The world unclaimed : a challenge to Heidegger's critique of Husserl / Lilian Alweiss.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Alweiss, Lilian, 1966-

Series:

Series in Continental thought ; 30.

Series in Continental thought ; 30

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976.

Heidegger, Martin.

Husserl, Edmund, 1859-1938.

Husserl, Edmund.

Physical Description:

xxviii, 243 pages ; 24 cm.

Place of Publication:

Athens : Ohio University Press, [2003]

Summary:

The World Unclaimed argues that Heidegger's critique of modern epistemology in Being and Time is seriously flawed. Heidegger believes he has done away with epistemological problems concerning the external world by showing that the world is an existential structure of Dasein. However, the author argues that Heidegger fails to make good his claim that he has "rescued" the phenomenon of the world, which he believes the tradition of philosophy has bypassed. Heidegger fails not only to reclaim the world but also to acknowledge its loss. Alweiss thus calls into question Heidegger's claim that ontology is more fundamental than epistemology. The World Unclaimed develops its powerful critique of Being and Time by arguing for a return to Husserl. It draws on Husserl's insight that it is the moving and sensing body that discloses how we are already familiar with the world. Kinaesthesia provides a key for understanding our relation to the world. The author thus suggests that thinkers in the vein of Husserl and Kant -who, for Heidegger, epitomize the tradition of modern philosophy by returning to a "worldless subject"- may provide us with the resources to reclaim the phenomenon of the world that Being and Time sets out to salvage. Alweiss's fresh and innovative study demonstrates that it is possible to overcome epistemological skepticism without ever losing sight of the phenomenon of the world. Moreover, Alweiss challenges us to reconsider the relation between Husserl and Heidegger by providing a forceful defense of Husserl's critique of cognition.

Contents:

Chapter 1. Husserl and Heidegger: A Reappraisal of Their Relationship

Why Husserl Is Not an Internalist

1. Husserl, a Methodological Solipsist? 4

2. Object and Meaning Do Not Coincide 5

3. The Structure of Consciousness 6

4. The Problem of Reference 7

5. "The Ontological Turn of the Concept of Evidence" 8

Heidegger's Indebtedness to Husserl

6. Intuitions without Concepts Are Blind 10

7. Categorial Intuition 11

8. Being Is Not a Predicate 12

The Transcendental Turn

10. Husserl and Hume 15

11. The Spectacle of the World 16

12. Ontology versus Epistemology 19

Chapter 2. Toward an "Unworldly" Beginning

Heidegger's Critique

13. Husserl's Cartesianism 23

14. The Incompleteness of Space 24

15. The Bracketing of the Unseen 25

16. An Incompleteness That Is Not Based on Lack 26

17. The Affirmation of an Enclosed Space 27

Toward an "Unworldly" Existence

18. The "Annihilation of the World" 29

19. The Description of Immanent Perception in Ideen I 30

20. Limitations of Ideen I 32

21. Why Lived Experiences Defy an Atomistic Worldview 33

22. Retention as a Primordial Intentionality 34

23. The Identity of the Impression and the Fiction of Atomistic Psychologism 36

24. The Extension of the Present 37

The Problem of "Sensuous Hyle"

25. The Problem of Data-Sensualism 38

26. Inconsistencies in Hua X 40

27. On the Nature of the 'Urimpression'

Husserl and Kant 42

28. A Kantian Phenomenology 43

29. The 'Function' of the Primal Impression 45

30. The Lawful Nature of the Appearing 46

31. The Nature of Protention 48

32. The Prioritization of Protention 49

33. Limitations of Our Account 50

The Enigma of the Consciousness of Time

34. The Shuddering Depths of Internal-Time-Consciousness 52

35. Absolute Consciousness 54

36. A Phenomenological "Transcendental Unity of Apperception" 55

37. The Riddle 57

38. The "Dogma of the Momentariness of a Whole of Consciousness" 58

39. The Double Nature of Retention 59

40. The Sublime Moment of Phenomenology 62

41. The "Annihilation of the World" That Does Not Lead to a Loss 64

The Vigilance of the Subject

42. The Seeing of 'Seeing', or I Can 'See' the 'Seeing' Itself 66

43. An Unconscious Given 67

Chapter 3. Heidegger's Recovery of the World

Dasein's Distinctiveness

44. Nihil Sine Esse Ratione 73

45. Dasein's Distinctiveness 74

46. Toward a Constitution without Subjectivity 76

47. Dasein as Being-in-the-World 77

The Distinctiveness of the World

48. A World without Spectators 79

49. Dasein's Spatiality 81

50. Space Is in the World 83

51. Dasein's Directionality 84

52. The A Priori Perfect 85

53. The World without Dirt 87

The Reluctance to Think Resistance

54. Heidegger's Double Refusal 87

55. The Ignoring of Sensibility 88

56. The Resistance to Thinking Resistance 89

57. The Excess of Life 90

From Resistance to Avoidance

58. The Forestructure of Understanding 92

59. A Circumventive Anteriority of Knowing 93

60. The World of Work as a Form of Circumvention 94

61. A 'Circumvention' Devoid of Teleology 95

62. A Referring without an Indicating 96

63. The Impossibility of Avoiding the Moment of Avoidance 98

64. The Return to Spatiality 100

65. The Avoidance of Spatiality 100

66. A Descriptive Apology 102

67. The Refusal to Return to Dasein's Hands 104

Chapter 4. The Final Loss of the World

From 'Immanent Transcendence' to 'Transcendent Immanence'

68. An Ambiguous Inversion 107

69. The Structure of Reciprocal Dependence 109

70. An Authentic Surrender 110

The Primacy of the World

71. The Indestructible Unity of Being-in-the-World 112

72. The Problem of Space 113

73. The Return to Temporality 115

74. The Primacy of the World Devoid of Space 116

75. Death as the Unmasterable Work That Can Never Be Performed 117

76. An Ambiguous Dis-location of the Unitary Ego Pole 118

77. The Horizonal Schema 120

78. The Return to an Originary Spatiality 122

79. The Struggle between Time and Space 124

80. Dasein Needs No Windows: 'Solus Ipse'! 126

A Defense of Infinity

81. The Denial of a Loss 129

82. The World as a Regulative Idea 131

83. The Fictional Basis of the World 133

84. Phenomenology as a Form of Archaeology 134

85. To Practice Phenomenology Is to Practice Humility 136

Chapter 5. The World Reclaimed

The Return to an Embodied Dasein

86. The Need to Return to an Embodied Dasein 142

87. Heidegger's Reservations 145

88. "The Body as an Outer Brain of Man" 147

89. The Prioritization of Theoretical Consciousness 149

The Body Moves before 'I Can'

The Break with Immanence

90. The Body as the Hyletic Foundation of Consciousness 151

91. The Body That Is Felt 152

92. The Double Apprehension of the Body 153

93. The Primacy of the Sensing Body 155

94. The Reduction of the 'I Can' 155

95. The Latency of Consciousness 156

96. The Spatium Sensibile as the Abiding Correlate of Experience 157

97. Husserl as the True Heir of Kant 158

98. The Absolute 'Hereness' of My Body 160

99. The Refutation of Idealism 161

100. The Objective World 162

101. But the World Does Not Move 163

Appendix. The World That Speaks

(a) A Linguistic Departure 167

(b) The Symbolic Structure of the World 168

(c) Resisting the Hybrid Called 'Language' 171

(d) The Return to Dasein 176

(e) The Fear of Fragmentation 177

(f) The Spatial Basis of Language 178.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages [227]-235) and indexes.

ISBN:

082141464X

OCLC:

49805896