Sortals and the subject-predicate distinction / Michael Durrant ; edited, with a postscript by Stephen Horton.

Format:

Book

Author/Creator:

Durrant, Michael.

Contributor:

Horton, Stephen.

Language:

English

Subjects (All):

Predicate (Logic).

Language and logic.

Semantics (Philosophy).

Physical Description:

xvi, 316 pages ; 24 cm

Place of Publication:

Aldershot ; Burlington, Vt. : Ashgate, [2001]

Contents:

B. Sortals, Names, Descriptions, Predicables, Substantival General Terms, Predicates 5

C. Plan of Campaign 9

I Sortals, Names and Predicables 13

A. Sortals: a Detailed Investigation 13

B. That Sortals are a Distinct Category of Symbol in that they are not Reducible to Names or Predicables/Predicates 24

C. Considerations on a General Thesis which may arise from the claim that Sortals are not Reducible to Predicables/Predicates 31

II Sortals and Identification 40

Part I The Priority of Sortal Identification over both Naming/Referring and Predication 40

A. Of the Priority of Sortal Identifying over Naming/Referring 40

B. A Case in which Referring may be taken as prior to Identifying 43

C. Consideration of a general attack on my thesis that Sortal Identification is prior to Naming/Referring 44

D. Some general arguments in favour of the thesis that Sortal Identification is prior to Describing or Predicating 49

Part II The Contribution of Gareth Evans 52

E. An introduction to Evans: His concept of 'Demonstrative Identification' 52

F. That Sortal Identification is logically prior to Demonstrative Identification 53

G. The Case against Demonstrative Identification (1): the Misconstruction of Demonstrative Sortal Phrases 53

H. The Case against Demonstrative Identification (2): Consideration of a stronger and weaker thesis as regards its base 56

I. That Demonstrative Identification (in Evans' sense) rests on, presupposes, Descriptive Identification in his sense and indeed on Sortal Identification 62

J. In that Demonstrative Identification is to be regarded as a mode of Identification, as opposed to a mode of Reference, it is reducible to Sortal Identification, in the sense of 'Sortal "Picking-Out"', 'Sortal "Discrimination"' 69

K. Of the relationship of 'Descriptive Identification' to 'Sortal Identification' and 'Predicate Identification' 72

L. Summary of Conclusions from Part I and Part II 75

Part III Thought and Speech 76

M. Of Evans' general thesis that Identification in Thought is prior to Identification in Speech 76

III Sortals and the Subject-Predicate Distinction 88

A. Strawson's Objections to Geach's Explanation of the Subject-Predicate Distinction 88

B. Strawson's 'Mediating' Criterion for the Subject-Predicate Distinction 94

C. An Attempted Account of what distinguishes an expression occurring in the role of Logical Subject 102

D. An Attempted Account of what distinguishes an expression occurring in the role of Logical Predicate 103

E. A more Precise Account of the Relation between Sortals and the Subject-Predicate Distinction 108

F. A Contrast with Quine 111

G. The Issue of a Criterion for the Subject-Predicate Distinction 123

H. An Account of the Relations between Referring, Identifying and Existence 125

I. Explanations of the Subject-Predicate Distinction in the sense of Answers to Two Questions 136

IV General Consequences of the Failure to Acknowledge the Category of the Sortal 148

A. The Attempted Reduction of Sortals to Predicates and its consequences 148

B. The consequences of failure to recognise the Sortal as a Principle of Counting and Distinction in its own right and equally those of the failure to recognise principles of Counting and Distinction in their own right formed from 'Matter' terms 151

C. Some Elucidations and Expansions 153

D. Summary of the General Consequences of the failure to acknowledge the Category of the Sortal 156

V Frege: Sortals as 'Concepts' 159

A. That Frege fails to recognise both the definite and indefinite form of the Sortal as a Distinct and Primary Category of general symbol (expression) 159

B. Some consequences and difficulties which arise from Frege's failure to recognise the Sortal as a Distinct and Primary Category of general symbol (expression) 165

C. Is Frege committed to a doctrine of absolutely simple names and correspondingly, absolutely simple particulars, as a consequence of his failure to acknowledge the Category of the Sortal? 169

VI Russell: Sortals as 'Descriptions' 181

A. Russell's basic Categories of Symbol 181

B. That no case can be made for Russell's implicit recognition of Sortals in his Theory of Descriptions 183

C. Particular Difficulties in Russell's position 187

D. Consequences of Russell's failure to acknowledge the Category of the Sortal 190

E. That Russell is committed to a doctrine of absolutely simple, basic Names and concomitantly to a doctrine of absolutely simple or 'pure' particulars 191

VII Geach: Sortals, Substantival General Terms and General Names 194

A. Geach's recognition of the category of Substantival General Term does not entail recognition of the category of the Sortal as either basic or distinctive 194

B. Geach's reduction of Substantival General Terms to Names or Predicables (Predicates) and its difficulties 195

C. Further criticisms of Geach's thesis that the introduction of Proper Names merely presupposes the introduction of Names 200

D. The disastrous Consequences of reducing Substantival General Terms and Sortals to Names or Predicables (Predicates) 204

VIII Strawson: Sortals - Failure to Recognise Their True Nature; His Dual Position 209

A. The Claim that Strawson recognises the true nature of the Sortal 209

B. That Strawson regards predicate expressions as a kind of Name, Sortal expressions as predicates and hence as a kind of Name 210

C. That Strawson also treats Sortal expressions as Predicative 215

D. A Summary Statement of Strawson's 'Dual Position' 216

E. Some General Difficulties for Strawson's 'Category' criterion for the Subject-Predicate Distinction 217

IX Strawson: Sortals and Sortal Instantiation 220

A. That for Strawson one can raise the Question: 'What Instances a Sortal Universal?'; that Strawson is not committed to either a Doctrine of 'Pure' or 'Relatively Pure' Basic Particulars 220

B. The Case for saying that Strawson is committed to either an unintelligible and/or impossible Account or no Account of what constitutes an Instance of a Sortal 225

X Strawson: Further Consequences of Failure to Recognise the Nature of the Sortal 229

A. That to treat Sortals as Predicates (indirectly) leads to the Search for a Basis for the Introduction of 'Particulars in General' 229

B. A Second Consequence of the Failure to recognise the Nature of the Sortal: the Search for a Basic Notion of an 'Instance' or Explanation of the Notion of an 'Individual Instance' 250

C. A Third Consequence of the Failure to recognise the Nature of the Sortal: the Search for an Underlying Basis for the Subject-Predicate Distinction in the sense of the Search for a certain type of Empirical proposition 252

XI Quine: Sortals and Canonical Notation 256

A. That Quine fails to recognise the Category of the Sortal and analyses Sortals out in favour of the Variables of Quantification and Predicates 256

B. Consequences of the Failure to recognise the Category of the Sortal 263

C. A Suggested Implication of my Thesis Rejected 268

D. Quine's Aims and Claims for the Theory of Canonical Notation 269

B. Theories of Reference 280

C. Formal Logic 285

D. Comparative Philosophy: The Analytic/Continental Divide 288.

Notes:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN:

075461378X

OCLC:

44737437