Games and public administration : the law and economics of regulation and licensing / Georg von Wangenheim.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Wangenheim, Georg von.

Series:

New horizons in law and economics

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Gambling industry--Government policy.

Gambling industry.

Gambling industry--Social aspects.

Gambling industry--Economic aspects.

Social aspects.

Government policy.

Physical Description:

xvi, 259 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm.

Place of Publication:

Cheltenham, UK ; Northhampton, MA : Edward Elgar, [2004]

Contents:

1.1 Licensing to Regulate 1

1.2 Motivation of the Study and Legal Discussion 3

1.3 Structure of Licensing Decisions 5

1.4 Economic Literature on Administrative Procedures 11

1.5 Organization of the Book 17

2 The Simple Inspection Game 21

2.2 Structure and Equilibria of the Game 22

2.3 Appropriateness of Assumptions for Administrative Procedure 26

2.4 Does the Nash Equilibrium Predict Behavior? 32

2.5 Conclusions from the Simple Inspection Game 55

3 Abstention and Falsely Denied Permissions 60

3.1 Linear Disutility of Investigative Effort 60

3.2 Increasing Marginal Disutility of Investigative Effort 64

3.3 Conclusions from Simple 3 x 3 Inspection Games 99

Appendix 3a Proof of Lemma 3.1 104

Appendix 3b Proof of Proposition 3.1 105

Appendix 3c Proof of Proposition 3.2 106

Appendix 3d Proof of Corollary 3.2 107

4 Non-Linear Error Trade-Offs 109

4.2 Properties of Non-Linear Error Functions 110

4.3 Nash Equilibria with Non-Linear Error Trade-Offs 112

4.4 Policy Implications With Non-Linear Error Trade-Offs 120

4.5 Conclusions from Non-Linear Error Trade-Offs 134

Appendix 4a The Slope of p(qi) 139

Appendix 4b Proof of Proposition 4.1 141

5 Endogenous Application Costs 143

5.2 The Queue 144

5.3 Nash Equilibria with Endogenous Application Costs 147

5.4 Stability of Nash Equilibria 160

5.5 Effects on Policy Implications 171

5.6 Conclusions from Endogenous Application Costs 183

Appendix 5a Proof of Lemma 5.1 188

6 Applications 190

6.1 Limits on Administration Time 190

6.2 Rewards and Punishments for Legal and Illegal Applications 196

6.3 Comparing Administration Time Limits and Fine-and-Reward Systems 208

6.4 Signaling by Incurring a Risk of Higher Losses in Case of Denial of Permission 217

6.5 Conclusions from the Applications 218

Appendix 6a Proof of Lemma 6.1 224

7 Summary and Outlook on Further Research 227

7.1 Summary of Main Results 228

7.2 Further Research on Variations of the Model 232.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 245-255) and index.

ISBN:

1843767562

OCLC:

53962317