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Just exchange : a theory of contract / F.H. Buckley.

Van Pelt Library K840 .B82 2005
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Buckley, F. H. (Francis H.), 1948-
Series:
Economics of legal relationships ; v. 8.
The economics of legal relationships ; v. 8
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Contracts.
Physical Description:
xiv, 205 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
Place of Publication:
London ; New York : Routledge, 2005.
Summary:
"F. H. Buckley's new book fills a prominent hole in the literature, explaining economic terms and jargon with welcome clarity and examining the moral basis of free contracting, as well as those cases where bargaining rights might reasonably be restricted. Along the way the book examines several philosophical puzzles, such as allegiance requirements, paternalism and fairness constraints. Buckley approaches fundamental issues of contract law from an economic perspective, though the book is far from being overly technical and will appeal equally to economists, philosophers and law students. This is a welcome addition to the literature on law and economics. This title available in eBook format. Click here for more information. Visit our eBookstore at: www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk.
Contents:
Part I The enforcement of contracts 1
1 The promising game 3
How to create a game 7
Hume on promising 13
The principle of fidelity 17
2 Rival theories of contract law 22
Reliance theories 22
Benefits theories 26
Will theories 27
3 The economic theory of contract law 35
The need for trust 36
Beneficial reliance 38
Credible commitments 41
Substitutes for contract law 43
4 Fidelity to promising 51
Respect, gratitude and consent 51
Natural duties of support 55
Part II The limits of bargaining freedom 61
5 Soft paternalism 63
Minors and incompetents 64
Judgment heuristics 67
Weakness of the will 84
Screening 99
6 Private perfectionism 102
Perfectionism and neutralism 103
Endogenous preferences 108
Internalities 110
Liberal perfectionism and conservative neutralism 111
7 Social perfectionism 116
Moral externalities 116
Common law illegality 119
The harm-to-others principle 121
The disintegration thesis 124
The case for neutralism 131
8 Substantive fairness 136
Game theoretic bargaining solutions 137
Cooperation theories 144
Incentive theories 148
Screening theories 151
Standard form contracts 152
9 Contractarian virtue 157
The cultural contradictions of contract law 158
The Romantic objection 165.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references (pages [174]-197) and index.
ISBN:
0415700264
0415700272
OCLC:
55488142

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