The sling and the stone : on war in the 21st century / Thomas X. Hammes.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Hammes, Thomas X.

Contributor:

John Penman Wood Library Fund.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Counterinsurgency.

Asymmetric warfare.

Operational art (Military science).

Military art and science--History--21st century.

Military art and science.

History.

Military art and science--History--20th century.

Physical Description:

xiv, 321 pages ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

St. Paul, MN : Zenith Press, [2004]

Summary:

David's sling-and-stone fight against Goliath isn't that far from Iraqi insurgents fighting against coalition forces. While the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to build a high-tech American military to win wars against other, albeit second-tier, Goliaths, insurgents have adopted and are practicing sling-and-stone, low-tech, fourth generation warfare (4GW). These 4GW warriors rely on networks of people over networks of state-of-the-art, high-tech weapons. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, explores the evolution and current practice of 4GW. "DOD's focus on high-tech drives its doctrine, organization, training, and education to teach people to take advantage of technology - not to think about, fight, and win wars," says Hammes. Just as the world has evolved from an industrial society to an information-based society, so has warfare. Information collection against today's threats requires a greater investment in human skills. Technology by itself is not the answer. The U.S. defense establishment's failure to address the importance of human knowledge over that of technology leaves us unprepared to deal with the kind of wars we are fighting today and those we are most likely to face in the future - fourth generation wars.

The Sling and the Stone explains why 4GW does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. As we've seen in Iraq, "servicing targets" with firepower isn't the answer. Fourth generation warfare is insurgency rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power. It uses all available networks - political, economic, social, and military - to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. Via its networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy's political will. Not only is 4GW the only kind of war America has ever lost, we have done so three times: Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. It has also defeated the Soviet Union (Afghanistan and Chechnya) and the French (Vietnam and Algeria). Arguably, 4GW has been the most successful form of war for the last 50 years. First defined by Mao, 4GW has evolved as each practitioner learned from his predecessors or co-combatants and refined its techniques.

Faced with enemies they could not beat using conventional war, 4GW warriors sought a different path. The anti-coalition forces in Iraq, the Chechans and the al-Qaeda network are simply the latest to use the tactics and techniques that have been developing for decades. "War has entered a new phase," says Hammes. "The fact that only unconventional or 4GW has succeeded against superpowers should be a key element in discussing the evolution of war. Unfortunately, it has been largely absent from the debate within the U.S. Department of Defense." Answers to the "hows" of 4GW along with recommendations for corrective actions are found in this insightful study of the strengths and weaknesses of conventional military power. Sure to be controversial, The Sling and the Stone should help stir the debate at the Defense Department and throughout the national security community about what kind of military our country needs and what kind of combat America's armed forces should be prepared to fight.

Contents:

Four generations of warfare

The first two generations of modern war

Transition to third-generation warfare

Changes in society

Mao and the birth of fourth-generation war

The Vietnamese modification

The Sandanista refinement

The Intifada : civilians versus an army

The al-Aqsa Intifada

Al-Qaeda : a transnational enemy

Afghanistan : a tribal network

Iraq : high-tech versus fourth-generation

Technology : not a panacea

Characteristics of fourth-generation war

Where to from here?

Evaluating the threat

The future is flexibility.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 296-310) and index.

Local Notes:

Acquired for the Penn Libraries with assistance from the John Penman Wood Library Fund.

ISBN:

0760320594

OCLC:

57010077