Essays on auctions with inter-dependent valuations / Sérgio Orioli Parreiras.

Format:

Book

Manuscript

Microformat

Thesis/Dissertation

Author/Creator:

Parreiras, Sérgio Orioli.

Contributor:

Mailath, George J., advisor.

University of Pennsylvania.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Penn dissertations--Economics.

Economics--Penn dissertations.

Local Subjects:

Penn dissertations--Economics.

Economics--Penn dissertations.

Physical Description:

x, 105 pages ; 29 cm

Production:

2001.

Summary:

Auctions that generate a significant revenue---high stakes auctions---have the common feature that the buyers' valuations share a significant common-value component. This is certainly true for spectrum license rights, privatization and oil drilling rights auctions. Nonetheless, even art auctions may exhibit a significant common-value component due to the resale possibility. In the three essays of this thesis two elements that play an important role in high stakes auctions are analyzed: the role of financial constraints and asymmetric information.

Second price auctions with budget constrained bidders. In this essay, Hanming Fang and I characterize the equilibrium of the second-price auction with budget constrained bidders.

Information revelation with budget constrained bidders. In this essay, Hanming Fang and I show that when buyers are financially constrained, it is no longer optimal for the auctionneer to commit to a policy of revealing all her available information.

Common value auction with asymmetrically informed bidders. In this final essay, I analyze common-value auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders. For the two-bidder case, I characterize the equilibrium of the first-price auction and select an equilibrium for the second-price auction. A recursive method to explicitly compute these equilibria is uncovered. Then, it is shown that, also under informational asymmetries, the second-price equilibrium yields more revenue than the first-price equilibrium. And, surprisingly, a bidder may benefit when her competitor becomes better informed. Moreover, she might even obtain a larger surplus than her better-informed competitor.

Notes:

Supervisor: George J. Mailath.

Thesis (Ph.D. in Economics) -- University of Pennsylvania, 2001.

Includes bibliographical references.

Local Notes:

University Microfilms order no.: 3031707.

OCLC:

244972610