Learning and coordination : inductive deliberation, equilibrium, and convention / Peter Vanderschraaf.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Vanderschraaf, Peter, 1962-

Series:

Studies in ethics (New York, N.Y.)

Studies in ethics

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Social interaction--Mathematical models.

Social interaction.

Socialization--Mathematical models.

Socialization.

Game theory.

Mathematical models.

Physical Description:

xix, 222 pages ; 24 cm.

Place of Publication:

New York : Routledge, 2001.

Summary:

Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.

Contents:

1 Social Interaction and Principles of Rational Decision 3

1.1 Examples of Social Coordination Problems 6

1.2 Noncooperative Games 14

1.3 Nash Equilibrium 28

1.4 Examples Revisited 36

1.5 Equilibrium-in-Beliefs 47

2 Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibrium Concepts 53

2.1 Rationalizability 55

2.2 Correlated Equilibrium Concepts 65

2.3 Correlated Equilibrium, Rationalizability, and Ratifiability 82

3 Equilibrium Selection via Inductive Dynamic Deliberation 99

3.1 The Dirichlet Rule 100

3.2 Inductive Deliberation with Endogenous Correlation 111

3.3 Correlating with "States of the World" 131

3.4 Dirichlet Dynamics with Imperfect Memory 149

3.5 Random Sampling Dirichlet Deliberation 163

3.6 Deliberators with Variable States 176

4 The Emergence of Social Convention 185

4.1 Lewis' Characterization of Conventions 187

4.2 Convention as Correlated Equilibrium 194

4.3 Dynamical Explanations of Conventions 201.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references (pages 213-218) and index.

ISBN:

0815340397

OCLC:

44926954