Dependencies, connections, and other relations : a theory of mental causation / by Wim de Muijnck.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

De Muijnck, Wim.

Series:

Philosophical studies series ; v. 93.

Philosophical studies series ; v. 93

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Philosophy of mind.

Mind and body.

Causation.

Physical Description:

xxxiii, 284 pages ; 25 cm.

Place of Publication:

Dordrecht ; Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

Summary:

When we do things for reasons, our behaviour seems to be caused by mental states such as beliefs and desires. But how can that be true? Is our body not already moved by 'physical' causes such as nerve impulses and muscle contractions? What difference is made by what is on our minds? It is unsettling that in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind we find widespread doubts about mental causation. For it is at the root of our existence as perceiving, thinking and acting subjects. Dependencies, Connections, and Other Relations. A Theory of Mental Causation covers, in its subsequent parts, ontology, the metaphysics of causation, and the philosophy of mind. It provides a firm theoretical basis for believing that in our all-physical world mental causation is perfectly real, and that it can be understood.

Contents:

I. A Brief History xvii

II. The Five Problems of Mental Causation xxi

ii.i. Mental anomalism xxi

ii.ii. Normativity xxiii

ii.iii. Phenomenal states of affairs xxiii

ii.iv. Externalism xxiv

ii.v. Causal exclusion xxv

III. A Look Forward xxix

iii.i. What we need xxix

iii.ii. What is coming xxxi

Part I. Ontology

Chapter 1 Particulars, Properties, and Relations 1

1.3. How properties are had 4

1.4. States of affairs 5

1.5. Token identity of particulars 7

1.7. Relational properties 11

1.8. Relationism 12

Chapter 2 Physicalism 15

2.1. A negative account of 'physical' 15

2.2. Supervenience and physical realization 16

2.3. The free lunch principle 19

2.4. Arguments for physicalism 21

Chapter 3 A Layered World 25

3.1. Levels of organization 25

3.2. Emergence 26

3.3. Upward causation 28

3.4. Multiple realizability 31

3.5. Relational properties and indirect supervenience 33

3.6. Relational properties and nonlocal supervenience 34

3.7. Against type identity 36

3.8. Non-identity and non-distinctness 39

Part II. Causality

Chapter 4 A Duality in the Concept of Causality 43

4.2. The double face of causality 46

4.3. Dependence and physical connection 47

4.4. Generality and particularity 48

4.5. Theories of causality 50

Chapter 5 Causal Dependence 53

5.1. INUS conditions 53

5.2. Counterfactuals and fixed circumstances 55

5.3. Noncausal conditions 58

5.4. Nonsalient causal conditions 59

5.5. Counting causes and effects 60

5.6. Indeterminism 61

5.7. Collateral effects 63

5.8. Overdetermination 65

5.9. Pre-emption 66

Chapter 6 Causal Connection 73

6.1. From counterfactual dependence to physical connection 73

6.2. The mechanistic approach 74

6.3. Causal processes 76

6.4. First criticism: the at-at theory of causal influence 78

6.5. Second criticism: causation by disconnection 80

6.6. Third criticism: causal relevance 82

6.7. Fourth criticism: the ontology of causal processes 84

6.8. What causal connections are 85

Chapter 7 Unifying Dependence and Connection 87

7.1. Physically linking causes and effects: Kitcher 87

7.2. Physically linking causes and effects: Mackie 87

7.3. Physically linking causes and effects: Dowe 89

7.4. From relations and mechanisms to dependencies and connections 90

7.5. The pairing problem 92

7.6. The pairing principle 94

7.7. Negative causal factors 96

7.8. Why we think causally 99

Chapter 8 Causation and Natural Law 101

8.1. The first problem of mental causation 101

8.2. The nomological approach to causation 101

8.3. Against the notion of 'causal law' 103

8.4. Laws and patterns 105

8.5. Particularism 106

8.6. Perception of causal relations 108

8.7. Causal perception as implicit knowledge 110

8.8. Causal perception: object and content 113

Chapter 9 The Problem of Causal Relata 115

9.1. Causal ontology and mental causation 115

9.2. Hume, Kim, and others 116

9.3. Examples of causal statements 117

9.4. Excluding concrete particulars 118

9.5. Excluding negative states of affairs 118

9.6. Excluding regularities 120

9.7. Properties of states of affairs 121

Chapter 10 Getting Events Wrong 125

10.1. Event mereology 125

10.2. Events according to Davidson 127

10.3. First criticism: causal relations and causal explanations 128

10.4. Second criticism: causal relevance and irrelevance of properties 131

10.5. Third criticism: the need for states of affairs 134

Chapter 11 Getting Events Right 137

11.1. Events according to Kim 137

11.2. The narrative view: events as episodes 138

11.3. In favour of the narrative view 140

11.4. Events, ongoing processes, and states of affairs 143

Chapter 12 Relations as Causal Relata 147

12.1. Relational causal relata 147

12.2. Causal relations as causes 149

12.3. Causal relations as effects 151

Chapter 13 Causal Efficacy 155

13.1. The need for a criterion 155

13.2. Locality and intrinsicness 156

13.3. The criterion of local difference 157

13.4. In favour of the criterion of local difference 158

13.5. Relational properties 161

13.6. The causal efficacy of relational properties 163

13.7. The causal efficacy of the past 166

Chapter 14 Supervenient Causation 169

14.1. Epiphenomenalism or downward causation: a dilemma? 169

14.2. Relationality and causal autonomy 171

14.3. Commensurateness and the correlation principle 172

14.4. Downward causation and causal closure 174

14.5. Downward causation as constraint 175

14.6. Doing versus exploiting causal work 178

Part III. Mind

Chapter 15 The Concept of Mind 183

15.2. Mind presupposes teleology 184

15.3. Mind presupposes representation 187

15.4. Mind presupposes (ir-)rationality 190

15.5. Mind presupposes perception and action 191

15.6. Mind and qualia 194

Chapter 16 Against the Computational Theory 199

16.2. The computational theory of mind 200

16.3. First criticism: epiphenomenalism 201

16.4. Second criticism: lack of psychological realism 202

16.5. Further criticisms 202

16.6. Propositional attitudes as mental models 205

16.7. In favour of the theory of mental models 208

16.8. Propositional attitudes according to interpretationism 209

Chapter 17 Against the Theory Theory 211

17.4. Interpretationism 216

17.5. Simulation theory 216

Chapter 18 Against Internalism 219

18.2. Semantic externalism 221

18.3. Interpretationist externalism 222

18.4. Social and linguistic externalism 223

18.5. Etiological externalism 224

18.6. Environmentalism 225

18.7. Reasons externalism 228

Chapter 19 Against Reductionism 233

19.2. Nagel-reductionism 234

19.3. Functional reductionism 235

19.4. Eliminativism 238

19.5. Reductionism as method 239

Chapter 20 Against Token Physicalism 241

20.2. Mental holism and uncodifiability 241

20.3. The problem of arbitrariness 243

20.4. Weak externalism 245

20.5. Against weak externalism 247

20.6. Actions 248

Chapter 21 The Five Problems Once Again 253

21.1. Mental anomalism 253

21.2. Normativity 254

21.3. Phenomenal states of affairs 256

21.4. Externalism 256

21.5. Causal exclusion 258.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages [261]-271) and indexes.

ISBN:

1402013914

OCLC:

52268830