Content, cognition, and communication : philosophical papers II / Nathan Salmon.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Salmon, Nathan U., 1951-

Series:

Salmon, Nathan U., 1951- Philosophical papers

Philosophical papers (Oxford University Press)

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Analysis (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

xvii, 361 pages ; 25 cm.

Place of Publication:

Oxford : Clarendon Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2007.

Summary:

Nathan Salmon presents a selection of his essays from the early 1980s to 2006, on a set of closely connected topics central to analytic philosophy. The book is divided into four thematic sections. The first contains six essays on the theme of direct reference, and associated issues regarding names and descriptions, demonstratives, and reflexivity. The following sections broaden the scope from philosophy of language, to include issues in epistemology and cognition. The four essays in the second section, under the heading of apriority, concern particular consequences of Millianism with respect to the semantic-epistemological status of certain special kinds of sentences. The five essays in the third section develop Salmon's project of reconciling Millianism with a host of problems posed by locutions of propositional attitude, especially by attributions of belief. The volume concludes with four essays about the distinction between meaning and use, or more generally, the distinction between semantics and pragmatics.

Contents:

Part I Direct Reference

1 A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn (1990) 3

2 Reflexivity (1986) 32

3 Reflections on Reflexivity (1992) 58

4 Demonstrating and Necessity (2002) 67

5 Are General Terms Rigid? (2003) 100

6 A Theory of Bondage (2006) 113

Part II Apriority

7 How to Measure the Standard Meter (1987) 141

8 How Not to Become a Millian Heir (1991) 159

9 Relative and Absolute Apriority (1993) 169

10 Analyticity and Apriority (1993) 183

Part III Belief

11 Illogical Belief (1989) 193

12 The Resilience of Illogical Belief (2006) 224

13 Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt (1995) 230

14 Relational Belief (1995) 249

15 Is De Re Belief Reducible to De Dicto? (1998) 270

Part IV Semantics and Pragmatics

16 Assertion and Incomplete Definite Descriptions (1982) 291

17 The Pragmatic Fallacy (1991) 298

18 The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly (2004) 309

19 Two Conceptions of Semantics (2004) 340.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages [351]-354) and index.

ISBN:

9780199282722

0199282722

9780199284726

0199284725

OCLC:

76360794