The ontological foundation of ethics, politics, and law / Francesco Belfiore.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Belfiore, Francesco.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Ethics.

Political science--Philosophy.

Political science.

Law--Philosophy.

Law.

Ontology.

Physical Description:

xix, 509 pages : illustrations ; 23 cm

Place of Publication:

Lanham, Md. : University Press of America, [2007]

Summary:

This extensive collection develops the philosophical content of sections from the previously published The Structure of the Mind (University Press of America, 2004). Dr. Belfiore begins from the basic ontological conception that considers the human "mind" or "spirit" as an evolving, conscious triad composed of intellect, sensitivity, and power, each exerting a selfish or moral activity. Through this approach the author develops new concepts about ethics, political philosophy, and the philosophy of law. Dr. Belfiore poses these and other concepts under the opinion that issues concerning human beings can only be discussed by referring to what humans are as ontological entities. Thus, the notions of good and norms of morality, law, and society are derived from the structure and function of the mind. It follows that the solutions Dr. Belfiore presents are the results of a discovery and not the consequence of a conscious choice. Otherwise stated, ethics, politics, and law are given an ontological foundation. For each topic considered, Dr. Belfiore shows how his thought can reinterpret the views of other philosophers. The result of this is an innovative and highly stimulating text, which is of interest to graduate students and scholars in the philosophical branches of ethics, politics, and law.

Contents:

Chapter 1 Premise: The Basic Ontological Conception 1

1.1 A New Ontological Conception: The Mind and Its Components 1

1.1.1 Expanding the Meaning of Descartes' "Cogito" 1

1.1.1.1 Critical Analysis of the "Cogito Ergo Sum" 1

1.1.1.2 The Mind, Its Components, and Its Products 3

1.1.1.2.1 The Intellect and the Products of Its Outward Activity: Ideas, Projects, and Fantasies 4

1.1.1.2.2 The Sensitiveness and the Products of Its Outward Activity: Sentiments 5

1.1.1.2.3 The Power and the Products of Its Outward Activity: Actions 5

1.1.1.2.4 The Inward Mind Activity (or Consciousness) and Its Products: Moral Events 6

1.1.2 The New Ontological Conception in Four Propositions 6

1.1.3 The Judgment Criteria for the Products of the Mind Components 7

1.1.3.1 Judgment by "Specific Criteria" 7

1.1.3.2 Judgment by the "Value Criterion", Valid for All Mind Products 8

1.1.3.2.1 Judgment of Ideas and Projects by the Value Criterion 8

1.1.3.2.2 Judgment of Sentiments by the Value Criterion 12

1.1.3.2.3 Judgment of Actions by the Value Criterion 12

1.1.3.2.4 Judgment of Moral Events by the Value Criterion 13

1.2 Synopsis of the Mind Components, Their Products, and Their Judgment Criteria 14

Chapter 2 Private Ethics: Consciousness and Moral Thoughts, Feeling, and Acts 19

2.1 Consciousness: The Inward Mind Activity That Produces the Moral Events 20

2.1.1 Moral Events (Moral Thoughts/Projects, Moral Feelings, and Moral Acts) 20

2.1.1.1 Moral Thoughts and Moral Projects/Decisions 21

2.1.1.2 Moral Feelings 22

2.1.1.3 Moral Acts 23

2.1.2 Defining Moral Events: Consciousness versus Selfishness 23

2.1.3 Moral Events versus Other Mental Products 24

2.1.3.1 Moral Thoughts and Moral Projects-Decision versus Selfish or personal Ideas and Projects-Decisions 25

2.1.3.1.1 Moral Thoughts (and Moral Conception) versus Selfish Ideas (and Scientific Theories) 25

2.1.3.1.2 Moral Projects and Decisions versus Personal (or Selfish) Projects and Decisions 26

2.1.3.2 Moral Feelings versus Personal (or Selfish) Sentiments 26

2.1.3.3 Moral Acts versus Personal (or Selfish) Actions 27

2.1.3.3.1 Features of Personal (or Selfish) Actions 27

2.1.3.3.2 Features of Moral Acts 28

2.1.3.3.3 Relationship Between Moral Acts and Personal Actions 29

2.1.4 Consciousness as the Generator of Moral Principles, Moral Values, and Moral Norms 30

2.1.4.1 Defining Moral Principles (Moral Thoughts), Moral Values (Moral Feelings), and Moral Norms (Moral Projects) 30

2.1.4.2 Hierarchical Arrangement of the Various "Moral Goods" 32

2.1.5 The "Ground Moral Norm" and the Spheres of Decreasing Moral Responsibility 36

2.1.5.1 The Ground Moral Norm: An "Open" (non Dogmatic) Norm 36

2.1.5.2 The Spheres of Decreasing Moral Responsibility of the Individual 37

2.1.5.2.1 Moral Responsibility Toward Others 37

2.1.5.2.2 Moral Responsibility Toward Oneself as the Origin of the Rights 41

2.1.5.3 The Limit of Moral Responsibility: The "Evolution-Allowing, Involution-Avoiding Condition" 42

2.1.6 The Imprecision in Defining Moral Goods and the Uncertainty in Moral Choices 44

2.2 Judgment of Moral Events 48

2.2.1 Judgment of Moral Events by the Morality Criterion 48

2.2.1.1 Moral Thoughts and Moral Judgments 48

2.2.1.1.1 The Supposed "Is-Ought Gap" and the "Evolution Toward Better States" as an Intrinsic Property of Mind 50

2.2.1.1.2 Filling the "Is-Ought Gap" (or Connecting Reason to Morals) 54

2.2.1.1.3 The Universalizability Principle 56

2.2.1.1.4 A New Version of the Universalizability Principle 65

2.2.1.1.5 Treating Men as Ends 68

2.2.1.1.6 Other Views About the Reason-Morals Relationship 69

2.2.1.2 Moral Feelings and Moral Judgments 70

2.2.1.2.1 Arguments Against the Role of Moral Feelings in Moral Judgments 71

2.2.1.2.2 The Notion of "Moral Feeling" in Classical Philosophical Works 71

2.2.1.2.3 The Notion of "Moral Feeling" in Modern Philosophy 74

2.2.1.3 Further Theories on Moral Judgment, Moral Thoughts, and Moral Feelings 89

2.2.1.3.1 Neither Utilitarianism nor Kantianism: Categorical Desires 89

2.2.1.3.2 Self-Interest Theories 90

2.2.1.3.3 Rawls' Constructivism: The Higher-Order Interests of Free and Equal Persons 93

2.2.1.3.4 Other Theories 97

2.2.1.4 Refusing Morality 108

2.2.1.4.1 Nietzsche's Thought 108

2.2.1.4.2 Moral Skepticism 111

2.2.1.5 Hard Moral Choices and Moral Dilemmas 122

2.2.1.5.2 Abortion: A Typical Hard Moral Case 123

2.2.1.5.3 Other Examples of Hard Moral Cases 129

2.2.1.6 Judgment of Moral Acts 131

2.2.1.6.1 Good versus Bad Moral Acts 131

2.2.1.6.2 Promoting the Evolution of Sensitiveness versus Promoting Happiness 132

2.2.1.6.3 Pursuing Mind Evolution as the Source of Human Rights 133

2.2.1.7 Classes of Good Moral Acts 134

2.2.1.7.1 The General Class of Good Moral Acts 134

2.2.1.7.2 The Sub-Classes of Good Moral Acts 135

2.2.1.8 The Selfishness/Consciousness Balance (or Outward versus Inward mind activity) 141

2.2.2 Judgment of Moral Events by the Value Criterion 143

2.3 Super-Normal and Abnormal Moral Behavior 145

2.3.1 Supererogation 145

2.3.2 Moral Formalism 145

2.3.3 Fanaticism 146

2.4 Human Freedom 148

2.4.1 The Claimed Freedom of Human Conduct 148

2.4.1.1 Personal Decisions and Actions, as Determined by the Prevailing Sentiment 148

2.4.1.2 Moral Decisions and Moral Acts as Determined by the Prevailing Moral Feelings 149

2.4.1.3 The Fundamental Moral Choice: Moral Projects versus Personal Projects (The Claimed "Free Will") 150

2.4.2 Moral Responsibility in the Absence of Internal Freedom 154

2.5 The Primacy of Ethics 157

2.5.1 Ethics and the Other Products of Mind Components 157

2.5.2 Ethics and Religion 158

Chapter 3 Public Ethics and Political Philosophy 161

3.1 Human Actions and Moral Acts: Their Judgment by the Value Criterion 161

3.1.1 Distinction of Actions into Particular and Universal by the Value Criterion 161

3.1.1.1 Society as the Result of the Universalization of Human Actions 162

3.1.1.1.1 The Origin of Human Society 162

3.1.1.1.2 Relationships Between Communities of Different Degrees of Universality 164

3.1.1.2 Public Selfish Actions versus Public Moral Acts as the Binomial Motor of Human Society 166

3.1.2 Social Institutions 169

3.1.2.1 The "Principle of the Best Approach to Universality" and the Public Justification of Social Institutions 170

3.1.2.1.1 Advantages of the "Principle of the Best Approach to the Universality of Public Actions" 172

3.1.2.1.2 The "Best Approach to Universality" and the Proposal of a "Gradational Democracy" 173

3.1.2.2 The "Voting Act" and Its Meaning 179

3.1.2.2.1 Making the "Voting Act" Free and Responsible 179

3.1.2.2.2 The Meaning of the "Voting Act" 181

3.1.2.3 The "Rating" of Actions (and of the Laws that Regulate Them), and the Public Justification of Power 183

3.1.2.3.1 The Rating of Actions and of Laws 183

3.1.2.3.2 Publicly Justified Power 183

3.1.2.3.3 Informal Mini-Communities 185

3.1.2.4 "Arrogance", "Violence", and Publicly Unjustified Power 187

3.1.2.5 Ethics and Politics, Duties and Rights 190

3.1.2.5.1 The Ethical Aspects of Politics: The "Evolution-Allowing Condition" as the Public Moral End 190

3.1.2.5.2 Duties as the Source of Rights 194

3.1.2.5.3 The Imprecision in Defining Public Moral Ends and Norms as Source of Discussion and Diverse (Competing but not Contrasting) Opinions 194

3.2 Political Concepts and Theories: Critique and Reinterpretation 198

3.2.1 General Concepts: 1. The Centrality of the Idea of Class to Understand Men and Society 198

3.2.2 General Concepts: 2.

Equality 199

3.2.2.1 Equality and Diversity 199

3.2.2.1.1 Equality of Human Beings: Their Common Properties and Universal Rights 199

3.2.2.1.2 Diversity of Human Beings: Their Individual Properties and Rights 200

3.2.2.1.3 Equality versus Diversity of Human Beings 202

3.2.2.2 Theories of Equality: A Critical Analysis 204

3.2.2.2.2 The Analysis of the Concept of Equality 205

3.2.2.2.3 Equality as Related to Meritocracy, Fraternity, and Friendship 220

3.2.2.2.4 The Confutation of the Concept of Equality 221

3.2.3 General Concepts: 3. Property 226

3.2.3.1 Private Property: Main Theories on Its Origin 227

3.2.3.2 A Justificatory Theory of Private Property 230

3.2.3.3 The Communal Property 234

3.2.3.4 Property, Liberty, and Virtues 236

3.2.4 Political Thought of Hobbes, Hume, and Nietzsche 237

3.2.4.1 Hobbes 238

3.2.4.2 Hume 240

3.2.4.3 Nietzsche 242

3.2.5 Utilitarianism 245

3.2.5.1 Happiness, Utility, and Welfare as Moral Ends 245

3.2.5.2 "Rule Utilitarianism" and "Government House Utilitarianism" 249

3.2.6 Liberal Equality and the Compensation for Inequalities 250

3.2.6.1 Rawls' Theory 250

3.2.6.1.1 Rawls' First Principle (Equal Right to Liberty) 250

3.2.6.1.2 Rawls' Second Principle (or Difference Principle) 250

3.2.6.1.3 Rawls' Rule of the Priority of Liberty (First Priority Rule) 254

3.2.6.1.4 Rawls' Rule of the Priority of Justice (Second Priority Rule) 254

3.2.6.2 Dworkin's Theory 256

3.2.6.3 Other Views on the Compensation for Inequalities 257

3.2.7 Libertarianism 259

3.2.8 Communism and Marxist Theories 266

3.2.8.1 Classic Communism and Historical Materialism: The Core of the Theory 266

3.2.8.1.1 Socialization of the Means of Production 268

3.2.8.1.2 The Alleged Abundance of Resources and the Need for Justice 272

3.2.8.2 "Exploitation" versus "Just Distribution" 272

3.2.8.2.1 On the Existence and Nature of the "Surplus Value" 273

3.2.8.2.2 Transfer of the "Surplus Value" 277

3.2.8.3 Alienation 278

3.2.8.4 Analytical Marxism and Non-Marxist Theories of Socialism 280

3.2.9 Communitarianism 280

3.2.10 Political Liberalism and Liberal Nationalism 283

3.2.10.1 Political Liberalism 283

3.2.10.2 Liberal Nationalism 285

3.2.11 Citizenship Theory 287

3.2.11.1 Citizenship Theory and Civic Virtues 287

3.2.11.2 Civic Republicanism 290

3.2.11.3 Teaching and Learning Civic Virtues 290

3.2.12 Multiculturalism 292

3.2.13 Feminism 298

3.2.14.1 Environmental Policy 301

3.2.14.2 Rebellion 302

3.3 Difficult moral choices in Public Life 304

3.3.2 Views About Dirty Hands Cases 307

3.3.2.1 Dirty-Hands Cases in Non-Democratic Non-Constitutional (Old and Modern) States 307

3.3.2.2 Dirty-Hands Cases in Modern Democratic Constitutional States 309

3.3.2.2.1 Dirty Hands and Democracy 309

3.3.2.2.2 The Alleged Justification of Dirty Hands 313

3.3.2.2.3 Against Dirty Hands 317

3.3.2.2.4 Comments on the Corruption in Political Life 322

3.4 International Politics 325

3.4.1 General Concepts and Ethical Issues 325

3.4.1.1 General Concepts 325

3.4.1.2 Ethical Issues in the International Politics 327

3.4.1.2.1 Ethics in the International Society 327

3.4.1.2.2 Remarks on War 329

3.4.2 Classical Theories on International Politics 331

3.4.2.1 Legal Positivism 331

3.4.2.2 Natural Law 333

3.4.2.3 Kantianism 334

3.4.2.4 Contractarian Thought 337

3.4.2.5 The Cosmopolitan Conception (Cosmopolitanism) 338

Chapter 4 Public Ethics and Philosophy of Law 345

4.1 A New Conception of Laws 345

4.1.1 Laws as Universal and Collective Projects 345

4.1.1.1 Defining Laws 345

4.1.1.2 Criteria for the Judgment of Laws 347

4.1.1.2.1 The Value Criterion 347

4.1.1.2.2 The Specific Judgment Criteria 348

4.1.1.3 The Two-Fold Nature and the Binding Force of Laws 348

4.1.1.3.1 The Two-Fold Nature of Laws 348

4.1.1.3.2 Validity, Efficaciousness, and Binding Force of Laws 350

4.1.1.4 Re-Definition of Laws 354

4.1.2 Laws and Rights in a Democratic Constitutional State 355

4.1.2.1 Laws in a Democratic Constitutional State 355

4.1.2.2 Duties as the Source of Rights in a Democratic Constitutional State 358

4.1.2.3 Norms, Laws, Rules, and Commands 359

4.2 Legal Theories: Critique and Reinterpretation 366

4.2.1 Natural Law Theory 366

4.2.1.1 Classical Views on Natural Law 366

4.2.1.2 Modern Views on Natural Law 368

4.2.1.2.1 The Ethical Basis of Law 368

4.2.1.2.2 Political Obligation (Reasons to Obey the Law) 370

4.2.1.2.3 Interpretation of "Prior Law" 371

4.2.2 Legal Positivism 373

4.2.2.1 Laws as Orders Backed by Threats 373

4.2.2.2 The Internal View of Laws 376

4.2.2.3 The System of Primary and Secondary Rules 378

4.2.2.3.1 The Distinction of Primary from Secondary Rules 378

4.2.2.3.2 The Nature of Secondary Rules (Rules of Recognition) 380

4.2.2.4 Laws and Morals 386

4.2.2.4.1 The "Minimum Content of Natural Law" Theory 386

4.2.2.4.2 Other Views on the Law-to-Morality Relationship 388

4.2.2.5 Dworkin's Rules, Principles, and Policies 391

4.2.3 The Indeterminacy of Law: Legal Formalism and Legal Realism 394

4.2.3.1 Legal Formalism 395

4.2.3.1.1 The Thesis of Legal Formalism 395

4.2.3.1.2 Legal Formalism and the Individuality of Judges 397

4.2.3.2 Legal Realism (Rule-Skepticism) 398

4.2.3.2.1 The Thesis of Legal Realism: Judges as Lawmakers 398

4.2.3.2.2 Legal Realism and the Binding Character of "Rules" 403

4.2.3.2.3 Legal Realism and the Internal View of Laws 405

4.2.3.2.4 Legal Realism and the "Final" Decisions 406

4.2.3.2.5 The Ultimate Criteria of Legal Validity 406

4.2.4 Other Legal Theories 409

4.2.4.1 Kantianism 409

4.2.4.2 Critical Legal Studies 411

4.2.4.3 The Rule of Law 413

4.2.5 Law and Economics 415

4.2.6 Constitutionalism 423

4.2.6.1 Moral Philosophy and Constitutional Law 423

4.2.6.2 The Nature and Function of Constitution 428

4.2.6.2.1 The Constitution and the Hierarchy of "Powers" 428

4.2.6.2.2 The Constitution and the Hierarchy of Laws 429

4.2.6.3 The Ontological Basis of the Separation of "Powers" 429

4.2.6.4 Different Constitutions 433

4.3 Adjudication 435

4.3.1 Defining Adjudication 435

4.3.1.1 Adjudication by Trial and Appellate Courts 435

4.3.1.2 Constitutional Constraint and Judicial Review 440

4.3.1.2.1 The Constitutional Constraint 441

4.3.1.2.2 The Judicial Review 443

4.3.2 Sanctions and Punishment 445

4.3.3 International and Supra-National Laws 449.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages [457]-481) and index.

ISBN:

0761836667

9780761836667

OCLC:

104799879