Interpreting probability : controversies and developments in the early twentieth century / David Howie.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Howie, David, 1970-

Series:

Cambridge studies in probability, induction, and decision theory

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Probabilities.

Bayesian statistical decision theory.

Jeffreys, Harold, 1891-1989.

Jeffreys, Harold.

Fisher, Ronald Aylmer, Sir, 1890-1962.

Fisher, Ronald Aylmer.

Physical Description:

xi, 262 pages ; 24 cm.

Place of Publication:

Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Contents:

1.1 The meaning of probability 1

1.2 The history of probability 2

1.3 Scope of this book 4

1.4 Methods and argument 5

1.5 Synopsis and aims 11

2 Probability up to the Twentieth Century 14

2.2 Early applications of the probability calculus 15

2.3 Resistance to the calculation of uncertainty 17

2.4 The doctrine of chances 19

2.5 Inverse probability 23

2.6 Laplacean probability 27

2.7 The eclipse of Laplacean probability 28

2.8 Social statistics 33

2.9 The rise of the frequency interpretation of probability 36

2.10 Opposition to social statistics and probabilistic methods 38

2.11 Probability theory in the sciences: evolution and biometrics 41

2.12 The interpretation of probability around the end of the nineteenth century 47

3 R.A. Fisher and Statistical Probability 52

3.1 R.A. Fisher's early years 52

3.2 Evolution - the biometricians versus the Mendelians 53

3.3 Fisher's early work 56

3.4 The clash with Pearson 59

3.5 Fisher's rejection of inverse probability 61

3.5.1 Fisher's new version of probability 61

3.5.2 The papers of 1921 and 1922 62

3.5.3 The Pearson-Fisher feud 65

3.6 The move to Rothamsted: experimental design 70

3.7 The position in 1925 - Statistical Methods for Research Workers 72

3.8 The development of fiducial probability 75

3.9 Fisher's position in 1932 79

4 Harold Jeffreys and Inverse Probability 81

4.1 Jeffreys's background and early career 81

4.2 The Meteorological Office 83

4.3 Dorothy Wrinch 85

4.4 Broad's 1918 paper 87

4.5 Wrinch and Jeffreys tackle probability 89

4.6 After the first paper 92

4.6.1 General relativity 92

4.6.2 The Oppau explosion 94

4.6.3 New work on probability - John Maynard Keynes 96

4.6.4 Other factors 101

4.7 Probability theory extended 103

4.7.1 The Simplicity Postulate 103

4.7.2 The papers of 1921 and 1923 107

4.8 The collaboration starts to crumble 109

4.9 Jeffreys becomes established 111

4.10 Probability and learning from experience - Scientific Inference 113

4.10.1 Science and probability 113

4.10.2 Scientific Inference 114

4.11 Jeffreys and prior probabilities 119

4.11.1 The status of prior probabilities 119

4.11.2 J.B.S. Haldane's paper 121

4.12 Jeffreys's position in 1932 126

5 The Fisher-Jeffreys Exchange, 1932-1934 128

5.1 Errors of observation and seismology 128

5.2 Fisher responds 133

5.3 Outline of the dispute 137

5.4 The mathematics of the dispute 139

5.5 Probability and science 143

5.5.1 The status of prior probabilities 144

5.5.2 The Principle of Insufficient Reason 148

5.5.3 The definition of probability 150

5.5.4 Logical versus epistemic probabilities 152

5.5.5 Role of science: inference and estimation 154

6 Probability During the 1930s 171

6.2 Probability in statistics 172

6.2.1 The position of the discipline to 1930 172

6.2.2 Mathematical statistics 173

6.2.3 The Neyman-Fisher dispute 176

6.2.4 The Royal Statistical Society 180

6.2.5 The reading of Fisher's 1935 paper 183

6.2.6 Statisticians and inverse probability 187

6.3 Probability in the social sciences 191

6.3.1 Statistics in the social sciences 191

6.3.2 Statistics reformed for the social sciences 194

6.3.3 The social sciences reformed for statistics 197

6.4 Probability in physics 199

6.4.1 General remarks 199

6.4.2 Probability and determinism: statistical physics 199

6.4.3 Probability at the turn of the century 202

6.4.4 The rejection of causality 204

6.4.5 The view in the 1930s 206

6.4.6 The interpretation of probability in physics 209

6.4.7 Quantum mechanics and inverse probability 211

6.5 Probability in biology 213

6.6 Probability in mathematics 216

6.6.1 Richard von Mises's theory 216

6.6.2 Andrei Kolmogorov's theory 219

Appendix 2 Bayesian Conditioning as a Model of Scientific Inference 235.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 239-251) and index.

ISBN:

0521812518

OCLC:

48084073

Online:

Publisher description