Dynamic games of political influence / Nicolas Sahuguet.

Format:

Book

Manuscript

Microformat

Thesis/Dissertation

Author/Creator:

Sahuguet, Nicolas, 1973-

Contributor:

Mailath, George J., advisor.

University of Pennsylvania.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Penn dissertations--Economics.

Economics--Penn dissertations.

Local Subjects:

Penn dissertations--Economics.

Economics--Penn dissertations.

Physical Description:

ix, 139 pages ; 29 cm

Production:

2001.

Summary:

Attempts to influence decision making can take many forms: electoral campaigns, advertising, voting, lobbying. The final outcome is often the result of a complex interaction of strategic behaviors where every actor tries to influence the process to his advantage.

The first chapter "Existence of equilibrium in a war of attrition for heterogenous prizes" analyzes a war of attrition with three symmetric players competing for two distinct prizes. When the first player to concede does not get any prize, each player exit's time is an increasing function of its type. But when the first player to concede can get the small prize (for instance, the first person to volunteer for serving in a committee may choose which task to perform), equilibrium strategies need no longer be strictly increasing. More importantly, a symmetric equilibrium can often fail to exist.

The second chapter "Dynamic all-pay auctions", joint with J. Horner, studies an all-pay auction where two players can spread their bids over two periods. The first period bid is used to influence payoffs and beliefs of the opponent. The analysis reveals who is bluffing, creating an impression of strength that lures their opponent into unwarranted pessimism; and who is sandbagging, creating an impression of weakness that lures their opponent into unwarranted optimism.

The third chapter "Campaign financing and equitable political outcomes", joint with N. Persico, is a model where parties, which differ in the strength of their popular appeal, choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party with less popular appeal has an incentive to "sell out" to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in popular appeal, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome.

Notes:

Supervisor: George J. Mailath.

Thesis (Ph.D. in Economics) -- University of Pennsylvania, 2001.

Includes bibliographical references.

Local Notes:

University Microfilms order no.: 3015365.

OCLC:

244971900