Wittgenstein's account of truth / Sara Ellenbogen.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Ellenbogen, Sara.

Series:

SUNY series in philosophy

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig.

Truth.

Physical Description:

xv, 148 pages ; 24 cm.

Place of Publication:

Albany : State University of New York Press, [2003]

Summary:

Wittgenstein's Account of Truth challenges the view that semantic antirealists attribute to Wittgenstein: that we cannot meaningfully call verification-transcendent statements "true." Ellenbogen argues that Wittgenstein would not have held that we should revise our practice of treating certain statements as true or false, but instead would have held that we should revise our view of what it means to call a statement true. According to the dictum "meaning is use, " what makes it correct to call a statement "true" is not its correspondence with how things are, but our criterion for determining its truth. What it means for us to call a statement "true" is that we currently judge it true, knowing that we may some day revise the criteria whereby we do so.

Contents:

Part I From "Meaning is Use" to the Rejection of Transcendent Truth 1

1. Wittgenstein's Rejection of Realism versus Semantic Antirealism 2

2. The Positive Account of Truth 6

3. Antirealism Revisited 19

Part II From "Meaning is Use" to Semantic Antirealism 25

4. The Acquisition Argument and the Manifestation Criterion 27

5. Antirealism Presupposes Realism 34

6. Tensions Between Wittgenstein and Dummett 44

7. Semantic Antirealism Is Inconsistent 55

Part III Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? 59

8. Criteria and Justification Conditions 61

9. Criteria and Realist Truth Conditions 75

10. Why Criteria Are Not Defeasible 83

11. Criterial Change, Conceptual Change, and Their Implications for the Concept of Truth 90

12. Why a Revisionist Account of Truth? 110.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 137-144) and index.

ISBN:

0791456250

0791456269

OCLC:

49743630