Iraqi security forces : a strategy for success / Anthony H. Cordesman ; with the assistance of Patrick Baetjer.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Cordesman, Anthony H.

Contributor:

Baetjer, Patrick.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.)

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Iraq War, 2003-2011.

Postwar reconstruction--Iraq.

Postwar reconstruction.

Armed Forces.

Iraq.

Iraq--Armed Forces.

Physical Description:

xxvi, 410 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm

Place of Publication:

Westport, Conn. : Praeger Security International, 2006.

Contents:

Saddam Hussein's "Powder Keg" xvii

America's Strategic Mistakes xx

The Importance of Creating Effective Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces xxiv

The Five Key Elements of Victory xxv

"Tipping Years" to Build Effective Forces xxv

1 The Importance of the Initial Failures in Grand Strategy and Strategic Assessment: The Background to the Effort to Create Effective Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces 1

The "Turkish Question" 2

Warning Indicators before and after the Fall 4

The Importance of Iraqi Public Opinion and Hostility and Distrust of Coalition Forces 5

Coalition Operations = "Occupier" Operations = Anger and Friction 6

Early Warning of the Need for Effective Iraqi Forces and True Interoperability: The Polls before the Transfer of Power 6

Iraqi Views Harden: The Polls in 2004 7

"Disbanding" Iraqi Forces 10

Disbanding the Corrupt and Incapable 11

The "De-Ba'athification and De-Saddamization" of Iraqi Forces 12

The Initial Ideological Approach to Creating Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces 15

Problems in the Culture of the U.S. Military 16

Failures at the U.S. Advisory and Civilian Assistance Level: The Problem of the Security Forces and Police 18

Problems in Governance and Iraq's Economy and Society 25

The Iraqi View: Failure to Foresee Insurgency, Not Postwar Disbandment, Is the Key Problem 26

The Legacy 27

2 The Growth and Character of the Insurgent Threat 29

Failing to Admit the Scope of the Problem through Mid-2004 29

Evolving Threat Tactics and Pressure on Government Forces 30

Political, Psychological, and Information Warfare Lessons 32

Lessons about Methods of Attack and Combat 40

Iraqi-U.S. Asymmetric Interaction and Noninteroperability 49

3 Coalition Training and Equipment Efforts: The Failures of 2003 51

Planning for the Wrong Forces and the Wrong Mission 55

Providing the Equipment and Training Effort with Too Little, Too Late 57

Initial Equipment Difficulties 58

Training and Force Development Coordination Problems 58

Tilting toward Reality 61

Shifts from October 2003 to Spring 2004 62

The Washington Problem 63

4 Failing to Deliver an Adequate Training and Equipment Program through the Tenure of the CPA and Mid-2004 65

The Period from June 2004 to the Fall of 2004 67

Progress in Training and Equipping Iraqi Security Forces 67

Progress at the Time the CPA Went Out of Business at the End of June 2004: The CPA View 69

Progress at the Time the CPA Went Out of Business at the End of June 2004: The GAO View 70

Too Little and Too Late in Getting Resources to the Iraqis 74

Force Status Data 75

Manpower and Training Status 76

The Overall Status of Iraqi Security Forces' Manning and Training Efforts 77

Progress and Problems in Creating an Effective Police Training Effort 78

Manning and Training Issues in Mid-2004 83

Equipment Issues in Mid-2004 84

Equipment Status under the CPA 85

The Equipment Effort at the End of the CPA 85

Militia and Civilian Disarmament Issues 87

The HUMINT Problem 91

5 The Fall of 2004: The Effort to Train Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces Slowly Begins to Gather Momentum 93

Creating More Effective Core Forces 94

Manning, Training, and Equipment of the Overall Mix of Iraqi Forces by Major Force Element 96

Equipment Holdings 99

Iraqi Minister of Defense Briefing-September 22, 2004 100

Resources as of September and October 100

6 The Status of Iraqi Forces in November 2004 103

Numbers of Active, Trained/Equipped/Authorized Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces as of Late November 2004 104

On Duty versus Trained and Equipped 104

Lack of Meaningful Equipment Reporting 106

Key Iraqi Force Components 106

Continuing Problems in Training the Police Forces 109

Warnings in a Senate Staff Report 109

The Critical Importance of Effective Police Forces 115

7 End of 2004 as a Benchmark: Trends in the Progress of Iraqi Security and Military Forces in December 2004 117

Manning at the End of 2004: A Statistical "Snapshot" 117

Manning at the End of 2004: Force Trends 119

Understanding the Manpower Trend Data 126

Equipment at the End of 2004 128

What Such Equipment Trend Data Mean 129

Facilities at the End of 2004 130

Spending at the End of 2004 131

Operational Readiness at the End of 2004 131

The Challenge of Deploying New Forces into Combat 132

Progress in Spite of Setbacks 132

Progress in Other Areas 134

8 The Run Up to Elections: Iraqi Security and Military Forces in January 2005 139

Manning in Levels in January 2005 140

Total Iraqi Manpower: Debate over Total Numbers 141

Equipment at the Beginning of 2005 143

Problems with Equipment Procurement within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense 144

Facilities 145

Operational Readiness 146

Other Force Developments 147

9 Iraqi Military and Security Forces in the Spring and Summer of 2005 151

Manning Levels of Iraqi Military and Security Forces Following the Election 155

Detailed Manpower Trends 158

The Meaning of a Constant Stream of Volunteers 161

Equipment Levels 162

The Quality of Equipment Deliveries 166

Beginning to Create Logistics and Support Capabilities 167

Vetting and Training 168

Ministry of Defense Training 169

Ministry of Interior Training 173

Embedded Advisory Teams: The Importance of the Luck Mission 180

Force Developments 186

Ongoing Force Developments 187

Near-Term Goals 196

Operational Readiness 198

Concerns over Iraqi Progress Following the Election 198

Increasing Deployment and Activity 200

The New Force Evaluation Matrix 202

Manpower Relative to Force Structure as Another Measure of the Readiness of Iraqi Forces 205

Problems and Progress in the Iraqi Police 206

The Iraqi Border Forces 212

The Issue of Financing 214

10 The Iraqi View of Iraq's Emerging Forces 219

Force Development Principles and Strategy 220

Developing Effective Ministries and "Governance" 221

Moving toward Iraqi Control of the Force Development Effort 222

Developing an Iraqi Force Plan 222

Iraqi Intelligence 224

Manpower Issues Affecting Force Development 226

Creating an Effective Iraqi Training Structure 227

The Iraqi View of Force Development 230

The Army 231

Merging the National Guard into the Army 231

The Air Force 232

Navy/Coast Guard 233

Ministry of the Interior Forces 233

Iraqis Do Not See the Past as the Defining Prologue to the Future 233

11 The Evolving Nature of the Insurgency and the Risk of Sectarian and Ethnic Conflict 237

An Unstable Mix of Threats 237

The Uncertain Cycles and Patterns in the Insurgency 239

Uncertain Claims That the Insurgency Is Losing Ground 240

Uncertain Trends in the Numbers 241

The Limits to the Insurgency 247

The Continuing Threat 249

Estimates of the Size of Threat Forces 249

Comparisons of Threat and Iraqi Forces 250

The Meaning of Coalition Victories and Insurgent Defeats 250

The Dominant Role of Iraqi Sunni Arab Insurgents 252

Ba'athists, Ex-Regime Loyalists, and/or "Sunni Nationalists" 254

Ba'athists, Non-Ba'athists, or Semi-Ba'athists? 255

Guesstimates and the "Numbers Game" 258

The Crime Problem 258

The Intelligence and Security Problem 259

Inclusion versus Exclusion 260

Islamist Groups and Outside Volunteers 261

The U.S.

State Department Assessment of Zarqawi 262

Zarqawi Operations in 2005 264

Zarqawi and Suicide Bombings and Volunteers 266

Zarqawi and "Weapons of Mass Media" 272

Zarqawi Ties to Bin Laden and Outside Sunni Islamist Groups 273

Zarqawi and Syria 276

Sunni Iraqi Nationalist versus Sunni Islamic Extremist, or De Facto Cooperation? 276

The Uncertain Status of the Shi'ites 278

The Role of Moqtada al-Sadr 279

The Role of Other Shi'ite Factions 280

Insurgent Pressure to Move toward Civil War 281

The Kurds and Other Minorities 284

The Role of Crime and Criminals 287

Other Forms of Financing the Insurgency 288

The Problem of Syria 291

The Problem of Iran 297

The Problem of Turkey 300

The Problem of Jordan 301

Iraqi Views of the Threat 302

Inclusion versus Conflict 303

Shi'ite Resistance to Sectarian Conflict 303

The Uncertain Role of Iraq's Sunnis 305

Insurgency and the Effectiveness and Visibility of Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces 308

12 Building the Future 315

Defining "Victory" and "Defeat" 316

The Broader Context of Success: A Nation for Iraqis and by Iraqis 317

Iraqi Sovereignty Means Iraqi Responsibility 318

Iraqi Responsibility for Taking Over the Security Mission 319

Creating Effective Iraqi Military, Security, and Police Forces 320

The Future Role of the United States and Coalition-and of U.S. and Coalition Forces 321

Foreign Troops and Iraqi Legitimacy 323

The Broader Question of American "Overstretch" 324

NATO, UN, and Regional Forces Are at Best a Temporary Expedient 324

The Role of NATO and European States 324

The United Nations and International Community 327

The Potential Role of Regional Forces 328

Ongoing Changes in U.S. Force Development Strategy 328

Seeking Success Rather Than an "Exit Strategy"-Changing the Main Mission of U.S. Forces 329

The Search for "Critical Mass" 331

Maintaining an Emphasis on Force Quality 332

Keeping the Police Effort in Balance 333

The Need to Provide All the Necessary Support and Resources 334

The Problem of Affordability, National Defense, and Transfer to the Iraqi Government 334

The Need for an Integrated Strategy 335

Integrating a Political, Economic, and Security Strategy 336

The Economic Aid Dimension 339

"Tipping Years" versus "Tipping Points": Opportunities and Recommendations for Changes in U.S. Policy and Actions 341

U.S. and Coalition Policy Priorities 342

Priorities for Iraqi Force Development 343

The Need for Focused Public Diplomacy 344

The Need for Metrics, Credibility, and Transparency 346

A Shifting Department of Defense Interest in Metrics 347

The Need for Public Transparency 348

The Tet Offensive Syndrome 349

The Broader Lessons for U.S. Policy and Planning 350

The Need for Accurate Grand Strategic Assessment 350

Nation-Building as a Critical Element of War Fighting 350

Undervaluing Local Military, Security, and Police Forces and Their Role in Shaping Legitimacy and Popular Support 352

Accepting the Need for Adequate U.S. Deployments and the Risk of Overstretch 353.

Notes:

"Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C."

Includes bibliographical references (pages [385]-410).

ISBN:

0275989089

OCLC:

60664381