Designing democracy : ideas for better rules / Hans Gersbach.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Gersbach, Hans.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Democracy--Mathematical models.

Democracy.

Elections.

Physical Description:

xi, 243 pages ; 25 cm

Place of Publication:

Berlin : Springer-Verlag, 2005.

Summary:

This book presents a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to improve the functioning of democracies. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. Such a judicious combination can alleviate a wide range of political failures without impairing the principles on which democracies are founded. The second part presents new rules for decision-making, agendas and agenda settings which can transcend the limitations of prevailing democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. An example is flexible majority rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal. The book comprises a sequence of simple models and intuitive explanations of the results they yield.

Contents:

Part I Incentive Contracts and Elections

1.1 The Ideas 3

1.2 The Theme 7

2 Unobservability and Short-Termism in Long-Term Policies 11

2.2 The Model 14

2.3 Fixed and Conditional Reelection Probabilities 18

2.4 Incentive Contracts at the Reelection Stage 21

2.5 Other Sources of Inefficiencies 24

3 Short-Termism and Competition for Incentive Contracts 29

3.2 The Model 33

3.3 Elections 38

3.4 Competition for the Incentive Contracts 41

3.5 Competition Without Commitment 44

3.6 Asymmetric Information 47

4 Reelection Thresholds 53

4.2 The Model 55

4.3 First-Best Solution 58

4.4 The Reelection Mechanism 59

4.5 Threshold Incentive Contracts 62

5 Effort Incentives and Monetary Rewards 67

5.2 The Model 70

5.3 First-Best Solution 74

5.4 The Reelection Mechanism 76

5.5 Self-Financing Incentive Contracts 80

5.6 Robustness and Non-commitment 85

6 Limits to Incentive Contracts in Politics 97

6.2 The Model 99

6.3 Fixed Wages 101

6.4 Competition for Wage Contracts 102

6.5 Welfare Comparisons 106

Part II Rules for Decision-Making and Agenda Setting

7.1 The Ideas 119

7.2 The Theme 122

8 Examples for Agenda Rules 125

8.2 Model and Treatment Rules 127

8.2.1 The Model 127

8.2.2 The Game 129

8.2.3 Constitutional Principles 130

8.2.4 Socially Efficient Solutions 135

8.3 Examples of Constitutions 136

8.3.1 Constitutions for Socially Efficient Projects 137

8.3.2 The Curse of Equal Treatment 142

8.3.3 Constitutions for Socially Inefficient Projects 143

8.4.1 General Constitutions 144

8.4.2 Amendments 146

8.4.3 Secret Ballots 149

9 Flexible Majority Rules 157

9.2 Model and Constitutional Rules 162

9.2.1 The Model 162

9.2.2 Socially Efficient Solutions 163

9.2.3 The Game 165

9.2.4 Constitutional Principles 168

9.3 First-Best Constitutions 171

9.3.1 No Negative Utility 172

9.3.2 Uncertainty Regarding p 176

9.3.3 Uncertainty Regarding p and (1 + [lambda])[kappa] 178

9.3.4 Uncertainty Regarding p,V[subscript h], and (1 + [lambda])[kappa] 179

9.5.1 Formalization of the Implementation Requirement 183

9.5.2 Proofs 185

10 Democratic Mechanisms 191

10.2 Motivation and Approach 194

10.3 Model and Treatment Rules 197

10.3.1 The Model 197

10.3.2 Socially Efficient Solutions 198

10.3.3 The Game 200

10.3.4 Constitutional Principles 203

10.4 First-Best Constitutions 207

10.4.1 Uncertainty About Winners and Losers 208

10.4.2 Uncertainty Regarding V[subscript h] 210

10.4.3 Uncertainty Regarding p 211

10.4.4 Higher Dimensional Uncertainty 213

10.5 Discussion and Alternative Democratic Mechanisms 213

10.5.1 Dictatorial Agenda Setting 213

10.5.2 Equal Treatment Rules 215

10.5.3 Only Project-Winners 216

11 Fair Division 219

11.2 The Model 223

11.3 A Finite Number of Periods 226

11.3.1 Random Recognition 226

11.3.2 Agenda Rules and Equal Distribution 228

11.3.3 Uncertainty About Discount Factors 230

11.4 Division of Resources with Infinite Periods 233.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN:

3540224025

OCLC:

56533514