Incentives to improve teaching : lessons from Latin America / Emiliana Vegas, editor.

Format:

Book

Government document

Contributor:

Vegas, Emiliana.

World Bank.

Series:

Directions in development (Washington, D.C.)

Directions in development

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Teachers--Salaries, etc--Latin America--Cross-cultural studies.

Rewards and punishments in education--Latin America--Cross-cultural studies.

School improvement programs--Latin America--Cross-cultural studies.

School improvement programs.

Rewards and punishments in education.

Teachers--Salaries, etc.

Latin America.

Genre:

Cross-cultural studies.

Physical Description:

xv, 435 pages : illustrations, map ; 23 cm.

Place of Publication:

Washington, D.C. : World Bank, [2005]

Summary:

Latin America faces tremendous challenges, particularly those of development, poverty, and inequality. Education is widely recognized as one of the most critical means of defeating these challenges. Democratizing education, by improving both its coverage and quality, is critical to overcoming the social and economic inequality that plagues Latin America. Ensuring that all children have the opportunity to learn critical skills at the primary and secondary level is paramount to overcoming skill barriers that perpetuate underdevelopment and poverty.

A growing body of evidence supports the intuitive notion that teachers play a key role in what, how, and how much students learn. Attracting qualified individuals into the teaching profession, retaining these qualified teachers, providing them with the necessary skills and knowledge, and motivating them to work hard and do the best job they can is arguably the key education challenge.

Incentives to Improve Teaching: Lessons from Latin America focuses on the impact of education reforms that alter teacher incentives on teaching quality and student learning. The reforms explored in this volume represent efforts by several countries in the region to increase teacher accountability and introduce incentives to motivate teachers to raise student learning. These efforts will be of interest to readers in governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, research institutions, and universities.

Contents:

1 Improving Teaching and Learning through Effective Incentives: Lessons from Education Reforms in Latin America / Emiliana Vegas, Ilana Umansky 1

Why and How Do Incentives Matter? 3

Incentives as a Broad and Complex Concept 4

Teacher Effectiveness and Student Performance 4

A Wide System Affecting Teaching and Learning 6

Education Reforms, Teaching Quality, and Student Learning 6

Review of Chapters 7

Improving Teaching Quality and Student Learning through Incentives 13

An Agenda for Further Research on Teacher Incentives 15

2 A Literature Review of Teacher Quality and Incentives: Theory and Evidence / Ilana Umansky 21

Principal-Agent Theory: Description and Critiques 22

Teacher Quality and Its Determinants 25

Current Educational Investment and Policies and Their Embedded Incentives 28

Merit Pay 35

School Organization 43

Political Economy of Reform 47

3 Are Teachers Well Paid in Latin America and the Caribbean? Relative Wage and Structure of Returns of Teachers / Werner Hernani-Limarino 63

How Can We Determine If Teachers Are Well Paid? 65

Are Teachers Well Paid? 74

4 Teachers' Salary Structure and Incentives in Chile / Alejandra Mizala, Pilar Romaguera 103

Who Are Chile's Teachers? 104

How Teachers' Salaries Are Determined 105

Changes in Teachers' Salaries 107

Effect of Salary Trends on Individuals Applying to Study Education 110

Analysis of Relative Teacher Pay 115

Incentives Embedded within Teachers' Salary Structure 127

Effect of the SNED on Schools' Academic Achievement: A Preliminary Evaluation 131

Evaluating Performance and Incentives: Teachers' and Principals' Perceptions 141

5 Educational Finance Equalization, Spending, Teacher Quality, and Student Outcomes: The Case of Brazil's FUNDEF / Nora Gordon, Emiliana Vegas 151

Background on Brazil's Education System and FUNDEF 154

Data 158

Empirical Strategy 168

Findings 173

Conclusions and Policy Implications 182

6 Arbitrary Variation in Teacher Salaries: An Analysis of Teacher Pay in Bolivia / Miguel Urquiola, Emiliana Vegas 187

Data 189

Teacher Pay in Bolivia 189

What Does the Pay Scale Reward? 192

The Flow of Teachers through the Salary Structure 197

Arbitrary Variation in Teacher Salaries 200

7 Teacher and Principal Incentives in Mexico / Patrick J. McEwan, Lucrecia Santibanez 213

The Carrera Magisterial Program 216

Data 217

Allocation of Promotions 222

Empirical Strategy 228

Results for Teachers 235

Results for Principals 245

8 Decentralization of Education, Teacher Behavior, and Outcomes: The Case of El Salvador's EDUCO Program / Yasuyuki Sawada, Andrew B. Ragatz 255

The Case of El Salvador's EDUCO Program 257

Empirical Analysis of the EDUCO Program 262

9 Teacher Effort and Schooling Outcomes in Rural Honduras / Emanuela di Gropello, Jeffery H. Marshall 307

Analytical Framework 308

Results 314

10 Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement in Nicaraguan Autonomous Schools / Caroline E. Parker 359

Nicaraguan Context 359

Nicaraguan Autonomy 360

Methods 367

Results 378

11 Political Economy, Incentives, and Teachers' Unions: Case Studies in Chile and Peru / Luis Crouch 389

Case Study of Chile: Reforms Designed and Implemented, Effect Yet to Be Seen 390

Case Study of Peru: Incentives Reforms Underdesigned, Unimplemented 405

Toward a Conclusion: Unions, Incentives, and Educational Progress in Latin America 417

1.1 Many Types of Teacher Incentives Exist 5

3.1 Unconditional Log Hourly Wage and Monthly Earnings Differential 66

3.2 Hours Worked Per Week 67

3.3 Unconditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers 78

3.4 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Coefficient for the Teachers' Dummy 80

3.5 Productivity Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Endowment Effect from the Oaxaca Decomposition 83

3.6 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Price Effect from the Oaxaca Decomposition 85

3.7 Contribution of the Difference in the Return to Schooling to the Conditional Log Wage Differential 88

3.8 Contribution of the Difference in the Returns to Potential Experience to the Conditional Log Wage Differential 89

3.9 Contribution of the Difference in Women's Wage Premiums to the Conditional Log Wage Differential 91

3.10 Contribution of the Difference in Rural Residence Wage Premium to the Conditional Log Wage Differential 92

3.11 Contribution of the Difference in Initial Wage to the Conditional Log Wage Differential 93

3.12 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Nonteachers by Quantile of the Conditional Wage Distribution 95

4.1a Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and All Nonteachers, 1998 118

4.1b Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and Nonteachers with 13 or More Years of Schooling, 1998 118

4.1c Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and Nonteachers with 17 or More Years of Schooling, 1998 119

4.2a Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and All Nonteachers, 2000 119

4.2b Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and Nonteachers with 13 or More Years of Schooling, 2000 120

4.2c Hourly Income Distribution of Teachers and Nonteachers with 17 or More Years of Schooling, 2000 120

4.3a Salary Differentials between Female Teachers and Nonteachers, 1998 128

4.3b Salary Differentials between Male Teachers and Nonteachers, 1998 128

4.4 Allowances and Monetary Incentives for Teachers, 2002/03 130

4.5 Responses of Principals: "I Agree or Strongly Agree with MINEDUC Regularly Evaluating Schools Receiving State Subsidies" 143

4.6 Responses of Principals: "I Agree or Strongly Agree That MINEDUC Should Provide Resources for Regularly Rewarding the Best Performing Schools" 143

4.7 Responses of Principals: "It Is 'Very Useful,' 'Somewhat Useful,' 'Useful' to Principal's Work That There Is a Monetary Award to Teachers, Associated with School Performance, Financed and Designed to MINEDUC Standards" 144

5.1 Evolution of Enrollment in Basic Education, by Level and Region, 1996-2002: EF1 159

5.2 Evolution of Enrollment in Basic Education, by Level and Region, 1996-2002: EF2 160

5.3 Gross Primary Enrollment Rates by Region, 1994-2000 160

5.4 Net Primary Enrollment Rates by Region, 1994-2000 161

5.5 Percentage of Qualified Teachers by Region, 1996-2002 162

6.1 Salary Progression for Urban Teachers of All Training Levels 194

6.2 Distributions of Salaries for Urban and Rural Teachers 203

6.3 GIS Data for Santa Cruz Schools 209

7.1 Fitted Values of Promotion on Final Points, by Year, for Teachers 225

7.2 Fitted Values of Promotion on Final Points, by Year, for Principals 227

7.3 Stylized Portrayal of Empirical Strategy 232

7.4 Fitted Values of Classroom Test Scores on Initial Points, by Bandwidth for Teachers 235

7.5 Kernel Densities of Test Score for Teachers 239

7.6 Fitted Values of Classroom Test Scores on Initial Points, by Bandwidth and State, for Teachers 241

7.7 Test Scores and Pupil-Teacher Ratios in Year 10 for Teachers 245

7.8 Fitted Values of Classroom Test Scores on Initial Points, by Bandwidth for Principals 246

7.9 Fitted Values of Classroom Test Scores on Initial Points, by Bandwidth and State 248

8.1 Comparison of EDUCO and Traditional Governance Structures 259

8.2 OLS Estimated Coefficients on the EDUCO Variable for Major Influence Level of Key Administrative Processes 274

8.3 Estimated Coefficients for EDUCO Perceived Amount of Influence Compared with Traditional Schools 275

9.1 Model of Effective Community School, With (Some) Testable Hypotheses 310

3.1 Household Surveys 73

3.2 Occupational Codes Included in the Definition of Teachers 75

3.3 Size of Teachers' Sample 77

3.4 Alternative Definitions of Nonteachers 77

3.5 Unconditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: ln(GTN + 1) 79

3.6 Conditional

Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Price Effect from the Oaxaca Decomposition: E[ln(wT)\X]-E[ln(wN)\X] 81

3.7 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Price Effect from the Oaxaca Decomposition: ln(DTN + 1) 84

3.8 Productivity Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Different Samples of Nonteachers: Estimated Endowment Effect from the Oaxaca Decomposition: ln(QTN + 1) 86

3.9 Conditional Log Wage Differential between Teachers and Sample 1 of Nonteachers by Quantile 96

4.1 Monthly Real Salaries of Full-Time (44 Hours) Teachers 107

4.2 Comparison of Teachers' Salaries with the Average Wage and Professionals' Salaries 108

4.3 Comparison of Teachers' Starting Salary with the National Minimum Wage 109

4.4 International Comparisons of Teachers' Salaries, 2001 111

4.5 Total Expenditures of the Ministry of Education, 1990-2001 113

4.6 Average Score for Admission to Teaching Programs 115

4.7 Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Variables in a Comparison of Teachers and Nonteachers, 1998 and 2000 117

4.8 Determinants of Labor Income, Teachers Compared with Nonteachers, 1998 122

4.9 Factors Determining Labor Income, Teachers Compared with Nonteachers, 2000 123

4.10 Breakdown of the Wage of an Average Municipal Sector Teacher, 2003 130

4.11 SNED: Beneficiaries and Resources 132

4.12 Trends in SNED Award Amounts 133

4.13 SNED's Effect on Effectiveness 139

4.14 SNED Relationship to Effectiveness 140

5.1 Mean Per Pupil Spending and Enrollment Rates by Region 155

5.2 Share of Teachers in Grades 1-4 with Credentials Higher Than Primary Education, 1996 156

5.3 Sources and Distribution Mechanisms of FUNDEF Funds, by Government Level 157

5.4 Number of Teachers by Level, Region, and Year 161

5.5 Mean Pupil-to-Teacher Ratio by Level, Region, and Year 162

5.6 Age-by-Grade Distortion by Region, Level, and Year 163

5.7 Annual FUNDEF Per Pupil Allocations by Region, State, and Year 165

5.8 Mean Per Pupil Spending, by Region and Year 166

5.9 Mean Net FUNDEF Per Pupil Allocation and Mean Per Pupil Expenditures, 1998-2002 167

5.10 Means, Standard Deviations, and Gini Coefficients for SAEB Language Scores in 1995, 2001 167

5.11 Means, Standard Deviations, and Gini Coefficients for SAEB Mathematics Scores in 1995, 2001 168

5.12 Stage 1: Effect of Mandated Educational Spending on Actual Educational Spending 173

5.13 Stage 1: Effect of Mandated Educational Spending on Actual Per Pupil Educational Spending, by Geographic Region 174

5.14 Stage 1: With Year-Specific Predictors 174

5.15 State-Level Effects of Spending on Enrollment, by Level 175

5.16 Effects of Educational Spending Per Pupil on Class Size, by Level 177

5.17 Effects of Educational Spending Per Pupil on Share of Teachers with Credentials Higher Than Primary Education, by Level 178

5.18 Effects of Educational Spending Per Pupil on Age-by-Grade Distortion, by Level 179

5.19 Effects of Education Inputs on Age-by-Grade Distortion, by Level 180

5.20 Estimated Effect of Changes in State-Level Mean Per Pupil Spending on Mathematics Student Achievement by Percentile 181

5.21 Estimated Effect of Changes in State-Level Inequality in Per Pupil Spending on Mathematics Student Achievement by Percentile 181

6.1 Base Salaries by Geographic Region and Training Status 190

6.2 Seniority-Based Pay Increases: Escalafon 191

6.3 Salary Structure 192

6.4 A Hypothetical Decomposition of the Teacher Wage Bill 195

6.5 A Decomposition of the Teacher Wage Bill 196

6.6 Distribution of Teachers by Geographic Region and Training Status 199

6.7 Distribution of Teachers by Training and Experience 199

6.8 Types of Schools in the Three Largest Cities 201

6.9 Descriptive Statistics on Teachers 202

6.10 Hours Worked and the Probability of Holding a Second Teaching Job 204

6.11 Student Characteristics in Urban and Rural Schools 206

6.12 Hours Worked by Teachers and Probability of Holding a Second Job 207

7.1 Evaluation Scheme for Carrera Magisterial 217

7.2 Teacher Promotions in Carrera Magisterial 219

7.3 Principal Promotions in Carrera Magisterial 220

7.4 Descriptive Statistics for Teachers 221

7.5 Descriptive Statistics for Principals 222

7.6 Determinants of Teacher Promotion, by State 226

7.7 Determinants of Principal Promotion, by State 229

7.8 Teachers' Initial Points and Classroom Test Scores 237

7.9 Teachers' Initial Points and Classroom Test Scores, within Narrow Bands 238

7.10 Teachers' Initial Scores and Classroom Test Scores: Difference-in-Differences 242

7.11 Principals' Initial Points and School Performance Scores 247

7.12 Principals' Initial Scores and Classroom Test Scores: Difference-in-Differences 249

8.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Municipality-Level Socioeconomic Variables 261

8.2 Means and Standard Deviations of Child and Household Variables, by School Type 262

8.3 Means and Standard Deviations of School, Teacher, Classroom, and Community Varables, by School Type 263

8.4 The Format of Questions on the Administrative Process 265

8.5 Means and Standard Deviations of Decentralization and Perceived Influence Variables 269

8.6 Means and Standard Deviations for Control Variables Used in Administrative Process Regressions 271

8.7 Level of Decentralization: Comparison of OLS Results to Propensity Score and Treatment Effects Results 278

8.8 Influence Level by Group: Comparison of OLS Results to Propensity Score and Treatment Effects Results 279

8.9 Means and Standard Deviations of Control Variables Used in Teacher Behavior Regressions 287

8.10 Means and Standard Deviations of Control Variables Used in Teacher Behavior Regressions 290

8.11 Comparison of OLS Results to Treatment Effects and Propensity Score Matching Results 292

8.12 Means and Standard Deviations of Student Achievement Test Scores 297

8.13 Estimated EDUCO Effects on Mathematics Scores 298

8.14 Estimated EDUCO Effects on Spanish Scores 299

8.15 Estimated Effects on Days of Absence 300

9.1 Sample Overview: Number of Students and Schools (in Parentheses), by Department 316

9.2 Comparisons of Student and Family Characteristics among PROHECO and Control Samples 317

9.3 Comparisons of School Characteristics between PROHECO and Control Samples 318

9.4 Comparisons of Teachers' Characteristics 319

9.5 Comparisons of Teacher Work Hours and Absences 320

9.6 Comparisons of Teacher Salaries and Payment "Issues" 322

9.7 Teacher Earnings Equations 323

9.8 Comparisons of Teaching Strategies 325

9.9 Comparisons of Teacher Planning Strategies, Part 1 326

9.10 Comparisons of Teaching Strategies, Part 2 327

9.11 Comparisons of Teacher Attitudes, Part 1 328

9.12 Comparisons of Teacher Attitudes, Part 2 329

9.13 Comparisons of School Environments According to Students 330

9.14 School Characteristics According to Directors 332

9.15 PROHECO Parameter in Regressions of Teacher and School Effort on Various Groupings of Variables 334

9.16 Summary of Test Scores 336

9.17 OLS Estimates of Determinants of Spanish Achievement, 2002 and 2003 337

9.18 OLS Estimates of Determinants of Mathematics Achievement, 2002 and 2003 339

9.19 OLS Estimates of Determinants of Science Achievement, 2002 and 2003 341

9.20 Breakdown of PROHECO and Control School Achievement Differences, 2003 346

9.21 First-Stage Equations: Binary Probit Estimates of PROHECO Participation, 2002 and 2003 348

9.22 Comparison of PROHECO Achievement Effect Using Predicted and Actual Measure of PROHECO Participation, 2002 and 2003 349

9.23 Ordered Probit Estimates of Student-Reported Absences, 2002 and 2003 352

9.24 OLS Estimates of Determinants of School Average Repetition and Dropout Rates, 2002 and 2003 354

10.1 Control Variables: Third-Grade Mean Values, by School Type 371

10.2 Years of School Autonomy, Third Grade 372

10.3 Third-Grade Descriptive Statistics for Incentive Variables 372

10.4 Third-Grade Descriptive Statistics for Infrastructure and Material Resources, by School Type 373

10.5 Third-Grade Descriptive Statistics for Professional Development, by School Type 374

10.6 Third-Grade Achievement Scores, by School Type 374

10.7 Third-Grade Spanish and Math Scores, by Years of Autonomy 374

10.8 Control Variables: Sixth-Grade Mean Values, by School Type 375

10.9 Years of School Autonomy, Sixth Grade 376

10.10 Sixth-Grade Descriptive Statistics for

Incentive Variables 376

10.11 Sixth-Grade Descriptive Statistics for Infrastructure/Material Resources, by School Type 377

10.12 Sixth-Grade Descriptive Statistics for Professional Development, by School Type 377

10.13 Sixth-Grade Achievement Scores, by School Type 378

10.14 Spanish and Math Scores, by Years of Autonomy 378

10.15 Third-Grade Spanish Achievement 379

10.16 Third-Grade Mathematics Achievement 380

10.17 Third-Grade Mean Difference in Scores between Autonomous and Centralized Schools, by Process 380

10.18 Sixth-Grade Spanish Achievement 381

10.19 Sixth-Grade Math Achievement 382

10.20 Sixth-Grade Mean Difference in Scores between Autonomous and Centralized Schools, by Process 382

11.1 Relationship of Incentives to Attributability of Results 403

11.2 Promotion Criteria According to Ley del Profesorado 408.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

0821362151

082136216X

OCLC:

60349055

Publisher Number:

9780821362150