulation and Income Support 212

6.4.1 The Economy 212

6.4.2 Electoral Preferences 215

6.4.3 Organized Collective Action 217

6.5 Interpreting the Results 222

6.6 Class Struggle and the Political Economy of Redistribution: Sweden and Germany in the Interwar Years 226

6.A Proofs of Main Results 245

6.A.1 Factor Demand 245

6.A.2 Proof of Lemma 2 246.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 259-270) and index.

ISBN:

9780472099955

0472099957

9780472069958

0472069950

OCLC:

77011438

Online:

Publisher description