The metaphysics of autonomy : the reconciliation of ancient and modern ideals of the person / Mark Coeckelbergh.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Coeckelbergh, Mark.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Autonomy (Philosophy)--History.

Autonomy (Philosophy).

Agent (Philosophy)--History.

Agent (Philosophy).

History.

Physical Description:

x, 222 pages ; 23 cm

Place of Publication:

Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Summary:

If we want to be autonomous, what do we want? The author shows that contemporary value-neutral and metaphysically economical conceptions of autonomy, such as that of Harry Frankfurt, face a serious problem. Drawing on Plato, Augustine, and Kant, this book provides a sketch of how "ancient" and "modern" can be reconciled to solve it. But at what expense? It turns out that the dominant modern ideal of autonomy cannot do without a costly metaphysics if it is to be coherent.

Contents:

1 The Modern Ideal of Autonomy 3

1.2 Berlin, Christman, and Feinberg 4

1.3 Frankfurt 5

1.4 Taylor 7

1.5 Further refinements 8

1.5.1 My desires and my life 9

1.5.2 The ideal of having many alternatives 10

1.5.3 Capacity and condition; political autonomy 10

1.5.4 The ideal of 'doing what you want' 11

1.5.5 Inner and outer autonomy 14

1.5.6 Autonomy and morality 17

1.6 Conclusion: A sketch of the modern ideal of the autonomous person 18

2 Ancient Ideals of the Person: Plato and Augustine 19

2.2 Plato's ideal of the person 21

2.2.1 The Phaedrus 21

The charioteer and the horses 21

Plato and madness 23

Dionysian madness and madness in ancient Greek culture 25

2.2.2 Book VII of the Republic 32

2.3 Augustine's ideal of the person 34

2.3.1 On Free Choice of the Will 34

2.3.2 Confessions 40

2.4 The challenge 44

3 Problems with the Modern Ideal: the Need for Extension 46

3.1 Frankfurt and the problem of infinite regress 46

3.2 Taylor 49

3.3 Murdoch 50

3.4 Wolf 53

3.5 Feinberg 56

3.6 'Doing what you want' and the relation between freedom and autonomy 59

3.7 Conclusion: the gap 60

4 Using Plato and Augustine to Fill the Gap 62

4.1 Plato 62

The Phaedrus again 62

Murdoch and Platonic vision 64

Merging ancient and modern ideals of the person 68

Madness 71

4.2 Augustine 74

Plato and Augustine 75

Problems 77

4.3 Conclusion: Overview of the argument in Part I and unresolved questions and difficulties 83

5 Sartrean Existentialism: Extreme Freedom and Groundless Choice 93

5.2 The Sartrean view of autonomy 94

5.3 Why we might want to adopt the Sartrean view of autonomy 95

5.4 What was left out 98

5.5 Objections 100

6 Frankfurt 105

6.2 Frankfurt's ideal 105

6.2.1 Frankfurt's central thesis: Love and care are essential to our autonomy 105

6.2.2 Frankfurt's concept of volitional necessity 106

6.2.3 The ideal of wholeheartedness 111

6.2.4 The necessity of love 112

6.2.5 Being overwhelmed by love versus being overwhelmed by (other) compulsions 113

6.2.6 Frankfurt's anti-Kantian argument 114

6.2.7 Frankfurt's anti-Hobbesian argument 116

6.2.8 Conclusion: Frankfurt's ideal of the autonomous person 117

6.3 The merits of Frankfurt's account 118

1 Filling the 'gap' identified in Frankfurt's earlier account and solving the three problems identified for the extended ideal of autonomy 118

2 Providing good arguments against the ideal of 'doing what you want' 119

3 Providing a good argument against the Sartrean ideal of autonomy 121

6.4 Objections 122

6.4.1 Objections to Frankfurt's arguments (thematic) 122

6.4.2 Consequences 138

1 Frankfurt's account fails to solve the problem of the endless hierarchy of desires 138

2 Frankfurt's account does not deal adequately with the three problems the extended ideal left 140

3 Frankfurt's account cannot be construed as an ideal/the best possible ideal of autonomy 141

Introduction to the Next Chapters: Two Kantian Ideals of Autonomy 146

7 Hill's Ideal of Autonomy 147

7.2 Hill's Kantian ideal of autonomy 147

7.2.1 What the Kantian ideal of autonomy is not, according to Hill 148

7.2.2 What the Kantian ideal of autonomy is, according to Hill 152

7.3 Merits of Hill's ideal: the extent to which he achieves his aims and solves the problems of the extended ideal of autonomy 157

7.4 Why Hill fails to achieve his own aims: Is Hill's ideal Kantian? 160

7.5 Objections to Hill's idea of choice and deliberation 161

7.6 Why Hill fails to solve Problem Three of the extended ideal 166

8 The Ideal of the Person in Kant's Groundwork 169

8.2 The ideal person according to Kant 170

8.2.1 Principles and reasons 170

8.2.2 Autonomy 176

8.2.3 Good will and the good 178

8.2.4 Why Kant's ideal of autonomy is not morally 'neutral' 180

8.2.5 Is self-control a Kantian virtue? More on Kant's second-best ideal of the person 182

8.3 Kant's answer to Problem Three 186

8.3.1 Two contradictory positions on the relation between autonomy and morality 186

8.3.2 The Wille/Willkur distinction reconsidered: Kant's concept of radical evil 189

8.4.1 Kantian autonomy and the extended ideal of autonomy 193.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 205-206) and index.

ISBN:

1403939381

OCLC:

54677709