The Iraq War : strategy, tactics, and military lessons / Anthony H. Cordesman.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Cordesman, Anthony H.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Iraq War, 2003-2011.

Strategy.

Tactics.

Nation-state.

Physical Description:

xiv, 572 pages : maps ; 25 cm

Place of Publication:

Westport, Conn. : Praeger ; Washington, D.C. : Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003.

Summary:

Respected military analyst Anthony H. Cordesman provides the first in-depth examination of key issues surrounding the most significant American war since Vietnam.

Contents:

2 The Limits of Analysis: What We Don't Yet Know 7

3 The Forces Engaged 15

The Changing and Uncertain Nature of Force Ratios 15

Iraq's Misuse of Its Force Strength during the Fighting 18

Failures in Iraqi Leadership 19

The Impact of Seapower 20

The Impact of Airpower 22

The Size and Nature of the Iraqi Air Force 22

The Size and Nature of the Coalition Air Component 24

The Coalition Application of Airpower 28

Effects-based Bombing 28

Anything but a Cakewalk 29

Land-based Air Defenses 32

The Iraqi Air Defense Command 32

The Weakness of Iraqi Air Defenses 34

Iraqi and Coalition Land Forces 36

Coalition Land Forces 37

The Size and Capability of Iraqi Forces 40

The Iraqi Land Force Command Structure 42

The Iraqi Manpower Base 43

The Iraqi Land Force Order of Battle 44

The Deployment of Iraqi Land Forces 45

Iraq's Irregular Forces 47

Iraqi Tank Strength 48

Other Iraqi Armored Equipment Strength 48

Iraqi Artillery Strength 49

Other Iraqi Major Land-Force Weapons 50

Army Aviation 51

Army Air Defenses 51

Other Qualitative Problems 51

The Problem of Future Force Ratios 52

4 The Course of the War and the Interaction of Joint Forces 57

The Beginning of the Conflict: The Decapitation Strike and Initial Land Advance 58

18/19 March: Prelude 60

19/20 March: G-Day 61

Intensive Air Operations and Continuing Land Advances 62

20/21 March 64

21/22 March 65

22/23 March 69

23/24 March 72

24/25 March 73

The Continuing Advance from the South 74

25/26 March 76

26/27 March 77

27/28 March 79

28/29 March 80

29/30 March 82

30/31 March 82

31 March/1 April 85

Regular army 85

Republican Guard forces 86

1/2 April 87

2/3 April 90

3/4 April 92

The "Battle of Baghdad" 94

4/5 April 96

5/6 April 102

6/7 April 104

7/8 April 106

8/9 April 108

9/10 April 112

The End of the Battle of Baghdad and Movement toward Tikrit 114

10/11 April 117

11/12 April 120

12/13 April 124

The End of the Conflict and First Efforts at the Transition to Nation Building 125

13/14 April 126

14/15 April 127

15/16 April 130

16/17 April 133

17/18 April 138

18/19 April 139

19/20 April 141

20/21 April 142

No Clean Ending 144

5 Three Debates: War Plan and Transformation, "Powell Doctrine" Versus "Rumsfeld Doctrine," and The "New Way of War" 149

The War Plan Debate 149

The Political Factors That Make the "War Plan" Debate Largely Moot 153

The Problem of Not Knowing the Detailed History and Nature of the "War Plan" 153

The "New Way of War" Debate 159

The Need to Remember the Past 160

The New "New Way of War"? 160

The "Powell Doctrine" versus "Rumsfeld Doctrine" Debate 163

The Need to Redefine "Decisive Force" 165

The Dangers of American "Triumphalism" 168

6 Lessons About the Interaction Between Military Fundamentals and New Tactics and Technology 173

The Value of Training, Readiness, and Human Factors 174

Innovation and Initiative 176

Morale and Motivation 177

Competence, Adaptiveness, and Flexibility in War Planning 178

Synchronicity, Simultaneity, Speed, Jointness, and Combined Arms 180

Situational Awareness, Intelligence, and Command and Communications 183

The Scale of the IS&R Effort 184

The Limits of IS&R Organization and Integration 184

The Need for Improvisation and Tailoring IS&R Systems to a Given Conflict 190

The Limits of IS&R Capability 193

The Impact of Space Warfare 195

Overall Coalition Superiority 195

Evolving Space into Jointness 196

Space and Communications 198

The Ongoing Evolution of Space 199

The Importance of GPS 200

GPS Jammers and Countermeasures 201

"Owning the Night" and "All-Weather Warfare" 202

The Need for Improved Tactical Support Capabilities 202

The Need for Better Radar and Space Capabilities 203

The Importance of Sustainability 203

Airborne Refueling 204

Logistics and Power Projection 205

Airlift and Sealift 207

The Role of the Reserves 209

7 Lessons Affecting the Overall Conduct of the War and Joint Forces 215

Land Power-Reinforced Air Power and Vice Versa 216

Increased Tempo of Operations: Shock and Awe versus Precision and Focus 218

Netcentric Warfare, IS&R Technology, Processing, Integration, and Near-Real-Time Information Flow and Targeting 219

The Broader Picture: The Need to Restructure U.S. Command and Control Systems and the Possible Need to Restructure Theater Commands 221

Areas for Improvement and Problems at the Battalion Level 222

Target Characterization and Battle Damage Assessment 227

Bandwidth 230

Asymmetric Warfare 231

Friendly Fire and Casualty Issues 238

The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System 240

Blue Force Trackers 243

Postwar Review of Force Plans, Basing, and Transformational Restocking 245

The Broader Implications of Cutting Enemy Casualties and Collateral Damage: A New Dual Standard and Form of Asymmetric Warfare? 246

Iraqi Civilian Casualties 246

Iraqi Military Casualties 247

The Problems with Not Estimating Casualties in a World Seeking "No Casualty" Wars 247

8 Air, Missile, and Land-Based Air Defense Forces 253

Air Dominance 253

Effects-based Bombing: Fundamentally Changing the Effectiveness of Air Power While Limiting Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage 256

Understanding Effects-based Bombing 257

The Pattern of Effects-based Bombing during the War 274

Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage 275

True Precision Air-Strike Capability 276

Understanding the True Meaning of Precision 277

The Scale and Nature of the Coalition Effort 279

In-Flight and Rapid Targeting and Retargeting: Time-Sensitive Strikes 280

Stealth 283

Close Air Support 285

Urban Close Air Support: A Reality under the Right Conditions 285

The Value of Expeditionary Air Power and Problems in Allied Readiness, Interoperability, and Modernization 287

Changes in Air Combat Packages 289

Hard-Target Kill Capabilities 290

Cruise Missiles 291

The Use of Precision Air Munitions 294

Laser-guided Bombs and the JADM 294

Other Guided Weapons and the CBU-105 295

The AGM-130, SLAM, and JSOW 296

British Use of Precision Weapons 297

Dumb Weapons and Strafing 299

The Problem of Cluster Munitions 299

The Bomber and the Advantage of Range-Payload 300

The Continuing Role of the Bomber 301

The impact of the B-1B Lancer 302

The future mix of B-1Bs and B-52s 302

The Impact of Range-Payload on Fighter Attack Aircraft and the F/A-18E/F 303

The Issue of Survivability in Future Wars 304

The Role of the E-8C JSTARS 304

The evolving capabilities of JSTARS 304

Integrating JSTARS into joint warfare 306

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 307

The Predator 307

The Global Hawk 308

The Dragon Eye 309

The Shadow and the Raven 312

The UAV Tactical User Interface 312

UAV Procurement and the UAV Road Map 315

The Strengths and Weaknesses of the A-10 316

The Strengths and Weaknesses of the A-64 Apache and Other Attack Helicopters 317

The Apache and Apache Longbow 317

A Need for Changes in Tactics and/or Technology? 318

The Need for Joint Fixed-Wing and Rotary-Wing Attack Operations? 323

Balancing Lessons from AH-1 Operations 324

The U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier 333

The U.S.

Marine Corps V-22 Osprey 335

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) 335

The Role of the Patriot 338

9 Lessons Affecting Army Land Forces 349

The Value of Main Battle Tanks and Heavy Firepower and Armor 351

Legacy versus Future Combat Systems 351

Tank Losses, Causes, and Lessons Learned 353

"Precision Artillery" as a Partner to "Precision Air Power" 358

The MLRS/ATACMS 359

The Potential Impact of SADARM 360

Special Forces as an Element of Joint Warfare 362

The Tactical Role of Special Forces 362

Technology 363

"Snake Eaters" with Maste's Degrees 364

Tactics of Improved Jointness 365

Urban Land Warfare 365

Maneuverability Rather Than Fighting on Traditional Terms? 366

Force the Defender to Maneuver and Move Outside of Cities 367

Postwar Urban Warfare 367

Research and Re-research on Local Weather and Operating Conditions 368

The Problem of Allied Power Projection, Interoperability, and Allied War-Fighting Capability 368

10 Lessons Affecting Marine Corps Land Forces 373

The Marines: Both "Post-Amphibious" and "Post-Littoral" Forces 374

Detailed Lessons from Marine Forces: Friction and the Continuing Fog of War 375

Lessons from the Combat Assessment Team Report for the Marine Corps Systems Command 381

Lessons from Field Reporting from the 1st Marine Division 388

Marine Corps Artillery 393

Friendly Fire 394

Marine Corps Supply and Logistics 395

11 Lessons Affecting Naval Forces 399

Aircraft Carriers 399

Jointness in Naval Air Operations 400

Jointness in C3, IS&R, and "Open Architecture" 401

Cruise Missile Ships 401

Mine Warfare and Naval Raids 401

Value of Sealift and Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships 402

The Value of Allies 403

12 Lessons Relating to Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction 405

Intelligence Strengths and Weaknesses 405

The Need for Better Assessment, Characterization, and Location of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Key Delivery Systems 407

Key Points in the U.S. and British White Papers 408

Problems in Collecting Data on Iraqi and Other Country WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems 425

Problems in Analyzing Iraqi and Other Country WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems 429

The Politics of Characterizing and Targeting Iraqi WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems 431

Dealing with a proven proliferator 432

Outstanding issues concerning Iraq's compliance with the UN effort 433

The Costs of Politicizing Intelligence 441

The Need for Rapid and Reliable Characterization of Chemical and Biological Agents and the Coalition Intelligence Effort 447

Organized Searches for Weapons of Mass Destruction in Proliferating Countries: The Search during and after the War 450

The Initial Search Effort 451

Expanding the Effort and Creating the Iraq Survey Group 452

Conversion to a Forensic Search Effort 454

Lessons for the Future 455

13 Other Lessons 471

The Role of Women in Combat 471

Military Medical Facilities and Capabilities 471

Safety

Becoming More Critical 472

14 Lessons from Iraqi Problems and Shortcomings 475

Iraq Really Was a Tyranny 476

Iraq Had Rival Politicized, Bureaucratic, and Compartmentalized Forces 476

Wasting the Best Forces Wastes All the Forces 479

Losing the Republican Guards in Open Warfare 479

Making Urban Warfare in Baghdad Difficult to Impossible 480

The Problem of Sanctions and Equipment Modernization 481

Iraqi Wartime Preparations Emphasized the Wrong Ideology and Type of Psychological Operations 482

Iraqi Command and Control: A Blind Force as Well as One without a Brain 483

Iraqi Irregular Warfare Tactics: Unexpected but More an Irritant Than Effective 483

Irregular Tactics Have Limited Success Unless They Have Popular Support 483

Problems in Urban Warfare 484

Iraq Failed to Use Its Weapons of Mass Destruction If It Had Them 484

Other Failures 485

Failure to Use Missiles Effectively 485

Failure to Use Water Barriers 485

Force Protection 485

15 Lessons Regarding the Value of Allies and Build-Up Time 487

Allies and Interoperability 487

The Value of Regional Allies 490

The Value of Rebuilding Alliances 491

16 Military Lessons Relating to Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building 493

The Impact of Limited Military Resources 494

Avoidable Problems 496

Problems in International Coordination 497

Failures in U.S. Policymaking and Leadership 497

Failures at the Field and Tactical Levels 499

A Failure of U.S. Leadership and Organization 504

The Inability of the U.S. Military to Properly Conceptualize and Understand Grand Strategy 506

There Is No "New Way of War" without Successful Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building 508

Intelligence on Conflict Termination and Nation Building 509

Lessons Relating to Political, Diplomatic, and Psychological Warfare 511

Limited Success in Psychological Warfare 511

Long-standing Failures in Public Diplomacy 513

Problems Stemming from the Bush Administration 514

The Strategic and Grand Strategic Aspects of Psychological and Political Warfare 515

The Overall Importance of Conflict Termination as a Critical Part of War Fighting 515

17 Grand Strategy: the Civilian Aspects of Nation Building and the Challenge of Winning the Peace 517

Short-Term Challenges and the Risk of Guerrilla War 517

Nation Building versus Guerrilla Warfare: Best, Worst, and Probable Cases 519

Lessons for Near-Term Action 524

The Medium-Term and Longer-Term Challenges in Nation Building 527

Fracture Lines in the Postwar Infrastructure 529

Political Fracture Lines 536

Internal Political Fracture Lines 536

External Political Fracture Lines 539

Demographic Fracture Lines 542

Economic Fracture Lines 542

Economic Strains and Weaknesses 543

Debt, Reparations, and Contingency Contracts 543

Energy and Oil Export Fracture Lines 544

Iraqi Oil Development Needs 545

Contingency Contracts Signed under Saddam 546

The Ethnic Fracture Lines of Oil Development and Control 547

The Fracture Lines of Oil and Gas Exports 548

Transparency and Conspiracy Theories 551

The New Fracture Lines Caused by Disarmament and the Need to Rebuild Iraqi Military Forces 551

Lessons for Peacemaking and Nation Building 555

18 Grand Strategy: the Outcome of the Iraq War and the New Old Middle East 559

An Example of What? 559

Israel and the Second Intifada 561

Iran 562

Syria 563

Turkey 564

Saudi Arabia and the Southern Gulf States 565

Jordan 566

Egypt 567

North Africa 567

Islamic Extremism and Terrorism 568

The U.S. Role and Presence in the Region 568

Energy Imports and Energy Security 569

The Underlying Factors That Shape the New Old Middle East 570.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN:

0275982270

OCLC:

52821128