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Exploring terrorist targeting preferences / Martin C. Libicki, Peter Chalk, Melanie Sisson.

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Van Pelt Library HV6432 .L53 2007
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Libicki, Martin C.
Contributor:
Chalk, Peter.
Sisson, Melanie.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Terrorism--United States--Prevention.
Terrorism.
United States.
Physical Description:
xxii, 107 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm
Place of Publication:
Santa Monica, CA : RAND, 2007.
Summary:
Al Qaeda, the jihadist network personified by Osama bin Laden, uses terror to restore a caliphate free of Western influence. Understanding al Qaeda's strategic logic might suggest what U.S. targets it may seek to strike and why. This book posits four hypotheses to link means and ends. The coercion hypothesis suggests that terrorists are interested in causing pain, notably casualties, to frighten the United States into pursuing favorable policies. The damage hypothesis posits that terrorists want to damage the U.S. economy to weaken its ability to intervene in the Islamic world. The rally hypothesis holds that terrorism in the United States would be carried out to attract potential recruits' and supporters' attention. The franchise Hypothesis argues that today's jihadists pursue their own, often local, agendas with, at most, support and encouragement from al Qaeda itself. The authors conclude that the coercion and damage hypotheses are most consistent with prior attack patterns, expert opinion, and al Qaeda statements. The rally hypothesis appears to have weaker explanatory power. The franchise hypothesis coincides with the majority of post-9/11 attacks, but, unless such franchises are active in the United States, may not indicate what the next attack in the United States might be.
Contents:
Chapter 2 What Drives al Qaeda's Choice of Targets? 5
The al Qaeda Targeting Process: Four Hypotheses 8
The Coercion Hypothesis 9
The Damage Hypothesis 11
The Rally Hypothesis 12
The Franchise Hypothesis 14
Some Observations on Rationality 18
Alternatives to Rational Action 19
Organization 21
Chapter 3 Hypothesis Testing: Quantitative and Qualitative Measures 24
Measuring Intent 24
Quantitative Measures 25
Qualitative Measures 25
Modeling Intent 26
Coercion 26
Damage 29
Rally 30
Franchise 31
Testing Hypotheses Against Past Attacks 32
World Trade Center (WTC), New York, 1993 34
Khobar Towers, Riyadh, 1996 35
East Africa Embassy Bombings, Nairobi and Dar Es Salam, 1998 36
USS Cole, Yemen, 2000 37
WTC, New York, and Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia, 2001 37
Bali, 2002 39
Djerba, 2002 40
MV Limburg, Yemen, 2002 40
Mombasa, 2002 41
Casablanca, 2003 42
Istanbul, 2003 43
Madrid, 2004 43
Riyadh, 2004 44
Hilton Hotel, Taba, Egypt, 2004 45
Chapter 4 Hypothesis Testing: Al Qaeda Statements and Expert Observations 49
Al Qaeda's Reading of History Suggests the Leverage of Terrorism 49
The Coercion Hypothesis 52
The Damage Hypothesis 57
The Rally Hypothesis 61
The Franchise Hypothesis 66
Chapter 5 Ramifications for al Qaeda Attack Planning in the United States 73
Coercion 74
Soft Targets 74
Categorizing Potential Attacks 80
Damage 81
Radiological Releases 82
Biological Attacks on Agriculture 84
Categorizing Potential Attacks 86
Rally 86
Suicide Terrorism 87
Categorizing Potential Attacks 91
Franchise 91
Is the United States Off the Target List for the Time Being? 92.
Notes:
"MG-483."
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN:
083303913X
9780833039132
OCLC:
67345952

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