Instrumental rationality and moral philosophy : an essay on the virtues of cooperation / by Bruno Verbeek.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Verbeek, Bruno.

Series:

Theory and decision library. Philosophy and methodology of the social sciences ; Series A, v. 33.

Theory and decision library. Series A, Philosophy and methodology of the social sciences ; v. 33

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Cooperativeness.

Physical Description:

xii, 286 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm.

Place of Publication:

Dordrecht ; Boston : Kluwer Academic Publishers, [2002]

Summary:

This book deals with a fundamental problem in political and moral philosophy: why should an otherwise rational agent comply with norms? The book is unique in that it deals with this question against the background of previously unconnected work in areas as diverse as evolutionary game theory, moral philosophy, action theory, formal decision theory, and social psychology. The author argues that standard rational choice analyses fail to explain several crucial features of norm-guided behavior. A complete analysis of the reasons rational agents have for compliance with norms has to include an account of specific virtues, such as trust and fairness. In order to accommodate these virtues in the theory of rational choice, Verbeek argues that we need to give up the inherently forward-looking character of instrumentally rational deliberation. Audience: This book will be of interest to students, philosophers, and economists, as well as other social theorists interested in norms.

Contents:

1.1 Norms 1

1.2 Rationality in action 2

1.3 Norms and rationality 4

Chapter 2 Conventionalism and Moral Motives 9

2.1 The two theses of conventionalism 9

2.2 The scope of conventionalism 11

2.3 Characteristics of norms 16

2.4 Conventions of coordination 18

2.5 Intermezzo: learning by experience 25

2.6 More conventions: norms of property 30

2.7 Conventions of reciprocity 35

2.8 Salience 40

2.9 Salient payoffs 44

2.10 The conventional character of salience 48

2.11 Breaking the convention 51

2.12 Sanctions, stability, and social cost 56

2.13 Resentment 65

2.14 Moral force and resentment 67

2.15 Conclusions and prospects 73

Appendix to Chapter 2: the production of sanctions 77

Chapter 3 Motives for Unconditional Cooperation 85

3.1 A first objection 85

3.2 Altruism 86

3.3 Altruistic cooperation and norm compliance 93

3.4 A cooperative virtue? 99

3.5 Process-oriented preferences for cooperation 102

3.6 Kantianism 106

3.7 The categorical imperative 114

3.8 Kantianism rejected 119

3.9 Unconditional cooperation? 121

Chapter 4 Motives for Conditional Cooperation: reciprocity, trust and fairness 125

4.2 Reciprocity 126

4.3 Reciprocity and cooperation 130

4.4 Trust and trustworthiness 134

4.5 Trust and cooperation 137

4.6 The secondary nature of resentment 142

4.7 Exploitation, parasites, and free riders 145

4.8 Reciprocity and nonexploitation 152

4.9 Reciprocity and fairness 153

Chapter 5 Virtuous Motives: restraint and spontaneity 159

5.2 Aristotle on virtues 160

5.3 Kant on virtues 162

5.4 Hume on virtues 166

5.5 Foot on the virtues 170

Chapter 6 Evolution of the Cooperative Virtues: an indirect justification 177

6.2 The theory of evolution 183

6.3 For the benefit of the group 189

6.4 For the benefit of kin 192

6.5 For mutual benefit 195

6.6 The commitment model 199

6.7 The role of signals in the commitment model 205

6.8 The reliability of signals 208

6.9 How convincing is evolutionary theory? 214

Chapter 7 The Rationality of Plans: requirements of dynamic choice 217

7.2 Plans and dynamic choice 218

7.3 Can SR, NEC, DC, and SEP always be satisfied? 222

7.4 Three responses 225

7.5 Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: SR 228

7.6 Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: NEC 229

7.7 Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: DC 231

7.8 Defending the conditions of plan acceptance: SEP 235

7.9 SEP and personal identity 239

7.10 On myopia, sophistication, and resoluteness 243

7.11 Changing preferences and the need for commitment 245

Chapter 8 The Rationality of Strategic Intentions: a justification of the cooperative virtues 249

8.2 The planning theory of intentions 249

8.3 Strategic intentions and the prisoners' dilemma 255

8.4 Limitations of the argument 263

8.5 Conclusions and further issues 268.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages [273]-281) and index.

ISBN:

140200639X

OCLC:

49806053