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Deontic morality and control / Ishtiyaque Haji.

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Van Pelt Library BJ1461 .H255 2002
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Format:
Book
Author/Creator:
Haji, Ishtiyaque.
Series:
Cambridge studies in philosophy
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Free will and determinism.
Ethics.
Duty.
Physical Description:
xiv, 288 pages ; 24 cm.
Place of Publication:
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, [2002]
Contents:
Two Parallel Riddles 1
Primary Goals 5
Prospectus 8
Part 1 Determinism and Deontic Morality
2 Obligation and Control 13
Fundamentals of Moral Obligation 14
'Can' and Obligation 16
3 Frankfurt-Type Cases and Deontic Control 25
Frankfurt-Type Examples 26
A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Wrong Actions 27
Principle CK and Wrongness 27
The Plausibility of Principles CK and WC 29
A Requirement of Alternative Possibilities for Deontic Morality 31
An Alternative Argument 33
4 Control Requirements of Deontic Anchors: Some Objections 36
Objections to K and Replies 36
Frankfurt-Type Cases and K 37
A Widerkerian Objection against K 37
An Objection from Counterintuitiveness 41
Fischer against K 43
A Direct Threat against K from Frankfurt-Type Examples 46
Self-Imposed Impossibility and K 47
Pereboom on OW 52
Genuine Moral Dilemmas and OW 53
Appendix Yaffe on K 54
5 Determinism and Deontic Anchors 59
The Consequence Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Alternative Possibilities 60
Some Objections and Replies 62
Why Determinism Undermines Deontic Anchors 65
Objections to the New Incompatibility Thesis and Replies 70
Appendix Saka on 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Determinism 77
Part 2 Indeterminism and Deontic Morality
6 Transition: From Determinism to Indeterminism 87
Synopsis 89
R-Libertarianism 91
Modest Meleian Libertarianism 92
An Objection and a Reply 95
Modest Meleian Libertarianism and Deontic Anchors 101
7 Robust Modest R-Libertarianism and Luck 104
Robust Modest R-Libertarianism 105
Robust R-Libertarianism and the Luck Objection 107
Picking up the Gauntlet 110
Refining PCEC 113
Support for NCC 117
Robust R-Libertarianism and Deontic Morality 120
8 Robust Modest R-Libertarianism and Deontic Anchors 122
The Problem and the Outlines of a Solution 122
A Case of CNC Manipulation: Psychohacker 125
Robust Modest R-Libertarianism and CNC Manipulation 127
Hierarchical Control and CNC Manipulation 133
Normative Agency and CNC Manipulation 135
Deontic Morality and CNC Manipulation 138
Antecedent Contrastive Control, Moral Responsibility, and Deontic Anchors 142
Part 3 Consequences of Being Deprived of Deontic Anchors
9 The Significance of the Possibility of Being without Deontic Anchors 151
Transition and Synopsis 151
Smilansky on the Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism 153
Pereboom on the Consequences of Determinism 155
10 Determinism, Deontic Anchors, and Appraisability 162
Possible Justifications for the Objective View 164
Supererogation, Suberogation, and the Objective View 167
The Supererogatory and the Suberogatory 167
Appraisability, the Supererogatory, and the Suberogatory 170
Rejecting an Alleged Asymmetry between the Super-and the Suberogatory 176
Praiseless Supererogation and Blameless Suberogation 177
The Objective View and the Significance of Alternative Possibilities 182
The Argument from Fairness 184
Two Faces of Responsibility 191
Appendix A Direct Challenge to the Objective View 194
11 Virtue Ethics without Metaphysical Freedom 197
An Outline of a Version of Virtue Ethics 198
Broad Contours of Another Virtue-Ethical Theory 202
The Many Faces of Morality and the Autonomy of Deontic Appraisals 205
Appendix Kekes on K 211
12 On the Connection between Morality's Dethronement and Deontic Anchors 221
The Overridingness Thesis 221
A Confusion Revealed 225
Slote on Overridingness 226
Kekes on Overridingness 230
Shortcomings of the Overarching Standard
Reason 234
On Reason's Dethroning Morality 235
Some Interim Conclusions 237
Overridingness and Culpability 239
A New Pair of Skeptical Arguments 242
On Not Being Sources of Deontic Morality 246.
Notes:
Includes bibliographical references (pages 272-281) and index.
ISBN:
0521813875
OCLC:
47930709

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