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Self-interpretation and emotion / Marc Andrew Cohen.

LIBRA Diss. POPM2002.163
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LIBRA B001 2002 .C678
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LIBRA Microfilm P38:2002
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Format:
Book
Manuscript
Microformat
Thesis/Dissertation
Author/Creator:
Cohen, Marc Andrew.
Contributor:
Hatfield, Gary, advisor.
University of Pennsylvania.
Language:
English
Subjects (All):
Penn dissertations--Philosophy.
Philosophy--Penn dissertations.
Local Subjects:
Penn dissertations--Philosophy.
Philosophy--Penn dissertations.
Physical Description:
xi, 193 pages ; 29 cm
Production:
2002.
Summary:
In this dissertation I argue that self-interpretive processes play a central role in the production of emotions.
I begin in Chapter One by reconstructing Charles Taylor's work on the subject: I use Taylor as a starting point in order to set out two theses about the role of self-interpretation in emotion. According to the first thesis, we interpret physiological responses to events and situations in order to produce emotions; this I call direct self-interpretation, and the process results in the assignment of meaning or aboutness to the response. I argue that without this meaning responses are not emotions or emotional. According to the other thesis we interpret ourselves and our relationships to others in order to establish a background against which emotion-producing appraisals can be made; this I call indirect self-interpretation.
In the chapters that follow I appeal to literature in experimental psychology to show that these theses are plausible. In Chapters Two and Three I show that direct self-interpretation is at work in the (supposedly) basic emotions, emotions for which a reflex-like appraisal process produces a physiological response. And in the fourth chapter I extend this account to the formation of all emotions. In that chapter I outline two comprehensive (though speculative) accounts of emotion, according to which what are called non-basic emotions are also the product of direct self-interpretation. On the one I take to be more plausible, non-basic emotions are formed in two stages: first, there is a reflex-like appraisal of a situation in general terms, for example, an appraisal of a situation as being one of social conflict, and second, the direct self-interpretation of the response produces a particular emotion, like shame, envy, or anger. Finally, in the Postscript I describe the recent the literature on the construction of emotion. I argue that most of the claims running through that literature are not compelling, but the claim that emotions are constructed in virtue of the role played by indirect self-interpretation should not be controversial.
Notes:
Supervisor: Gary Hatfield.
Thesis (Ph.D. in Philosophy) -- University of Pennsylvania, 2002.
Includes bibliographical references.
Local Notes:
University Microfilms order no.: 3054932.
OCLC:
244972745

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