To form a more perfect union : a new economic interpretation of the United States Constitution / Robert A. McGuire.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

McGuire, Robert A. (Robert Allen), 1948-

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

United States. Constitutional Convention (1787).

United States.

Constitutional history--United States.

Constitutional history.

Constitutional law--Economic aspects.

Constitutional law.

Constitutional law--Economic aspects--United States.

United States--Economic conditions--To 1865.

Economic conditions.

Physical Description:

xii, 395 pages ; 25 cm

Place of Publication:

Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2003.

Summary:

Many important questions regarding the creation and adoption of the United States Constitution remain unresolved. Did slave-holdings or financial holdings significantly influence our Founding Fathers' stance on particular clauses or rules contained in the Constitution? Was there a division of support for the Constitution related to religious beliefs or ethnicity? Were founders from less commercial areas more likely to oppose the Constitution? To Form a More Perfect Union successfully answers these questions and offers an economic explanation for the behavior of our Founding Fathers during the nation's constitutional founding. In 1913, American historian Charles A. Beard controversially argued in his book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution were less interested in furthering democratic principles than in advancing specific economic and financial interests. Beard's thesis eventually emerged as the standard historical interpretation and remained so until the 1950s. Since then, many constitutional and historical scholars have questioned an economic interpretation of the Constitution as being too narrow or too calculating, believing the great principles and political philosophies that motivated the Founding Fathers to be worthier subjects of study.

In this meticulously researched reexamination of the drafting and ratification of our nation's Constitution, Robert McGuire argues that Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, George Mason, and the other Founding Fathers did act as much for economic motives as for abstract ideals. To Form a More Perfect Union offers compelling evidence showing that the economic, financial, and other interests of the founders can account for the specific design and adoption of our Constitution. This is the first book to provide modern evidence that both substantiates and challenges many of the overall conclusions found in Charles Beard's An Economic Interpretation. To Form a More Perfect Union presents an entirely new approach to the study of the shaping of the U.S. Constitution. Through the application of economic thinking and rigorous statistical techniques, as well as the processing of vast amounts of data on the economic interests and personal characteristics of the Founding Fathers, McGuire convincingly demonstrates that an economic interpretation of the Constitution is valid. Radically challenging the prevailing views of most historians, political scientists, and legal scholars, To Form a More Perfect Union provides a wealth of new findings about the Founding Fathers' constitutional choices and sheds new light on the motivations behind the design and adoption of the United States Constitution.

Contents:

Prologue: A New Economic Interpretation 3

Chapter 1 The Evolution of the Prevailing Interpretation 15

Chapter 2 Economics and the Constitution 33

Part I The Philadelphia Convention of 1787

Chapter 3 The Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution 49

Chapter 4 Another Look at the Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution 94

Chapter 5 The Choice of the Basic Design of the Constitution 109

Part II The Ratification of the Constitution, 1787-1790

Chapter 6 The Overall Ratification Vote in the Nation 131

Chapter 7 The Ratification Vote within Individual State Conventions 162

Epilogue: The Lessons of 1787 and Ratification 207

Appendix 3 Full and Parsimonius Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention 254

Appendix 4 Personal-Interest and Constituent-Interest Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention 266

Appendix 5 Alternative Voting Model and Hypothesis Tests for Nationalism at the Philadelphia Convention 272

Appendix 6 Voting Models for Pooled Samples of the State Ratifying Conventions 275

Appendix 7 Voting Models for Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia Ratifying Conventions 298.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 365-376) and index.

ISBN:

0195139704

OCLC:

46837023